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Preface 
 
 
My interest in econometric modelling of producer behaviour was triggered 
when I started as a freshman at the Research Department of Statistics Norway 
in the early 1990s. However, drawn by the waters of Western Norway, I left 
Statistics Norway already in 1994 to pursue a career with economic research, 
strategy and communication in the finance and petroleum industries. Since 
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behaviour and market interaction among international oil and gas companies. 
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StatoilHydro has been the primary champion of this project. My gratitude 
therefore goes out to all the people in StatoilHydro who have shown interest 
in my academic aspirations. Without the generous support from my superiors 
and the keen interest from my colleagues, this project could not have been 
accomplished. 
 
The research behind this thesis has been carried out at the University of 
Stavanger, under the excellent supervision of professor Petter Osmundsen, 
who also provided the inspiration and hospitality which was critical to make 
me take on the challenge of a PhD project. I am also thankful to my co-
adviser Knut Einar Rosendahl from the Research Department at Statistics 
Norway. Knut Einar has rendered a range of valuable comments and 
suggestions for the papers of this thesis, and also provided me with 
opportunities to present and discuss my work with his competent colleagues at 
Statistics Norway. 
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discussions, comments and suggestions from a range of inspiring colleagues 
at the University of Stavanger, including (but not limited to) Kristoffer 
Wigestrand Eriksen, Hans Jacob Fevang, Benn Folkvord, Jens Petter Gitlesen,  
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Sigbjørn Tveterås, and Atle Øglend.  
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Petroleum Directorate, for providing me with data for the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf, and for their interest in my research. 
 
Last but not least, I will always be indebted to my loved-ones at home. It is 
Trude, Agnes Marie and Håkon Mathias who have had to carry the burden of 
a remote husband and father, always with a piece of mind clinging to some 
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Summary 
 
 
High growth and welfare aspirations will require massive energy investment 
in the years ahead of us, especially in the non-OECD area. With more than 60 
per cent of primary energy supply, oil and natural gas play a dominant role in 
today’s global energy market. Even with high ambitions to contain 
greenhouse gas emissions and arrest global warming, petroleum is likely to 
remain an important source of energy in a 20-year perspective. A good 
understanding of the investment process among oil and gas companies is 
important to grasp the full picture of oil and gas supply. Insights from oil and 
gas investment studies may translate into policies to improve the security of 
energy supply, to promote energy efficiency and economic growth, and to pull 
people out of poverty through the extension of affordable energy. 
 
In petro-states like Norway, oil and gas investments play an important role for 
macroeconomic fluctuations in the short to medium term. A proper 
understanding of investment behaviour in the oil and gas industry is therefore 
useful for economists, market analysts, policy-makers, and everyone who 
takes an interest in economic and financial market fluctuations. Moreover, 
strategies for resource management become important for any country rich in 
petroleum resources. In this context, the links between exploration, reserve 
accumulation, field development and production become important both to 
corporate strategists and to policy-makers. 
 
Profit maximisation is the key behavioural assumption for international oil 
and gas companies, as for most other industries. However, some features are 
specific to oil and gas production. The reserve concept is unique to non-
renewable resource industries, and so is exploration activity. High capital 
intensity, imperfect competition, and extensive political attention are some 
other distinguishing characteristics. Industry-specific methods and tailored 
analyses are therefore required. Combining industry-specific theories of 
investment behaviour with the best statistical methods available, this thesis 
adds new empirical insights on issues of capital formation and interaction 
between companies and markets in the international oil and gas industry. 
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Efforts and efficiency in oil and gas exploration is the subject of Part 1. 
Empirical studies are conducted on a data set for the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. In the first study, an econometric model of exploration and appraisal 
drilling is specified and estimated. Explanatory variables include the oil price, 
cumulative discoveries and open exploration acreage. The dynamic model 
accounts explicitly for sluggishness and short-term adjustments in exploration 
drilling. We find robust long-term oil price effects on exploration activity, 
whereas the short-term response is muted. On the other hand, the temporary 
influence on exploration drilling from licensing rounds for new exploration 
acreage is significant, and so are the feedback effects from historical 
exploration success. At the same time, the longer-term impact of these 
variables is more moderate. 
 
Drilling efforts have been subject to a wide range of econometric studies since 
the mid 1960s, especially for the US. Less attention has been paid to the 
success and efficiency of oil and gas exploration, not to mention the 
interaction between efforts and efficiency. Important gaps of the previous 
literature are bridged by the second paper of this thesis, where three 
components of reserve growth are examined simultaneously in an integrated 
and novel modelling approach. Departing from a simple theory of exploration, 
modern techniques of time-series econometrics are applied to estimate three 
simultaneous equations for drilling activity, success rates and average 
discovery size.  
 
An increase in the oil price of 1 per cent produces a persistent increase in 
annual reserve-generation of 1 per cent, according to the results. However, the 
oil price exerts a negative influence on the discovery rate and a positive 
influence on average discovery size. This suggests that overall exposure to 
exploration risk in the oil and gas companies is positively linked to the oil 
price. The proposed modelling approach illustrates that policy measures need 
not and should not be limited to the regulation of drilling activity. With 
reserve additions as the ultimate target, the potential gains from measures to 
stimulate the success rate or average field size may well exceed the direct 
importance of drilling activity in itself (i. e. number of spudded wells). 
Second, my results suggest that annual reserve additions are procyclical, due 
to a strong positive link between the oil price and average discovery size. If 
the government interest is to stabilise reserve growth over time, this result 
provides a case for countercyclical licensing policies. 
 
Standard theory of irreversible investment and real waiting options suggest 
that the relationship between investment and uncertainty is negative. 
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However, recent contributions to the theory of strategic investment point out 
that investment implies not only the sacrifice of a waiting option, but also a 
potential reward from the acquisition of future development options. 
Increased uncertainty has the potential to increase the value of both these 
types of real options. Thus, the theory of compound options may give rise to a 
positive relationship between investment and uncertainty. Empirical studies 
are therefore required to settle the question.  
 
This forms the basis for the paper in Chapter 4. Based on data for 170 
companies over the period 1992-2005, we estimate various models of 
investment, with robust results for the uncertainty variables. Our results 
suggest that industry-specific uncertainty (oil price volatility) has a 
stimulating effect on investment rates, as suggested by modern theory of 
strategic investment and real options. On the other hand, overall uncertainty 
(stock market volatility) represents a bottle-neck for investment and capital 
formation. Based on recent contributions to the theoretical investment 
literature, our results offer a valuable supplement, as we offer empirical 
support to the idea that strategic investments with real options may give rise 
to a positive relationship between investment and uncertainty. 
 
Recent developments in the oil and gas industry suggest that investment 
behaviour is not necessarily changeless over time. In the paper of Chapter 5, 
we propose a micro-econometric procedure to investigate the stability of 
investment behaviour. Based on a data set for 253 oil and gas companies over 
14 years, we estimate dynamic models of capital formation, accounting 
explicitly for sluggishness and partial adjustment.  
 
Our results provide robust evidence for two distinctly separated historical 
regimes of investment behaviour in the international oil and gas industry over 
the last 15 years; one from 1992 to 1997, and one from 1998-2005. The late 
rise in oil price and cash-flows has had a far smaller impact on investment 
rates than what was typical before 1998, suggesting that financial market 
pressures in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis have caused tightened 
capital discipline in recent years. Moreover, the early 1990s were 
characterised by a negative relationship between investment and uncertainty, 
whereas the recent increase in oil price volatility seems to have spurred 
investment over the last few years. This result is at odds with the vast majority 
of previous studies of investment and uncertainty, but well in line with recent 
development of theories of compound options structures, imperfect 
competition and strategic investment behaviour.  
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The last part of this thesis deals with the interaction between companies and 
investment behaviour on the one hand, and external oil and financial market 
dynamics on the other. In the paper of Chapter 6, we explore a hypothesis that 
a change in investment behaviour among international oil companies (IOC) 
towards the end of the 1990s had long-lived effects on OPEC strategies, and 
on oil price formation. Coordinated investment constraints were imposed on 
the IOCs through financial market pressures for improved short-term 
profitability in the wake of the Asian economic crisis. Clustering of attention 
on short-term profitability gave rise to a coordinated equilibrium of reduced 
investment. This tacit collusion had a dampening effect on production growth, 
and was also supportive of the subsequent increase in the oil price. 
 
A partial equilibrium model for the global oil market is applied to compare 
the effects of these tacitly collusive capital constraints on oil supply with an 
alternative characterised by industrial stability. Our results suggest that even 
temporary economic and financial shocks may have a long-term impact on oil 
price formation. Specifically, we find that the curb on IOC investments in the 
late 1990s caused an increase in the oil price of 10 per cent in the long run. 
Both OPEC and non-OPEC producers have gained from this development, 
whereas the cost is carried by oil-importers and consumers. 
 
The interaction between capital markets and company behaviour is also 
subject to scrutiny in the last paper of this thesis. To assess important drivers 
of company valuation, a simple econometric model is specified and estimated 
on market and accounting data for 14 major oil and gas companies from 1990 
to 2003. Company-specific valuation multiples are regressed against a number 
of financial indicators, as well as the oil price.  
 
A key result is that short-term accounting returns (RoACE) are not supported 
as an important value-driver in our estimated model. On the other hand, 
valuation multiples respond negatively to an increase in the oil price, 
implying that oil and gas companies are priced at mid-cycle oil prices. The 
estimated model suggests a robust and material influence on market 
valuations from oil and gas production. This suggests that company size and 
reputation still plays an important role in the valuation process. The study 
elucidates some of the weaknesses of RoACE for company valuation 
purposes. Our primary focus is on inter-company comparisons and relative 
stock market valuation. However, within the individual companies, a 
consistently normalised RoACE may still prove useful for internal efforts to 
improve operational and financial performance over time. 
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Sammendrag 
 
 
Høye forventninger om vekst og velstand vil kreve store energiinvesteringer 
verden over i årene som kommer. Med mer enn 60 prosent av 
energiforsyningen har olje og naturgass en dominerende rolle i dagens globale 
energimarked. Store ambisjoner om å begrense utslipp av drivhusgasser og 
begrense den globale oppvarmingen kan neppe forhindre at petroleum vil 
forbli blant verdens viktigste energibærere selv i et 20-års perspektiv. 
Investeringer og kapitalakkumulasjon blant olje- og gasselskapene er en viktig 
del av tilbudssiden i energimarkedet generelt, og i olje- og gassmarkedene 
spesielt. Studier av olje- og gassinvesteringer kan gi verdifull ny kunnskap, 
med politikk-implikasjoner som kan bedre forsyningssikkerheten i 
energimarkedet, fremme økonomisk vekst og løfte mennesker ut av fattigdom 
gjennom bedre tilgang til energi. 
 
I Norge spiller olje- og gassinvesteringene også en viktig rolle for den 
makroøkonomiske utviklingen både på kort og lang sikt. God oversikt over 
mekanismene bak olje- og gassinvesteringene er dermed nyttig for økonomer, 
markedsanalytikere, offentlige myndigheter og alle andre med interesse for 
svingninger i konjunkturer og kapitalmarkeder. Alle land med store olje- og 
gassforekomster vil i tillegg ha interesse av å utvikle gode strategier for 
ressursforvaltningen. I så måte vil sammenhengene mellom leteaktivitet, 
ressursutvikling, feltutbygging og produksjon være sentrale både for selskaper 
og myndigheter. 
 
Til grunn for atferden blant internasjonale olje- og gasselskaper ligger en 
målsetning om å maksimere den økonomiske inntjeningen, på samme måte 
som i andre næringer. Enkelte trekk er imidlertid særegne for olje- og 
gassnæringen. Det gjelder for eksempel påvisning og utvikling av olje- og 
gassreserver, som er en kritisk forutsetning for selve produksjonsaktiviteten. 
Høy kapitalintensitet, ufullkommen konkurranse og stor politisk 
oppmerksomhet er eksempler på andre næringsspesifikke særtrekk. De 
økonomiske standardmodellene for produsentatferd krever derfor 
spesialtilpasning, og skreddersøm er påkrevd for analyseverktøyet når olje- og 
gassindustrien står i søkelyset. Industrispesifikk økonomisk teori for 
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investeringsatferd kombineres i denne avhandlingen med moderne metoder 
for statistisk analyse. Resultatet er ny innsikt om kapitaldannelse og 
samhandling mellom selskaper og markeder i den internasjonale olje- og 
gassindustrien. 
 
Aktivitet og effektivitet i oljeselskapenes letevirksomhet er temaet i den første 
delen av avhandlingen. I kapittel 2 spesifiserer vi en teoretisk modell for 
leting etter olje og naturgass, som deretter tallfestes med utgangspunkt i 
historiske data fra norsk kontinentalsokkel. Som forklaringsvariabler bruker vi 
oljepris, historiske funnresultater og tilgang til leteareal. Modellen tar hensyn 
til tregheter og kortsiktige tilpasninger av samlet leteboring. Resultatet 
innebærer at oljeprisen har en viss betydning for leteaktiviteten, men 
tilpasning til endringer i oljeprisen tar tid, og den kortsiktige responsen er 
beskjeden. For de kortsiktige svingningene i leteaktiviteten spiller 
lisenspolitikk og funnresultater en langt viktigere rolle. Til gjengjeld tyder 
resultatene på at verken lisenstildelinger eller funnsuksess kan påvirke 
leteaktiviteten på vedvarende basis.  
 
Leteaktivitet har vært gjenstand for en rekke analyser innenfor 
økonomiforskningen, spesielt når det gjelder data fra USA. Faktorer og 
mekanismer bak resultatene av leteaktiviteten er ikke like godt utforsket. 
Viktige mangler ved litteraturen på området adresseres i kapittel 3, hvor 
reservetilveksten blir dekomponert og kartlagt i en integrert og nyskapende 
empirisk modell. Nærmere bestemt anvendes moderne teknikker for 
tidsserieøkonometri i en simultan tallfesting av tre ligninger for leteaktivitet, 
funnsuksess og gjennomsnittlig funnstørrelse. 
 
Resultatene tyder på at en økning i oljeprisen på 1 prosent bidrar til en økning 
av samme størrelsesorden for den årlige reservetilveksten. Dette skyldes ikke 
bare at høyere oljepris gir høyere leteaktivitet, men også at leteresultatene blir 
bedre når oljeprisen stiger. Vi finner riktignok tegn på at funnratene faller når 
oljeprisen stiger. Men enda viktigere er det at en økning i oljeprisen gir en 
betydelig økning i gjennomsnittlig funnstørrelse. Dette indikerer at 
oljeselskapene tar større risiko i leteaktiviteten når oljeprisen er høy, noe som 
gir utslag i lavere funnrater, men også flere store funn.  
 
Denne analysen illustrerer tydelig at myndighetenes oppmerksomhet bør 
strekke seg lengre enn til selve leteaktiviteten. Med reservetilvekst som 
endelig mål for letevirksomheten kan tiltak for å heve funnrater og 
gjennomsnittlige funnstørrelser gjerne gi større uttelling enn en økning i 
antallet letebrønner. Videre antyder analysene av letevirksomheten at 
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tilveksten i reservene svinger i takt med oljeprisen. Dersom myndighetene er 
opptatt av en jevn tilvekst av nye utbyggingsmuligheter tilsier dette at 
letepolitikken bør inneholde motsykliske elementer. 
 
Økonomisk teori tar hensyn til at bedriftenes investeringer i mange tilfeller er 
irreversibel. Når ledelsen har tatt beslutningen om å bygge ut et olje- eller 
gassfelt er det ingen vei tilbake. Slike mekanismer medfører at økt usikkerhet 
vil gi reduserte investeringer, fordi verdien av å vente med å investere blir 
større når usikkerheten øker. Nyere forskningsbidrag påpeker imidlertid at 
investeringsbeslutningen ikke bare medfører et tap av muligheten til å vente, 
men også at selskapet blir kompensert i form av nye muligheter for framtidig 
vekst og videreutvikling. Med slike modifikasjoner gir ikke teorien noen 
entydig sammenheng mellom investeringer og usikkerhet. For å avklare 
spørsmålet trenger man derfor analyser av data fra virkeligheten.  
 
Olje- og gassinvesteringer under usikkerhet danner utgangspunktet for 
artikkelen i kapittel 4. Ulike investeringsmodeller tallfestes her ved hjelp av 
data for 170 olje- og gasselskaper gjennom en 14-årsperiode. Her finner vi at 
økt generell usikkerhet skaper en flaskehals for investeringene, mens økt 
industrispesifikk usikkerhet (oljeprisvolatilitet) har en stimulerende effekt. I 
lys av nyere teori for investeringer under usikkerhet åpner disse resultatene 
for at særtrekk ved olje- og gassindustrien gjør at den empiriske 
sammenhengen mellom oljeinvesteringer og usikkerhet ikke er i tråd med 
tradisjonell økonomisk teori. 
 
Utviklingen av olje- og gassindustrien gjennom de siste 10 årene er preget av 
uro og omveltninger – i markedene rundt selskapene, i forholdet mellom 
selskapene og internt i hvert av selskapene. Kapittel 5 presenterer et 
modellopplegg som er utviklet for å undersøke hvorvidt prosessen rundt olje- 
og gassinvesteringene har vært stabil gjennom de siste 15 årene. Data fra 253 
selskaper fra begynnelsen av 1990-tallet og fram til i dag benyttes for å 
tallfeste dynamiske modeller for kapitaldannelse, med eksplisitte mekanismer 
for kortsiktig dynamikk og tregheter. 
 
Ved hjelp av moderne statistiske metoder finner vi solide holdepunkt for to 
tydelig atskilte historiske regimer for investeringsatferden i olje- og 
gassindustrien; det første regimet fra 1992 til 1997, og et annet fra 1998 og 
fram til i dag. Resultatene tyder på at den siste oljeprisøkningen har hatt en 
vesentlig mindre betydning for investeringene enn det som var vanlig før 
1998. Dette er en refleksjon av at økt press fra finansmarkedene om 
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lønnsomhetsforbedring har skjerpet kapitaldisiplinen, og lagt en demper på 
investeringsviljen blant olje- og gasselskapene de siste 10 årene.  
 
Den siste delen av avhandlingen kretser rundt interaksjonen mellom 
oljeselskaper på den ene siden, og finans- og oljemarkedet på den andre. I 
kapittel 6 studerer vi en hypotese om at endringer i investeringsatferden blant 
internasjonale olje- og gasselskaper har hatt langvarige virkninger på 
oljeprisen. Et koordinert finansmarkedspress for bedret lønnsomhet på tvers 
av hele industrien bidro til en implisitt samordning mellom selskapene 
omkring et lavere investeringsnivå enn man ville fått uten dette presset. 
Effekten ble den samme som ved et stilltiende samarbeid med OPEC; mye 
tyder nemlig på at redusert vekst i olje- og gassproduksjonen støttet opp om 
den påfølgende økningen i oljeprisen. 
 
En partiell likevektsmodell for det globale oljemarkedet anvendes for å 
tallfeste virkningene på oljeprisen av den forbigående endringen i selskapenes 
investeringsatferd. Vi finner at selskapenes midlertidige tilbakeholdenhet har 
gitt en langsiktig økning oljeprisen på 10 prosent. Dette tyder på at selv 
midlertidige endringer i selskapenes atferd kan få vedvarende virkninger i 
oljemarkedet. Alle produsenter av olje – innenfor og utenfor OPEC – har tjent 
på denne utviklingen, mens kostnadene ved oljeprisøkningen blir båret av 
oljeimportører og forbrukere. 
 
Samspillet mellom kapitalmarkeder og selskaper står også i fokus for 
avhandlingens siste kapittel. Statistiske metoder benyttes her for å undersøke 
hvordan aksjemarkedets verdsetting av selskapene påvirkes av finansielle og 
operasjonelle prestasjonsindikatorer. Et hovedresultat består i at de estimerte 
modellene ikke gir støtte til regnskapsbaserte lønnsomhetsmål (RoACE) som 
viktige verdidrivere. Vi finner videre klare tegn på at internasjonale olje- og 
gasselskaper prises med utgangspunkt i langsiktige oljeprisforventninger, og 
at størrelse og omdømme spiller en viktig rolle for aksjemarkedets 
verdsetting. Studien belyser enkelte svakheter ved regnskapsbaserte 
indikatorer for verdsettingsformål. Innenfor hvert selskap kan likevel 
konsistente mål for avkastning på sysselsatt kapital likevel være nyttige for å 
følge opp interne forbedringsprosesser over tid. 
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1. Motivation and Scope 
 
 
1.1 Why study oil and gas investments? 
 
With brisk economic growth and high oil prices, issues of energy supply have 
ascended on the geopolitical agenda. Global oil demand is being fuelled by 
strong growth, both in the OECD area and in emerging economies – like 
Brazil, Russia, India and China. Consequently, the sharp increase in the oil 
price over the last years has raised concerns among consumer interests about 
the security of supply. To sustain general expectations for global economic 
growth, IEA (2003) estimates that energy supply will have to be supported by 
capital expenditures in the amount of USD 16 trillion over the period 2001-
2030. Power generation represents some 60 per cent of this requirement, 
whereas the residual 40 per cent relates to fossil fuels (cf. Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. World energy investment requirement 2001-2030 (per cent) 
 
Total: 16 trillion dollars 
Electricity
60 %
Oil
19 %
Gas
19 %
Oil Total Gas
Exploration & 
development
Refining
Other
Exploration & 
development
LNG Chains
Transportation,
distribution
and storage
72 %
13 %
15 %
55 %
8 %
37 %Coal
2 %
 
Source: International Energy Agency (2003). 
 
The background for this huge economic commitment is the need to extend the 
supply of electricity and fossil fuels to new populous groups of consumers in 
fast-growing emerging economies like India and China (IEA, 2007). The link 
between economic growth and energy demand is stronger in developing 
countries than in the OECD. Consequently, the average share of energy 
investment in GDP seems to vary inversely with economic affluence. 
However, with high levels of current consumption, the industrialised part of 
the world will hardly lose their position in the energy market. Although fast-
growing energy markets in non-OECD countries play an important role for 
Overview 
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the growth in energy demand, OECD countries are still expected to account 
for some 40 per cent of world energy investment over the next 30 years. 
 
The availability of capital to meet future energy requirements is not a matter 
of course. A range of uncertainties and challenges are involved, for policy-
makers, for the oil and gas industry and in terms of fund-raising and financing 
arrangements. At the overall level, energy-consuming households, companies 
and countries are concerned with stability and reliability of energy supply. 
Moreover, a geopolitical concern to reduce global poverty raises policy 
concerns to spur investment in new energy-supply infrastructure. Last but not 
least, environmental threats caused by energy consumption may well have 
implications for both producers and consumers. Ambitions to cut greenhouse-
gas emissions will most certainly have an impact on both the level and 
composition of energy investment. A wild-card in this energy-environment 
game is technology development, which is important for the penetration of 
new energy solutions, and therefore also has an important role in future 
energy investments.  
 
Figure 2. Investment requirement by region and activity 
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Source: International Energy Agency (2003). 
 
For investments relating to fossil fuels, IEA figures suggest a 50/50 split 
between oil and gas investments, with exploration and development activities 
as the most important sources of investment demand. The IEA estimates 
imply that an annual USD 100 bn of investment is required to meet the needs 
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and aspirations implied by general economic expectations over the next 30 
years. 2/3 of these investments should be absorbed by exploration and 
development activities, implying a gross capital accumulation of nearly USD 
4000 bn in global upstream oil and gas activities over the period. 
 
On the one hand, the effects on energy supply from gradual depletion of 
reserves and deterioration of infrastructure will have to be arrested through 
investments in upgrades and new production capacity. More than half of 
future investments in non-renewable energy supply are required simply to 
maintain supply at present levels. On the other hand, persistent economic 
growth and increasing welfare aspirations will entail investments in additional 
production capacity. This part of energy investment will mainly be directed at 
the fast-growing markets in non-OECD countries. 
 
Investment behaviour in the oil and gas industry shares several characteristics 
with general corporate investment behaviour. However, some features are 
specific to oil and gas production, and industry-specific analyses are therefore 
required. The reserve concept is unique to non-exhaustible resource 
industries, and so is exploration activity. Other distinguishing features include 
cyclical investments, large indivisible investment projects, long investment 
lags, imperfect competition, extensive political attention, and potential super 
profits due to exhaustibility and resource rent. Special features of the oil and 
gas industry will therefore have to be appreciated both in terms of investment 
behaviour and the selection and impact from various explanatory factors. 
 
Uncertainty and risk for oil and gas investments are also related to overall 
uncertainties and risks for (energy) investment, but all sources of uncertainty 
are not necessarily the same. At one level, the global and regional reserve 
potential is affected by geological uncertainty (below-ground risks). At 
another level, there is uncertainty concerning the availability and access to 
remaining reserves, regulatory and market conditions (above-ground risks). 
To a large extent, these risk factors are specific to oil and gas investments, and 
therefore also have to be addressed explicitly in empirical assessments. The 
reserve situation today is that market-oriented oil and gas provinces like USA, 
Canada, United Kingdom and Norway are faced with progressing depletion. 
The vast majority of global oil and gas reserves are located outside the OECD 
area, and exploration and development activities are now gradually being 
redirected towards these resource-rich regions of the world (e.g. Russia, Latin 
America, and the OPEC countries), introducing a range of new risk factors for 
Western oil and gas companies. 
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These resource-rich countries are typically quite different from the market-
oriented systems that Western oil and gas companies have been used to from 
oil and gas provinces in Europe and North America. Oil and gas resources 
often play a national strategic role, strong national oil companies are common, 
and so are restrictions on foreign investment. Licensing, fiscal and 
commercial terms are subject to negotiations and special restrictions may even 
apply to marketing arrangements. Additional risks and uncertainty around 
future investment relate to widespread corruption, weak control and legal 
systems, political and military unrest, human rights issues and a variety of 
operational risk factors relating to local operation (e. g., Karl 1997). 
 
As all fossil fuels are non-renewable, access to producible reserves is a special 
and critical issue. Unless oil and gas production volumes are replaced through 
successful exploration efforts, the basis for future production will be 
undermined. Consequently, an important strategic challenge for the oil 
industry currently relates to reserve replacement. Empirical studies of the 
exploration process may thus shed light on the fundamentals of oil and gas 
supply, as well as the potential for policy measures to influence investment 
and energy supply. Such studies may reveal insights that carry interest not 
only from an academic perspective, but also for strategists and policy-makers. 
 
To recapitulate, empirical studies of the investment process among oil and gas 
companies are both necessary and important to understand the economics of 
oil and gas supply. Insights from such studies may translate into policies to 
improve the security of energy supply, to promote energy efficiency and 
economic growth, and to pull people out of poverty through the extension of 
affordable energy. 
 
From a domestic Norwegian perspective, there are additional reasons to be 
interested in oil and gas investment. Since the first discovery in the late 1960s, 
Norway has rapidly developed into one of the largest oil exporter worldwide. 
The development of a domestic oil and gas industry has been a strategic 
objective shared by a stable majority of political parties. Consequently, the oil 
and gas industry plays an important role in the Norwegian economy today. As 
illustrated in Figure 3, the petroleum sector represents approximately 25 per 
cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Oil and gas revenues represent 
more than 50 per cent of total export, and every third unit of government 
revenue can be attributed to oil and gas activities.  
 
For macroeconomic policies, oil and gas investments are especially important. 
The reason is not their quantity (approx. 6 per cent of mainland GDP), but 
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their volatility. With an import share of approx. 1/3, a 50 per cent reduction in 
oil and gas investments from one year to another will represent a direct 
impulse to mainland GDP at approx. 2 percentage points, before any 
repercussions.1 Consequently, oil and gas investments play an important role 
for macroeconomic fluctuations in the short to medium term. A proper 
understanding of investment behaviour in the oil and gas industry is therefore 
useful for economists, market analysts, policy-makers, and everyone who 
takes an interest in economic and financial market fluctuations. 
 
Figure 3. The position of the Norwegian oil and gas industry 
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Source: (Norwegian) Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE 2007). 
 
At the same time, strategies for resource management become important for 
any country rich in petroleum resources. In this context, the links between 
exploration, reserve accumulation, field development and production become 
important not only to corporate strategists, but also to policy-makers. 
Empirical studies of oil and gas investment improve our understanding of the 
various stages of the oil and gas production process, and how these activities 
are affected by geological, economic, and policy-related factors. As an 
example, a smooth growth rate in production on the national level requires not 
only a stable level of field developments, but also a steady supply of new 
discoveries. The efficiency of public licensing policies therefore depends on a 
thorough understanding of company behaviour in the exploration process.  
                                                 
1 Based on employment in Norwegian oil and gas activities, Cappelen et al. (2003) suggest a 
short-run macroeconomic multiplier around 2, and a long-term multiplier above 3. In other 
words, 1000 new jobs in the oil and gas industry will encourage the employment of another 
2000 persons in the rest of the economy over a 5-year period. 
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Figure 4. Key figures for the Norwegian continental shelf 
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Source: Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (MPE 2006). 
 
A range of perspectives is available to justify more work on empirical studies 
of oil and gas investment behaviour. At the international level, interest is 
motivated by economic growth concerns, by income distribution, and by 
environmental issues. In petro-states like Norway, oil and gas investments are 
important for the macroeconomic business cycle, and for the design of 
strategies and policies for national resource management. As we will see, oil 
and gas investment behaviour is not fully explored by previous academic 
research. Recent developments in general investment theory and econometrics 
leave room for valuable and interesting applications on data from the oil and 
gas industry. 
 
 
1.2 Overall scope and research ideas 
 
International oil and gas companies combine capital, labour and other inputs 
to produce oil and natural gas from natural deposits. The development and 
production of oil and gas reserves is a capital-intensive activity. Investment 
behaviour and the process of real capital formation is therefore of special 
interest in the oil and gas industry.  
 
Profit maximisation is the key behavioural assumption for international oil 
and gas companies, as for studies of most other industries. Consequently, 
investment behaviour in the oil and gas industry shares several characteristics 
with general corporate investment behaviour. However, as mentioned above, 
some features are specific to oil and gas production, and industry-specific 
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analyses are therefore required. One of these features is related to the non-
renewable nature of the output. The reserve concept is unique to non-
renewable resource industries, and so is exploration activity. Oil and gas 
reserves may be seen as inputs to the production of oil and natural gas. These 
reserves are not readily available in well-functioning input markets, like the 
case is for traditional inputs. Rather, oil and gas companies have to invest in 
risky exploration activities, to maintain and grow the base of oil and gas 
reserves, and to sustain subsequent production activity over the longer term. 
At the same time, reserve additions are the result of a production process of its 
own, and both the efficiency of this process and the implied accumulation of 
oil and gas reserves contribute significantly to the value of an oil company. 
 
Reserve replacement is currently an important strategic challenge both for 
companies and countries. New empirical insights in the economics of oil and 
gas exploration should therefore be of interest both for company managers 
and policy-makers. Consequently, one of my research ideas is to apply 
modern econometric techniques to time series data from the NCS, to shed 
light on exploration activity in a partly mature, and highly regulated oil and 
gas province. 
 
Figure 5. Efforts and efficiency in NCS exploration 
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Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD 2007). 
Exploration drilling efforts have been subject to a wide range of econometric 
studies since the mid 1960s, especially for the US (Dahl and Duggan, 1998). 
Less attention has been paid to the success and efficiency of oil and gas 
exploration, not to mention the interaction between efforts and efficiency. 
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Modern co-integration techniques of time series econometrics are also yet to 
be applied to oil and gas exploration data. Finally, only a few empirical 
exploration studies cover more than one oil price cycle. To bridge these gaps 
in the literature, another research idea of this project has been to address three 
components of reserve growth simultaneously in a co-integration framework. 
This approach allows the oil price and other explanatory variables to influence 
reserve growth not only through exploration activity, but also via the (ex post) 
success rate and average field size. 
 
Non-renewable properties of oil and gas resource extraction can hardly be 
neglected in studies of exploration behaviour, and especially not when 
applications are designed on aggregate time series data. Drawing on recent 
advances in panel data econometrics, an alternative approach is to investigate 
data for a range of individual companies. Each oil and gas company holds a 
portfolio of assets at various stages of development, maturation and depletion. 
Moreover, typical panel data sets cover a shorter time span than time series 
data. With this perspective on oil and gas investments, non-renewable 
properties become less apparent than in field-specific data and regional time 
series data. Panel data studies of company accounts may therefore rely on a 
neo-classical investment model as the theoretical point of departure. However, 
the estimated investment models may still reveal insights for oil and gas 
investment which are quite different from other (manufacturing) industries (e. 
g., Lamont, 1997). 
 
Figure 6. Investment indicators in the international oil and gas industry 
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Oil price volatility: Annualised standard deviation of daily price change (250 days rolling data 
window). 
Sources: Investment indicators: Deutsche Bank (2005), oil price and stock market data: Reuters 
Ecowin (http://www.ecowin.com). 
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With a powerful panel data set at hand, two ideas are particularly interesting 
in terms of empirical oil and gas investment research. First, recent 
developments in the oil and gas industry suggest that investment behaviour is 
not necessarily changeless over time. Shifts and shocks in prices, liquidity and 
uncertainty may carry over to management mentality. Moreover, substantial 
changes in the economic environment of the firm may also induce changes in 
the underlying models of investment behaviour. We will therefore investigate 
how the process of capital formation at the firm-level might be affected by a 
period of far-reaching industrial upheaval and restructuring. One striking 
example in this respect was manifested by the wave of mergers the 
international oil and gas industry in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis 
towards the end of the 1990s (e.g., Weston, Johnson and Siu, 1999).  
 
Second, the role of uncertainty in empirical investment models has attracted 
increasing interest from empirical researchers over the last decade (Carruth et 
al., 2000). In the standard theory on irreversible investments, the option value 
of waiting to invest is positively influenced by an increase in uncertainty. 
Consequently, this real-options approach to investment suggests a negative 
relation between investment and uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
However, investment implies not only the sacrifice of a waiting option, but 
also a potential reward from the acquisition of future development and growth 
options. Increased uncertainty will increase the value of both waiting and 
growth options. A reconciling study by Abel et al. (1996) illustrates how both 
these perspectives can be accommodated in modern theories of investment. 
Adding future put options of contraction to the traditional call options of 
deferral, ambiguous results are produced for the sign of the 
investment/uncertainty relationship. Consequently, empirical studies are 
required to settle the issue. Based on company data for a range of international 
oil and gas companies, the idea is therefore to estimate and test the role of 
uncertainty in oil and gas investment.  
 
Spending on exploration and physical capital accumulation can be financed 
through retained earnings, but also from debt and equity markets (Reiss, 
1990). In consideration of competition, strategies, targets and costs, the total 
capital budget is allocated to various types of capital expenditure – like 
exploration, field development, operational upgrades, and/or acquisitions of 
assets or businesses. In practice, corporate investment is also affected by 
specific return targets and planning assumptions for input and output prices 
(wages, interest rates, exchange rates, oil and gas prices). As fixed assets, real 
capital is employed in production activities of the firms. The return from these 
individual assets may be enhanced through measures for revenue support and 
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cost suppression along the entire value chain. Moreover, corporate investment 
returns are managed through portfolio optimisation, involving acquisitions, 
divestitures and swap transactions. Finally, cash-flow from operations is 
distributed by management decisions, for reinvestment, debt payments and 
accommodation of shareholders (dividends or share buybacks).  
 
Figure 7. Growth, profitability and returns 
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* in real terms (at 2004-prices). 
Source: http://www.ecowin.com (stock market data), Deutsche Bank (2004; industry data). 
 
Access to capital markets is influenced by corporate results and performance, 
strategies, financial structure, management and control systems. 
Consequently, the cost of capital is also influenced by these variables. At the 
same time, financial markets serve as an important intermediary for 
communication between investors and companies. Investment advice and 
company valuation in the equity market is decisive in this respect, and 
therefore it becomes important to develop and maintain good relations with 
the capital market (e.g., Boone, 2001). Over the last 10 years, oil and gas 
companies have been subject to increasing financial market pressures (e. g., 
Weston et al, 1999; Osmundsen et al., 2007). During this period, stock market 
analysts focused increasingly on simplistic indicators of short-term 
accounting returns in their valuation analyses (Antill and Arnott, 2000, 2002; 
UBS Warburg, 2003; Deutsche Bank, 2004). The most important of these 
indicators was Return on Capital Employed (RoACE; cf. Figure 7).2  
                                                 
2 RoACE is defined as net income adjusted for minority interests and net financial items (after 
tax) as a percentage ratio of average capital employed, where capital employed is the sum of 
shareholders’ funds and net interest-bearing debt. 
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Score-cards of financial and operational targets were pursued by corporate 
managers, under the surveillance of analysts and investors. Companies who 
failed to deliver, were mentioned systematically in negative terms, in the 
financial press, in analyst reports, and in the investment community. This 
pressure instigated an increase in capital discipline in the oil and gas industry, 
which in turn put a lid on long-term capacity growth and reserve 
development. 
 
One of the research ideas for this project has been to study how oil and gas 
investment behaviour is influenced by the interaction between financial 
markets on one hand, and oil and gas markets on the other. A key hypothesis 
is that the described pressures from financial markets have repressed 
investment and production growth in the international oil and gas industry. In 
turn, this development may also have had implications for global oil and gas 
supply, and for oil price formation. Econometric techniques can be applied to 
estimate the relation between performance and stock market valuation. With 
access to a full model for the global oil market (e. g., Aune et al. 2005), it is 
also possible to quantify the oil market implications of increased capital 
discipline in? the oil and gas industry. 
 
 
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
 
2.1 Theory of investment behaviour 
 
The perceived mystery of capital accumulation and its role in business 
fluctuations has a long history. Already in his General Theory, Keynes (1936) 
noted:  
 
“Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full 
consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only 
be taken as the result of animal spirits – a spontaneous urge to action rather 
than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative 
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.” 
 
Since the path-breaking 1930s, the investment decision of the firm has 
attracted broad academic interest from researchers in corporate finance, 
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industrial organisation, public economic and macroeconomics. Based on early 
theoretical contributions from pioneers like Haavelmo (1960), Jorgenson 
(1963) and Tobin (1969), empirical interest in investment behaviour also has a 
long tradition in applied economic research.  
 
The process of investment and capital formation is inherently dynamic. The 
capital stock of the firm is augmented by investment, and debased through 
technological and economic depreciation. These characteristic features are 
appreciated by economic theory, and models of corporate investment usually 
depart from some sort of dynamic optimisation problem. The standard 
workhorse of applied investment research dates back to Jorgenson (1963) and 
Tobin (1969), and is derived from the neoclassical company’s intertemporal 
profit maximisation problem.3  
 
Jorgenson (1971) provides an overview of early empirical contributions, 
whereas modelling strategies and results up to the early 1990s are surveyed by 
Chirinko (1993). Chirinko’s comprehensive recapitulation reflects the 
separation between two distinct modelling strategies. On the one hand, 
econometric models are derived from the first-order conditions of 
intertemporal maximisation problems, in the neo-classical spirit of Tobin 
(1969) and Jorgenson (1971). On the other hand, a range of accelerator 
models are based on general autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) forms, and 
estimated without the stringent connection to maximising behaviour of 
economic theory (e.g., Mayresse, Hall, and Mulkay, 1999; Bond et al., 2003). 
Structural models should be preferred on theoretical grounds, but tend to 
underperform the more flexible (accelerator) models in terms of prediction. 
Here lies a fundamental trade-off in modern empirical investment research: 
“the applied econometrician must choose between distributed lag models that 
are empirically dependable but conceptually fragile and structural models that 
have a stronger theoretical foundation but an unsteady empirical 
superstructure” (Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer, 1999). This present thesis 
includes applications of both these groups of models.  
 
During the 1970s, the role of options in financial markets was studied by a 
range of prominent scholars (e.g., Merton, 1973; Black and Scholes, 1973; 
Cox and Ross, 1976). However, it was not until the early 1980s that further 
academic interest in theories of fixed business investment behaviour was 
spurred by the material equivalent to financial options – the real options 
approach. Cukierman (1980), Bernanke (1983), Brennan and Schwartz 
                                                 
3 A formal derivation of the neo-classical investment model is offered in Appendix 1. 
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(1986), McDonald and Siegel (1986) study the implications of irreversibility 
and waiting options for real investment decision-making.4 Common for these 
contributions was the idea that investment could not be reversed. This 
irreversibility provided the firms with a real option to defer investment. Any 
increase in the uncertainty around future profitability will enhance the value 
of this waiting option. Consequently, this strand of literature suggests a 
negative link between investment and uncertainty (Carruth et al., 2000; Bond 
et al., 2005). 
 
However, the conclusion of a negative investment/uncertainty relationship is 
relaxed in recent contributions to the literature on strategic investment and 
real options. The investment decision involves not only the initial waiting 
option, but also potential future waiting and development options. Abel et al. 
(1996) argue that investment theories with compound option structures leave 
the investment/uncertainty relationship unsettled. Recent applications in 
management and finance (e.g., Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Smit and 
Trigeorgis, 2004) also stress that investment implies not only the sacrifice of a 
waiting option, but also a potential reward from the acquisition of future 
development options. Increased uncertainty will increase the value of both 
waiting and development options. Moreover, the value of waiting options is 
also eroded by investment lags (Bar-Ilan and Strange, 1996; Pacheco-de-
Almeida and Zemsky, 2003), imperfect competition, and strategic investment 
behaviour (Grenadier, 2002; Aguerrevere, 2003; Akdogu and MacKay, 2007). 
Empirical studies are therefore required to settle the investment-uncertainty 
relationship. 
 
Compound options are especially relevant for the oil and gas industry. As 
illustrated in the left-hand panel of Figure 8, oil and gas developments are 
characterised by sequential investment decisions and huge capital 
expenditures for production facilities and infrastructure. Irreversibility 
therefore becomes an important issue. At the same time, the opening of a new 
oil and gas area often involves basic investments that may reduce the 
thresholds for future neighbouring developments. An example is provided in 
the right-hand panel of Figure 8. The initial development of the Statfjord and 
Gullfaks fields in the North Sea over the 1980s prepared the ground for the 
subsequent industrial development of the entire Tampen area. With imperfect 
competition and first-mover advantages, the value of future development 
options may dominate the instant value of deferral. All these options are 
influenced by uncertainty. Again, we see that the role of uncertainty in oil and 
                                                 
4 It deserves mentioning that the same irreversibility issues in investment under uncertainty 
were touched upon even earlier by Henry (1974).  
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gas investment can not be established without empirical investigations. Based 
on company data for the international oil and gas industry, two of the papers 
in this thesis provide new empirical results and insights concerning the 
investment/uncertainty relationship. 
 
Figure 8. Compound options in oil and gas development 
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Based on Smit and Trigeorgis (2004).                Source: Statoil. 
 
Another strand of the investment literature is concerned with theories of 
capital market imperfections. With this point of departure, several 
contributions in econometric investment research have extended the neo-
classical framework to test for the presence and importance of financial 
frictions (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson, 1988; Schiantarelli, 1996; 
Hubbard 1998). A number of applications conclude that changes to net worth 
(cash-flow) plays a significant role for investment behaviour, which is not 
consistent with the “financial irrelevance” theorem of Modigliani and Miller 
(1958). However, recent contributions suggest that these results may be 
tainted by measurement error (e. g., Erickson and Whited, 2000) and model 
specification problems (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Gomes, 2001), leaving 
room for additional research to conclude the issue. One of the papers of this 
thesis explores the role for cash-flow variables in oil and gas investment, 
suggesting a new link between uncertainty and financial frictions in the 
process of capital formation. 
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2.2 Econometric method 
 
In terms of empirical methods, most of the early studies of investment 
behaviour were based on aggregate time series data. However, recent 
contributions to time series econometrics have yet to be applied to oil and gas 
investment. This is especially relevant for studies of oil and gas exploration 
behaviour. The reason is that the number of contributions to the empirical 
exploration literature slowed to a trickle some 15 years ago, before the new 
time series econometrics had reached this field of economic research. Two 
papers in this thesis apply techniques of co-integration and error-correction to 
time series data from the Norwegian Continental Shelf.  
 
During the 1970s, common practice in time series econometrics was to 
estimate simple linear regressions on non-stationary time series data. 
However, as shown by Granger and Newbold (1974), this estimation strategy 
is likely to produce spurious relationships between time series variables. If the 
time series variables of the proposed model are trending, their linear 
combination may also have a trend. Consequently, the error term of a simple 
linear model will fail to meet the requirements of standard estimation 
methods. In that case, direct estimation of the parameters will produce 
inefficient coefficient estimates, and the validity of statistical inference is 
therefore problematic. Direct estimation of the structural relation will also not 
describe the underlying dynamics of the data-generating process properly 
(Engle and Granger, 1987; Greene, 2003).  
 
However, if the variables of interest are integrated of degree 1 (I(1)), their 
difference will be stationary (yt ~ I(1) Þ  D yt ~ I(0)). A key result from the 
literature on co-integration and error-correction is that a linear combination of 
non-stationary variables may produce a stationary error-term. If such a 
combination is represented by the underlying relationship of our model, the 
variables are co-integrated, and their set of coefficients will define their co-
integrating vector. 5  In this case, we may estimate the dynamics of the process 
in an error-correction specification. In the error-correction model, the change 
in the dependent variable is specified as a linear function of changes and 
levels of both the dependent and the independent variables. The error-term of 
the error-correction model will now be stationary and well-behaved, provided 
that a co-integrating vector is indeed identified by our simple model. 
 
                                                 
5 A pioneering reference to the literature on cointegration and error-correcton is Engle and 
Granger (1987). A useful recent update is provided by Hendry and Juselius (2000, 2001). 
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In error-correction model specifications, coefficients on changes in exogenous 
variables may be interpreted as short-term effects, whereas the long-term 
(structural) parameters can be derived from the coefficients attached to the 
level variables (Bårdsen, 1989). For single-equation models, standard 
estimation procedures may be applied directly on the error-correction 
specification to obtain unbiased and efficient estimates for both short-term 
dynamics and the long-term underlying structure of our model (Engle and 
Granger, 1987). For the systems version of the model, maximum likelihood 
techniques have been developed by Johansen (1988, 1995). A novelty of this 
thesis is the employment of co-integration and error-correction models in 
empirical studies of oil and gas exploration. The application to time series and 
panel data for the Norwegian Continental shelf illustrates a rich and flexible 
framework with interesting implications. A closely related framework is also 
applied to microeconomic panel data to estimate an accelerator model with 
error-correction for total investment among international oil and gas 
companies (cf. Chapter 5).  
 
Microeconomic data based on company information offers more variance in 
the cross-section, and therefore represents a powerful point of departure for 
studies of investment behaviour (Bond and van Reenen, 2007). Complications 
relating to autoregressive properties of time series data are less apparent for 
panel data. However, new challenges arise, especially in dynamic panel data 
models – where the lagged endogenous variable is typically included among 
the regressors. Nickell (1981) shows that lagged endogenous variables will 
typically not have the desired exogeneity qualities in dynamic panels. Under 
these circumstances, both the OLS and the fixed-effects estimators will be 
inconsistent (see e.g., Bond, 2002), with an upward bias for OLS and a 
downward bias for the fixed-effects estimator. A variety of instrumental 
variable techniques have been developed to handle this endogeneity bias of 
dynamic panel data models. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) propose a 2SLS 
estimator for a model transformation in differences, with instruments that are 
correlated with the transformed lagged dependent variable and orthogonal to 
the differenced error term. Moreover, Anderson and Hsiao propose lagged 
differences of the lagged dependent variables as instruments to obtain 
consistent estimates of the dynamic model. In a corresponding first-difference 
GMM framework, Arellano and Bond (1991) show that deeper lags of the 
dependent variables are also available for the preferred instrument matrix. 
 
A challenge with the original Arellano Bond framework is that lagged 
differences represent poor instruments for first differences of persistent time 
series, and especially for variables that are close to a random walk. In meeting 
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this challenge, Arellano and Bover (1995) demonstrate that additional 
moment conditions may be provided by the inclusion of the original level 
equations in the system of estimated equations, with significant efficiency 
gains. Their estimator is referred to as the System GMM estimator, further 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer 
(2000), and implemented in Stata by Roodman (2006). In Chapters 4 and 5, 
we take advantage of these developments in the estimation of dynamic panel 
data models for oil company investment. Bond (2002) offers a nice 
introduction to these methods. For a more comprehensive modern textbook 
treatment, see Arellano (2003). 
 
 
 
3. Overview of the papers 
 
 
3.1 Exploration economics in a regulated petroleum province 
 
Oil and gas exploration has been subject to economic research for decades. 
The attention has largely been concentrated on the US oil and gas industry, 
with some studies also for the United Kingdom. In this article, we present new 
insights on the relation between exploration activities and economic variables 
in the highly regulated industrial environment in Norway.  
 
Starting with the Ekofisk discovery in 1969, a number of subsequent field 
developments laid the foundations for a new and important industry in 
Norway, and a significant supplying region for US and European oil and gas 
markets. The Norwegian government has played an active role in the 
development of a Norwegian petroleum industry, with a strategy characterised 
by gradualism. The impact of external market forces has traditionally been 
subdued by a carefully developed regulatory system, followed up by well-
developed institutions and governance systems.  
 
Based on detailed database information from the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, a unique data set has been developed to cover the 40-year history 
of three separate regions of the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). This 
panel data set has not been subject to econometric studies before. A drilling 
function is derived from a simple theory of exploration, whereby drilling 
efforts are explained by the oil price, cumulative discoveries and available 
exploration acreage. We estimate error-correction models that capture 
sluggishness and short-term dynamics in the data, as well as the longer-term 
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relations between drilling efforts and the explanatory variables. Finally, we 
present projections to illustrate how exploration activity is affected by 
changes in oil prices, licensed exploration acreage and new discoveries. 
 
Our models are estimated for a regulated market regime, and the results reveal 
new and interesting insights with respect to exploration behaviour. We 
establish economic effects that are quite robust, but their magnitude is rather 
small compared to previous studies. The estimated model suggests a robust, 
long-term impact from the oil price, whereas the estimated short- term effects 
are rather weak. Our results illustrate how new licensing rounds stimulate 
exploration drilling in new attractive prospects. Discoveries are also shown to 
provide additional feedback to exploration drilling, but this drilling response 
quickly culminates in anticipation of new licensing rounds. Our models are 
quite successful in accounting for dynamics and sluggishness in the 
exploration drilling behaviour, and the estimated error-correction models 
suggest a rapid adjustment process. 
 
 
3.2 Efforts and efficiency in oil exploration: a VEC approach 
 
Drilling efforts have been subject to a wide range of econometric studies since 
the mid 1960s, especially for the US. Less attention has been paid to the 
success and efficiency of oil and gas exploration, not to mention the 
interaction between efforts and efficiency. Only a few empirical exploration 
studies cover more than one oil price cycle. Modern techniques of time series 
econometrics are also yet to be applied to oil and gas exploration data. 
Finally, the data we observe for efforts and efficiency in oil exploration are 
produced by simultaneous decisions in each company. This simultaneity 
should be appreciated also in econometric models of the exploration process. 
 
To bridge these gaps in the economic literature, this study examines three 
components of reserve growth simultaneously in an integrated and novel 
modelling approach. A theoretical model for reserve-generation is derived 
from standard neoclassical behavioural assumptions. A decomposition of 
reserve growth is then applied to specify annual reserve additions as a result 
of drilling activity, success rates and average discovery size. Co-integration 
techniques are applied to estimate a vector error-correction model with three 
simultaneous equations for drilling activity, success rates and average 
discovery size. The econometric model also links the three components of 
reserve-generation to relevant economic, geological and technology variables.  
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The data set covers the full history of oil and gas activity on the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (1969-2004). The estimated model gives a breakdown of 
effects from explanatory variables between these key components of reserve-
generation, as well as a systematic separation between short-term (temporary) 
effects and long-term (persistent) effects in the exploration process. Estimated 
long-term elasticities are illustrated in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Decomposed elasticities of reserve generation 
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*) FIML estimates obtained with Stata 9.0 (see Chapter 3). 
a) Semi-elasticity: percentage change in dependent variable from absolute change in depletion 
 indicator. 
 
An increase in the oil price of 1 per cent produces a persistent increase in 
annual reserve-generation of 0.89 per cent, according to our results. More 
precisely, a negative influence from the oil price on the discovery rate is 
dominated by a positive influence on average discovery size. On impact, this 
suggests a pro-cyclical pattern for reserve-growth. The proposed modelling 
approach illustrates that policy measures need not and should not be limited to 
the regulation of drilling activity. With reserve additions as the ultimate 
target, the potential gains from measures to stimulate the success rate or 
average field size may well exceed the direct importance of drilling activity in 
itself (i. e. number of spudded wells). Second, our results suggest that annual 
reserve additions are procyclical, due to the strong positive link between the 
oil price and average discovery size. If the government interest is to stabilize 
reserve growth over time, this result provides a case for countercyclical 
licensing policies. 
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3.3 Investment and uncertainty in the international oil and gas industry 
 
Standard theory of irreversible investment and real waiting options suggest 
that the relationship between investment and uncertainty is negative. 
However, recent contributions to the theory of strategic investment point out 
that investment imply not only the sacrifice of a waiting option, but also a 
potential reward from the acquisition of future development options. 
Increased uncertainty has the potential to increase the value of both these 
types of real options. Thus, the theory of compound options may give rise to a 
positive relationship between investment and uncertainty. Empirical studies 
are therefore required to settle the question. With highly strategic investments 
and an abundance of real options, the oil and gas industry offers an especially 
appropriate application. 
 
The combination of investment theory, modern econometric procedures and 
panel data offers a robust framework to study the impact of industry 
uncertainty on total investment expenditures. Applying System GMM 
estimators on a data set covering 170 companies over the period 1992-2005, 
we draw on recent empirical research of the relation between investment and 
uncertainty in manufacturing industries. However, our scope is different, and 
so are our results.  
 
Our results suggest that industry-specific uncertainty (oil price volatility) has 
a stimulating effect on investment rates, as suggested by modern theory of 
strategic investment and real options. On the other hand, overall uncertainty 
(stock market volatility) represents a bottle-neck for investment and capital 
formation. A negative relationship between investment and uncertainty is the 
standard result of modern theories of irreversible investment. The majority of 
empirical studies in the field are also in support of this hypothesis. Based on 
recent contributions to the theoretical investment literature, our results offer a 
valuable supplement, as we offer empirical support to the idea that strategic 
investments with real options may give rise to a positive investment/ 
uncertainty relationship. 
 
Over the last 15 years, international oil and gas companies have gone through 
a period of industry upheaval, restructuring and escalating market turbulence. 
Easily accessible oil and gas reserves in market-oriented economies like USA, 
Canada and United Kingdom are faced with depletion. Oil and gas 
investments are now gradually redirected in a rat race for increasingly scarce 
oil and gas resources. Our results should therefore be interpreted in the 
context of strategic investments (Bartolini, 1993; Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004). 
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3.4 Shifting sentiments in company investment 
 
Recent developments in the oil and gas industry suggest that investment 
behaviour is not necessarily stable over time. Changes and shocks in prices, 
liquidity and uncertainty may carry over to management mentality. Moreover, 
substantial shifts in the economic environment of the firm may also induce 
changes in the underlying models of investment behaviour, among managers 
as well as investors. We propose a micro-econometric framework to assess 
how the process of capital formation at the firm-level might be affected by a 
period of far-reaching industrial upheaval and restructuring.  
 
Based on accounting information for 253 companies over the period 1992-
2005, we specify the process of capital formation as an accelerator model with 
error-correction, whereby investment is explained as a continuous adjustment 
process towards a long-term equilibrium relation between capital and output. 
The error-correction process is disturbed by temporary shocks, and by 
variation in a set of financial and operational control variables. Based on the 
industrial restructuring of the late 1990s, we apply a flexible dummy-variable 
(GMM) procedure to test for the presence of a structural break in oil and gas 
company investment. 
 
Our results provide robust evidence for two historical regimes of investment 
behaviour in the international oil and gas industry over the last 15 years; one 
from 1992 to 1997, and one from 1998-2005. The late rise in oil price and 
cash-flows has had a far smaller impact on investment rates than what was 
typical before 1998, suggesting that financial market pressures in the 
aftermath of the Asian economic crisis have caused tightened capital 
discipline in recent years. Moreover, the early 1990s were characterised by a 
negative relationship between investment and uncertainty, whereas the recent 
increase in oil price volatility has spurred investment over the last few years. 
This result is at odds with the vast majority of previous studies of investment 
and uncertainty, but well in line with recent development of theories of 
compound options structures, imperfect competition and strategic investment 
behaviour (e.g., Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004). 
 
Industrial leaders and their companies respond continuously to changing 
political and market environments. Their models and ways of thinking 
may be stable for periods. However, from time to time their mindset is 
also challenged by external forces, and sometimes these pressures bring about 
deeper behavioural changes. Our study demonstrates that such a change took 
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place in the oil and gas industry in the 1ate 1990s, in response to external 
economic shocks and massive pressure from financial markets. 
 
 
3.5 Financial market pressures, tacit collusion and oil price formation 
 
Ever since the oil price shocks of the early 1970s, the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been followed with massive 
interest from the public, reflecting the vital significance of the oil price to 
industry, households and financial markets. The special structure of the oil 
market has also attracted scholarly interest, with numerous studies of OPEC’s 
role and strategy in various models of producer behaviour under imperfect 
competition. Less attention has been given to the role of producer behaviour 
in non-OPEC countries. Nevertheless, investment behaviour in the 
international oil and gas industry is an important part of supply-side dynamics 
in the oil market, and therefore also an important factor behind the formation 
of oil prices. 
 
Figure 10. Company valuation and oil market shares 
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Source: Deutsche Bank (2004), US Energy Information Administration (EIA). 
 
The key hypothesis of this paper is that a strategic redirection of the 
international oil industry towards the end of the 1990s has had long-lived 
effects on OPEC strategies – and on oil price formation. Starting in 1998, 
increased focus on shareholder returns, capital discipline and return on capital 
employed (RoACE) caused a slowdown in investment rates and production 
growth among international oil companies. Thus, the emphasis on short-term 
profitability and financial indicators had the same effect as a coordinated 
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equilibrium of reduced investment, implicitly representing a tacit collusion to 
support an increase in the oil price. At the same time, strong growth in oil 
demand and consolidation in the competitive fringe allowed OPEC to raise 
their price ambitions significantly at the turn of the century. 
 
The objective of this study is to quantify the oil price impact of these 
developments. Using an equilibrium model for the global oil market, we 
examine the effects of the change in investment pattern on oil supply and oil 
prices, as compared with a situation characterised by industrial stability and 
unchanged price ambitions within OPEC. The model simulations clearly 
suggest that enhanced capital discipline caused a temporary slowdown in 
investment and production growth among international oil companies. 
Consequently, global exploration activities, investment expenditures and oil 
production growth were suppressed, allowing OPEC to raise their price 
ambitions. Our results suggest that even temporary economic and financial 
shocks may have a long-term impact on oil price formation. Specifically, we 
find that the curb on IOC investments in the late 1990s caused an increase in 
the oil price of 10 per cent in the long run. Both OPEC and non-OPEC 
producers gain from this development, whereas the cost is carried by oil-
importers and consumers. 
 
 
3.6 Valuation of international oil companies 
 
Since the late 1990s, stock market analysts have focused strongly on short-
term accounting return measures, like RoACE, for benchmarking and 
valuation of international oil and gas companies. To assess important drivers 
of company valuation, a simple econometric model is specified and estimated 
on market and accounting data for 14 major oil and gas companies from 1990 
to 2003. The company-specific valuation multiple EV/DACF is regressed 
against a number of financial indicators, as well as the oil price. Our models 
take into account the potential endogeneity challenge in our data for market 
valuation and company performance. 
 
A key result is that the general perception of RoACE as an important value-
driver is not supported by our estimated model. More precisely, the 
econometric results indicate that the valuation impact of this simple 
profitability measure is negligible. On the other hand, valuation multiples 
respond negatively to an increase in the oil price, implying that oil and gas 
companies are priced at mid-cycle oil prices. The estimated model also 
suggests a robust and material influence on market valuations from oil and gas 
Overview 
 36 
production. This suggests that company size and reputation still plays an 
important role in the valuation process. Finally, reserve replacement ratios 
contribute positively to stock market valuation, but the effect is quite modest, 
and the significance is marginal. 
 
The study elucidates some of the weaknesses of RoACE for company 
valuation purposes. Our primary focus is on inter-company comparisons and 
relative stock market valuation. However, within the individual companies, a 
consistently normalized RoACE may still be a useful key indicator in their 
internal efforts to improve operational and financial performance over time. 
 
This paper represents an early attempt to substantiate the links between 
market valuation and financial and operational indicators in the international 
oil and gas industry. The results are interesting, but preliminary. Our belief is 
that profitability and returns on invested capital is linked to company 
valuations. However, our RoACE variable does not establish this link. Future 
research should explore alternative measures of underlying financial 
performance, to overcome the weaknesses of RoACE. 
 
 
 
4. Unresolved issues/suggestions for future research 
 
 
4.1 Econometrics of effort and efficiency in oil and gas exploration 
 
Efforts of oil and gas exploration on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) 
are addressed in the econometric study of Chapter 2 of this thesis. In addition 
to exploration efforts, resource growth will depend on exploration success and 
average discovery size. This challenge is met by the vector-error-correction 
analysis of Chapter 3. Both these studies leave room for further sophistication. 
First, recent trends in oil and gas exploration activity indicate that companies 
respond swiftly to any oil price drop, whereas the reaction to an oil price 
increase is typically sluggish. An interesting avenue for further research 
would therefore be to allow this kind of asymmetry in the econometric model 
specification. A modelling approach is proposed for exploration activity by 
Mohn and Osmundsen (2007), but how these asymmetries may relate to 
success rates, field size and reserve growth remains an issue for further 
research.  
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To grow and develop their base of reserves, oil and gas companies have at 
least two strategies at their disposal. Exploration drilling is important, but for 
maturing oil fields, efforts to increase oil recovery (IOR) also yield substantial 
results in terms of reserve additions. Consequently, oil and gas companies 
balance their drilling efforts between exploration and production drilling. An 
interesting topic for further research would therefore be to study how 
production drilling has contributed to reserve growth on the NCS, and at best, 
to analyse total drilling efforts in a combined framework of investment 
behaviour. 
 
More work is also required to identify processes of depletion and 
technological progress. A problem with data dominated by the time series 
dimension is that these variables tend to correlate. We have included both 
time trends and depletion variables in our estimated models. However, it is 
hard to claim that either of these proxies represents exact measures of the 
underlying processes we would like to uncover. Data sets with more cross-
sectional variation would probably offer more opportunities in this respect. 
Unfortunately, such a detailed and refined approach would exhaust the limits 
of our data set, and therefore has to be left for future research. Panel data 
studies of fields, regions, or countries should therefore be pursued to grasp the 
full picture of technological progress and depletion mechanisms in oil and gas 
exploration. 
 
Finally, we have based our study on the empirical failure of traditional 
dynamic optimisation models of exploration behaviour. The theoretical point 
of departure for the exploration studies of this thesis is a static, discretionary 
approach to the process of exploration. Another topic for further research 
would be to formulate a dynamic theory of exploration behaviour to support 
our empirical model more rigorously. Such a theory should preferably also 
include the trade-off between various types of investment among the oil and 
gas companies, as well as explicit transmission mechanism for uncertainty 
and asymmetric adjustment costs. 
 
 
4.2 Microeconometric studies of oil and gas investments 
 
Based on micro data for international oil and gas companies, we explore 
issues of investment behaviour also in a generalised panel data setting. In 
Chapter 4, the role of various types of uncertainty is explored in a simple Q 
model approach, whereas shifting sentiments and structural breaks are 
addressed in Chapter 5. These studies reveal specific and interesting new 
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insights on oil and gas investments, with especially thought-provoking results 
for the role of uncertainty. Nonetheless, these papers should be regarded as 
introductory exercises, as they raise a number of new questions in addition to 
the ones they answer. 
 
The uncertainty indicators of our study apply to overall uncertainty like 
general stock market volatility and oil price volatility. The analysis should 
therefore be augmented or replicated with company-specific risk variables to 
test the robustness of our results. The straightforward variable choice for this 
purpose is share price volatility. However, another potential allegation against 
our approach is that our uncertainty measures are historical rather than 
forward-looking. This choice is a conscious one, and well in line with specific 
forms of expectations formation (e.g., adaptive expectations). Still, alternative 
measures of forward-looking uncertainty should also be explored. Candidates 
include uncertainty indicators from survey data, analyst forecasts, implied 
volatility from option markets, and estimated volatility based on ARCH 
specifications. 
 
The application of micro data in studies of oil and gas investment is 
unprecedented. The statistical power of these data sets represents a world of 
opportunities for further sophistication. A well-established modelling strategy 
in similar studies is related to sample splits. Companies can be grouped 
according to special characteristics, and regressions are run on each of the 
groups separately. In the same way, the data set can be grouped according to 
special values or intervals for the explanatory variables, and regressions may 
then be run on each of the sub samples. This technique can be applied not 
only to address cross-sectional variations, but also to study asymmetries in 
investment behaviour.  
 
Finally, we should bear in mind that our studies of oil and gas investment do 
not solve the fundamental conundrums of contemporary empirical investment 
research. Chapter 4 offers an application of the neo-classical q model of 
investment to a panel of international oil and gas companies. Although we 
correct our market-to-book ratio for potential measurement error, the 
fundamental problem of model specification is still unsolved. In Chapter 5, 
we propose an approach to study how companies across an industry may 
move from a situation of financial flexibility to financial friction. However, 
the general role of financial variables in theoretical and empirical investment 
models remains unclear. More work should therefore be done on oil and gas 
company data to help resolve the big issues of modern investment research. 
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4.3 Oil company investment and market interaction 
 
The presented study of company valuation represents an early attempt to 
substantiate the links between market valuation and financial and operational 
indicators in the international oil and gas industry. The results are interesting, 
but preliminary. Our original hypothesis was that company valuations are 
linked to profitability and returns on invested capital. However, our RoACE 
variable does not establish this link. Future research should explore alternative 
measures of underlying financial performance, to overcome the weaknesses of 
our RoACE measure. By including the oil price, we try to isolate the oil price 
effect on RoACE, and to pick up variation in short-term profitability that can 
not be attributed to oil price variation. An interesting direction for future 
research would be to correct the company RoACE measures for oil price 
variation in each company, to establish a more precise indicator of underlying 
financial performance. Such an indicator is more likely to have a robust 
influence on company valuations than our reported RoACE measure. 
 
A weakness with the present valuation study also concerns the quality of the 
data set. With 14 companies over 14 years, the number of observations is 
limited. Moreover, our data set contains information only for large 
multinational companies. A larger set of company data for a wider range of 
companies would increase the statistical power of the econometric analysis, 
and shed better light on the general process of company valuation. A richer 
data set would also make it possible to study variation across (groups of) 
companies in greater detail. In this context, an interesting direction for future 
research would also be to study the stability of the valuation process more 
carefully. Modern econometric techniques may reveal more exact information 
on how the process of capital formation in the oil and gas industry was altered 
in the late 1990s, as demonstrated for business fixed investment in Chapter 5 
of this thesis. 
 
Potential implications of financial market pressures for oil price formation are 
explored in Chapter 6 of the thesis. The study explores the dynamics of the oil 
and gas industry, and illustrates potential implications in terms of OPEC 
behaviour and total oil supply in an interesting way. However, our broad 
model analysis leaves room for improvement as well as further research. 
Ideally speaking, our assertion that financial market pressures implicitly led to 
tacit collusion in terms of reduced investment should be explored further in a 
theoretical framework, with the development of an appropriate theoretical 
model of strategic investment. Moreover, the role and formation of oil price 
expectations deserves a more careful treatment, both for IOC investment 
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behaviour and for OPEC’s investment decision. The exact form of OPEC’s 
preferred oil price trajectory should also be modelled with more rigour. Last 
but not least, there are producers outside OPEC who do not comply with our 
neoclassical assumption of profit maximisation and standard competitive 
investment behaviour. More comprehensive studies are therefore justified for 
the ascending role of countries like China and Russia in global oil and gas 
supply.  
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Abstract1 
 
Reserve replacement remains a key challenge for the international oil and gas 
companies. As market-oriented oil and gas provinces are maturing, 
exploration activity is shifted towards the resource-rich, regulated regimes 
outside the OECD. Regulated oil and gas provinces remain under-explored 
also in econometric terms. In this paper, we specify and estimate an 
econometric model of exploration and appraisal drilling for the highly 
regulated Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) over the period 1965 to 2004. 
Explanatory variables include the oil price, cumulative discoveries and open 
exploration acreage. Estimated error-correction models account explicitly for 
sluggishness and short-term adjustments in exploration drilling. We find 
robust long-term oil price effects on exploration activity, whereas the short-
term response is muted. On the other hand, the temporary influence on 
exploration drilling from licensing rounds for new exploration acreage is 
significant, and so are the feedback effects from historical exploration 
success. At the same time, the longer-term impact of these variables is more 
moderate.   
 
 
JEL classification: C22, G31, Q38  
 
Key words: Oil exploration, Reserve generation; Industrial economics: 
Econometrics  
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Kvaal, Eric Mathiesen, Bård Misund, Knut Einar Rosendahl, Terje Skjerpen, Erik Søndenå, 
Terje Sørenes, Anders Toft, seminar participants at the University of Stavanger and delegates at 
the annual conference of the Norwegian Economist Association in Bergen 5-6 January 2006 for 
valuable comments and discussions. Two anonymous referees also provided very useful 
comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. Introduction   
 
exploration drilling from licensing rounds for new exploration acreage is 
significant, and so are the feedback effects from historical exploration High 
oil prices and “Peak Oil” concerns make investment behaviour and supply 
side dynamics in the oil and gas industry more interesting than ever.2 Several 
commentators and analysts link the current high oil prices to the lack of 
investments in the oil sector, as oil and gas exploration throughout the world 
has failed to respond to increasing oil prices over the last years (Osmundsen et 
al. 2005a, b). At the same time, oil and gas reserves in market-oriented 
economies like USA, Canada and United Kingdom are faced with depletion. 
Oil and gas investments are therefore gradually redirected towards resource-
rich regions of the world (e.g. Russia, Latin America, and the OPEC 
countries), where the degree of regulation and government intervention is far 
higher than Western oil and gas companies have been used to.  
 
Oil and gas exploration has been subject to economic research for decades. 
The attention has largely been concentrated on the US oil and gas industry, 
with some studies also for the United Kingdom. In this article, we present new 
insights on the relation between exploration activities and economic variables 
in the highly regulated industrial environment in Norway,3 the third largest net 
oil exporter in the world. Based on detailed database information from the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, a unique data set has been developed to 
cover the 40-year history of three separate regions of the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS). This panel data set has not been subject to 
econometric studies before. A drilling function is derived from a simple 
theory of exploration, whereby drilling efforts are explained by the oil price, 
cumulative discoveries and available exploration acreage. We estimate error-
correction models that capture sluggishness and short-term dynamics in the 
data, as well as the longer-term relations between drilling efforts and the 
explanatory variables. Finally, we present projections to illustrate how 
exploration activity is affected by changes in oil prices, licensed exploration 
acreage and new discoveries.  
 
                                                 
2 The “Peak Oil” idea stems from Hubbert’s (1962) idea that oil production can be described in 
terms of logistic growth, with subsequent bell-shaped trajectories for reserves and production. 
Today “Peak Oil” refers to the popular discussion of when world oil production will actually 
peak. 
3 For an overview of the regulatory regime in the Norwegian oil and gas industry, see Glomsrød 
and Osmundsen (2005). 
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The Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) is a relatively young oil and gas 
province. The first discovery was made in 1969, and the Ekofisk field was put 
on stream two years later. A number of discoveries were made in subsequent 
years, and laid the foundations for a new and important industry in Norway, 
and a significant supplying region for US and European oil and gas markets. 
In 2005, total petroleum production came in at 257 M scm (4.4 mmboepd). 
Figure 1 illustrates the role of the NCS in the international oil market. The 
Norwegian government has played an active role in the development of a 
Norwegian oil and offshore industry. The strategy for resource management 
and industrial development has been characterised by gradualism. The impact 
of external market forces has traditionally been subdued by a carefully 
developed regulatory system, followed up by well-developed institutions and 
governance systems. For an industry and policy overview of the NCS, see 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2005).  
 
Several resource-rich countries outside the OECD show interest for the 
Norwegian Model for resource management and industrial development. Our 
study of exploration behaviour should be of interest not only to the 
governments in regulated oil and gas provinces worldwide, but also to 
companies who aim at developing new business in the expanding resource-
rich regions outside the OECD area.  
 
Figure. Oil production and net export by country 
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The paper is organised as follows. A brief survey of previous related research 
is offered in Section 2, before a simple theory of exploration based on 
producer behaviour and duality principles is outlined in Section 3. The 
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empirical specification is derived in Section 4 and our data set is presented in 
Section 5. Econometric results are presented and discussed in Sections 6 and 
7, respectively, before some concluding remarks are offered in Section 8.  
 
 
2. Previous research   
 
The combination of geological and economic variables in empirical models of 
exploration dates back some 40 years. By many, Fisher (1964) is claimed to 
have opened this field of research with his seminal econometric studies of US 
oil and gas exploration.  Fisher (1964) estimate equations for the drilling rate, 
success rate and the discovery rate for different US Petroleum Administration 
Defence Districts (PADD) over the period 1946-1955. Explanatory variables 
include oil prices, seismic crews and proxy variables for drilling costs. Based 
on extended versions of the same data set, updates and extensions of the 
Fisher framework were presented in a range of papers for the US oil and gas 
industry over the following 15 years.   
 
Erickson and Spann (1971) expand the set of explanatory variables and 
detected a connection between technological ability and success rates. 
Concentrating on gas exploration, Pindyck (1974) estimates a similar model 
on a broader data set, with quite different results from those of Fisher (1964) 
and Erickson and Spann (1971). Pindyck (1978) was the first to open for the 
aspects of intertemporal maximisation, as he introduced the interest rate in his 
drilling equation. Kolb (1979) concentrates on oil-prone districts in a slightly 
more disaggregated approach. These early Fischer models had a simple 
structure that largely could be justified based on economic fundamental 
principles. However, the theoretical foundation was gradually improved, as 
dynamics and uncertainty were introduced explicitly in the producer’s 
optimisation problem.   
 
The geological approach to exploration and production modelling emphasises 
the importance of physical factors like cumulative production and 
technological conditions, whereas economic factors are typically not 
accounted for. The key reference to this approach is Hubbert (1962), who 
argues that cumulative production evolves according to a logistic growth 
model. A standard result of this literature is that the success rate from 
exploration will depend on the maturity of the petroleum province in question.  
Since the mid 1970s (Bouhabib 1975), cumulative measures of reserves, 
drilling efforts and discoveries have typically been included in the 
econometric exploration models. The role of these variables has been to 
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account for the dampening depletion effects on exploration success and 
consequent reserve additions. Moroney and Berg (1999) illustrate that model 
diagnostics and forecasting performance of simple Hubbert models improve 
when economic and policy variables are included.  
 
A requirement for theory-based econometric research on the oil and gas 
industry is that the data set is generated in an industrial environment guided 
by commercial principles. The quality of the data will usually increase, the 
longer the history of the actual activity. This explains why most of the 
empirical work on exploration behaviour is done in USA. A survey of 
empirical exploration models for the US oil and gas industry is offered by 
Dahl and Duggan (1998). Into the 1990s, some studies also emerged for the 
exploration and production of oil and natural gas on the United Kingdom 
Continental Shelf (e.g., Pesaran 1990; Favero and Pesaran 1994). Based on an 
integrated, dynamic optimisation problem, these studies produce plausible, 
estimated equations for exploration, development and production. However, 
they fail to produce robust estimates in support of intertemporal 
maximisation. Later studies, especially for the US oil and gas industry, have 
therefore relaxed the assumption of intertemporal behaviour, and several have 
returned to the period-by-period optimisation approach (e.g., Iledare 1995; 
Iledare and Pulsipher 1999; Farzin 2001). This behavioural assumption is also 
applied by Ringlund et al. (2004). Still, their econometric specification of 
oilrig activity for a panel of non-OPEC countries is indeed dynamic. Our 
approach will follow a similar line of thought.4  
 
Over the last 15 years, general depletion mechanisms have been supplemented 
with theories for infant-industry cumulative scale economies, stemming from 
learning-by-doing effects in exploration activities (Quyen 1991). One of the 
few attempts to incorporate this kind of industrial dynamics in empirical 
models is represented by Hendricks and Porter (1996), who apply game 
theory to study the impact of information externalities on drilling behaviour in 
the Gulf of Mexico. Rehrl and Friedrich (2005) also account for both learning 
and depletion effects in an applied logistic growth framework for long-term 
analysis of production and price formation in the oil market.  
 
Three different perspectives have been applied to study exploration 
economics.  One approach is to see exploration behaviour from the company’s 
perspective, and base the econometric models on micro data (e.g., Ghouri 
                                                 
4 To test the validity of this assumption, interest rate variables were included in the preliminary 
estimation of our model. However, we were unable to establish plausible and robust estimates 
of their coefficients. 
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1991). An alternative is to consider individual oil and gas fields as the 
principal economic unit, focusing specifically on the life-cycle dynamics and 
vintage issues of oil and gas production (e.g., Iledare 1995). The most 
common perspective is based on aggregate data for regions, countries or 
groups of countries. All the above articles except Ghouri (1991) and Iledare 
(1995) fall into this category, and so does our study.   
 
 
3. A simple model of exploration behaviour   
 
Our theoretical point of departure is a simple model for the technology 
structure associated with the development of oil and gas reserves. Abstracting 
from acquisitions and divestitures, there are two primary sources of organic 
reserve growth. First, the companies may engage in exploration drilling. 
Traditionally, this activity has offered great rewards for the successful 
companies, but the associated risks are also high. Second, the companies may 
invest capital and efforts to increase the recoverable reserves in producing 
fields. Techniques for active reservoir management have come far, and 
include carefully planned drilling of new production wells, various injection 
techniques and other IOR measures to increase recovery and maximise the 
economic value of reservoirs in production and their associated 
infrastructure.5 The risks associated with this type of investments are 
generally lower than for exploration activities, but so are also the expected 
rewards.   
 
Oil and gas producers maximise profits from production and reserve 
generation, as illustrated in Figure 2. As the markets for oil and gas reserves, 
license shares and other petroleum assets have matured, exploration for oil 
and gas reserves has developed into an autonomous profit-generating activity 
among integrated international oil and gas companies. Exploration decisions 
do not necessarily require future development and production. Rather, any 
discovery is evaluated on its own merit, and a range of strategies is available 
for further value optimisation.  
 
 
 
                                                 
5 IOR (Increased Oil Recovery) is the usual concept for measures to extend reserves in NCS 
reservoir management. In other provinces, the EOR (Enhanced Oil Recovery) concept is more 
common. Essentially, these concepts are synonyms. However, their actual content may vary 
marginally across different provinces, according to regional variation in type of efforts and 
techniques. 
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Figure 2. Stylised production structure in an oil and gas company 
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Oil and gas companies employ exploration staff for the long term. A standby 
capacity is maintained over the business cycle, almost independent of 
fluctuations in the oil price and exploration activity from year to year. Seen 
from the oil and gas companies on the NCS, exploration activities are not very 
capital-intensive, as all capital equipment are hired for specific activities. We 
therefore hypothesise a subordinate role for traditional inputs like capital and 
labour in decisions concerning exploration activity. This means that 
fluctuations in exploration activity from one year to another is driven mainly 
by the oil price, and by the availability and quality of exploration 
opportunities.  
 
The role of traditional inputs (capital and labour) is also not well explained by 
empirical studies of exploration behaviour (Dahl and Duggan 1997). Attempts 
have been made to include interest rates and user-costs of capital (e.g. 
Pindyck 1978; Pesaran 1990), but their role is generally not justified by 
econometric evidence. Interest rate variables are therefore normally not 
included in modern empirical exploration studies (e.g., Iledare and Pulsipher 
1999; Farzin 2001; Ringlund et al. 2004). The strongest argument for this 
simplification is that dynamic optimisation is not well supported by previous 
attempts to explain the economics of oil and gas exploration, especially not in 
Europe.6 Human capital and learning-by-doing has drawn some interest in 
theoretical studies (e.g. Quyen 1991; Hendricks and Porter 1996), but so far, 
no clear role is established for labour and labour costs in empirical models of 
exploration behaviour. Based on these results and our own preliminary 
                                                 
6 See Farzin (2001) for a thorough discussion of the failure of interest-rate variables and 
intertemporal maximisation hypotheses in empirical exploration models. 
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findings7, we therefore assume that costs associated with capital and labour 
stem from a standby capacity, and that they are insensitive to fluctuations in 
exploration activity from one year to another. Accordingly, the cost of 
traditional inputs is treated as constant. This means that oil and gas companies 
evaluate their exploration activity from year to year based on the opportunity 
set offered by oil and gas market developments, accumulated underground 
experience and current regulatory conditions – given a fixed capacity of 
labour and capital.  
 
In technical terms, the production technology of exploration is described by a 
well-behaved production function yt = f(zt, x), where yt is annual reserve 
generation, zt is a vector of state and policy variables and traditional inputs (x) 
are treated as fixed. Candidates for the zt vector include licensed exploration 
acreage, cumulative oil and gas discoveries, seismic activity and variables to 
capture technological progress.8 The following revenue function (r(pt, zt)) now 
summarises the income side of our crude model of exploration behaviour:9  
 
{ } .),(..max),( ttttytt yxzftsypzprr ³×==      [1] 
 
pt is the oil price, our proxy variable for the marginal value of oil and gas 
reserves.10 The corresponding profit function is given by:  
 
{ } ,),(..)(),(max),,( ttttytt yxzftsxczprxzp ³-== pp     [2] 
 
where c represent the fixed capacity costs discussed above.  
 
 
                                                 
7 We allowed for general wage and interest rate variables in the early stages of our estimation 
process. Based on statistical evaluation, none of these variables could justify a position in the 
preferred empirical models. 
8 For studies focusing explicitly on technological progress in the exploration process, see 
Forbes and Zampelli (2000, 2002) and Managi et al. (2005). 
9 See Livernois and Ryan (1989) for a discussion of non-jointness and separability issues in oil 
and gas exploration technologies. 
10 Following Iledare (1995), we have also tested the properties of a variety of more 
sophisticated unit cash-flow variables, as well as the adaptive expectations hypothesis for the 
oil price. These variables are typically put together in relations like: vt
e = pt
e(1-ct)(1-tt), where 
vt
e is a proxy for the expected marginal value of reserves, pt
e is the expected oil price, ct is a unit 
cost variable and tt is a corresponding unit tax. However, none of the measures that incorporate 
price expectations, unit costs and tax payments were able to outperform the simple oil price 
variable in our model, and we therefore stay with our plain formulation. 
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Applying Hotelling’s lemma to the profit function of Equation [2], we have 
for the optimal supply plan for new reserves: 
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An asterisk is added to yt* to distinguish optimal reserve generation from the 
actual or observed activity. Positive changes to the oil price are expected to 
stimulate reserve additions – and drilling efforts, whereas the marginal impact 
of changes to the state variables (zt) will depend on the specific nature of these 
variables.  
 
Price expectations and/or adjustment lags in the impact of the explanatory 
variables may cause exploration activity to differ from the desired level 
defined by Equation [3]. The data-generating process may well be 
characterised by sluggishness and dynamics, even if the data is not the result 
of an intertemporal optimisation process. The exploration process may be 
disturbed by contractual obligations, leads and lags in the exploration 
technology, uncertainty about future prices, as well as regulatory constraints. 
We assume that any deviation from the optimal rate of reserve generation is 
adjusted by a constant fraction each year:   
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where an asterisk is appended to separate the optimal reserve requirement (rt*) 
from the observed level (rt). 0 < l < 1 specifies the speed of adjustment. The 
following logarithmic form will have its parallel in our empirical 
specification:11 
 
  .)ln(lnlnln 1
*
11 --- -=- tttt yyyy l        [5] 
                                                 
11 As pointed out by one of the referees, an alternative could be to let the deviation from current 
optimal reserve additions (yt
*/yt-1) determine the pace of adjustment instead of the lagged 
deviation (yt-1
*/yt-1). However, the information set for yt
* is not known with certainty before the 
end of period t. Consequently, yt
* can also not be determined with certainty before the end of in 
period t. We therefore assume that the underlying adjustment is based on the lagged 
equilibrium error – in an econometric specification that encompasses the adaptive-expectations 
hypothesis for the dependent variable (cf. Mizon and Richard 1986). 
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Our empirical specification will support partial adjustment in exploration 
efforts. Further, our empirical model allows for a separation between 
immediate short-term price responses on the one hand, and the long-term 
price effects on the other – driven by gradual adjustment of drilling activity 
and price expectations.12  
 
 
4. Empirical specification    
 
We need a specification of the profit function in [1] that can be estimated by 
econometric methods, taking proper account of the characteristics of the data-
generating process. A simple and tractable point of departure is a Cobb-
Douglas specification for the revenue function in Equation [2]:   
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where k is a constant term, and d and bi represent elasticities of revenue with 
respect to the oil price (pt) and state and policy variables (zit), respectively. We 
also include a time trend (T), to capture the effect on profit from potential 
technological progress (g). Differentiation of [6] with respect to pt now yields 
the following expression for the desired supply of oil and gas reserves: 
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Letting k = ln(Kd) and a = d-1, we now obtain the following (log) linear 
relation between exploration activity and explanatory variables: 
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12 Previous empirical studies of exploration behaviour have generally been in favour of the 
adaptive-expectations hypothesis for oil prices (e.g., Farzin 2001). With our error-correction 
approach, we present estimates for the gradual adjustment of exploration activity. A potential 
source of delayed response is the gradual adaptation of price expectations, but we do not 
estimate this process explicitly. See Prat and Uctum (2001) for a discussion of modelling 
strategies for oil price expectations. 
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Reserve additions from exploration (rt) may be seen as a combined result of 
actual drilling activity (dt) and drilling efficiency (et): ttt edr ×= , where et 
represents drilling efficiency, or average contribution of new reserves per 
exploration well.13 The focus of our study is on drilling efforts, and for the 
remainder of the paper we therefore focus our attention on the dt variable as 
the reserve-generating factor. 
 
As indicated by the partial adjustment mechanism for exploration activity and 
the adaptive expectations hypothesis for prices, there is reason to believe that 
the data-generating process is dynamic by nature. In econometric terms, both 
the dependent and the independent variables in [8] are likely to be non-
stationary. If these variables have a trend, their linear combination may also 
have a trend, and the error term will fail to meet the requirements of standard 
estimation methods. In that case, direct estimation of the parameters will 
produce inefficient coefficient estimates, and the validity of statistical 
inference is therefore problematic. Direct estimation of the structural relation 
will also not describe the dynamics of the data-generating process properly.  
 
However, if the variables in Equation [8] are integrated of degree 1 (I(1)), 
their difference will be stationary (yt ~ I(1) Þ  D yt ~ I(0)). A key result from 
the literature on co-integration and error-correction is that a linear 
combination of non-stationary variables may produce a stationary error-term. 
If such a combination is represented by [6], the variables are co-integrated, 
and their set of coefficients defines the co-integrating vector.14 In this case, we 
may estimate the dynamics of the process in an error-correction specification. 
We now expand our zt vector to include cumulative oil and gas discoveries 
(rest),15 licensed exploration acreage (acrt) and a time trend (T) to capture 
technological progress.  This yields for the equation to be estimated: 
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13 More precisely, drilling efficiency is the product of the success ratio and average discovery 
size. 
14 A pioneering reference to the literature on cointegration and error-correcton is Engle and 
Granger (1987). For a recent survey, see Johansen (2006). 
15 Another candidate for historical exploration success is simply lagged exploration efficiency – 
or discovered resources per exploration well (et). Both these variables have been tested in 
various econometric specifications. Models with lagged efficiency as a proxy for historical 
exploration success generally show weaker statistical performance than the specification in 
Equation [9]. On this background, we conclude that the most relevant information about 
historical exploration success is captured by the evolution of our resource variable (rest). 
Efforts and efficiency in oil and gas exploration 
 61 
where ai and bj are the coefficients to be estimated. Footscript k is introduced 
to represent variation across the three regions of our data set, and ukt is an 
error-term with the usual white noise characteristics. Equation [9] states the 
change in the dependent variable as a function of lagged changes in 
independent variables and the lagged deviation from the underlying structural 
equilibrium, as defined by [8]. The error-term will now be stationary and 
well-behaved, provided that a co-integrating vector is indeed identified by [8]. 
The short-term dynamics of the model is now described by the set of a-
coefficients. These coefficients may be interpreted as instantaneous and 
temporary effects on the dependent variables from changes in the explanatory 
variables. l represents the speed of adjustment, or the error-correction 
coefficient. The long-term structural relationship is established when the 
changes in all variables approach zero. Following Bårdsen (1989), estimates 
for the underlying structural parameters of [8] can therefore be derived 
directly from [9]. Eliminating all change variables in [9], and solving for dkt 
yields for the long-term structural relation:  
 
,lnlnln Tacrrespkd ktacrktrestkt gbba ++++=                 [10] 
 
where the structural coefficients are derived from [9] as: 
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l
b
l
a
l
43210 ,,,,
bbbba
k acrres -=-=-=-=-=         [11] 
 
Standard estimation procedures may now be applied directly on [8] to obtain 
unbiased and efficient estimates for both short-term dynamics and the long-
term underlying structure of our model.  
 
 
5. Data set and variables   
 
Our data set is retrieved from the data bases of the Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, who has collected and processed information and statistics on 
Norwegian oil and gas activities since the early 1970s. We have time series 
for all variables over the period 1965-2004, split between the three major 
offshore regions on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.16 The upper bound for 
the number of observations in our panel is 40x3 = 120. However, observations 
are missing for some of the regions in some of the years. For example, the 
                                                 
16 The North Sea, The Norwegian Sea and The Barents Sea, cf. map in Appendix 1. 
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Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea were not opened for exploration drilling 
before 1980.  
 
Figure 3. Key variables of the data  
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Sources: Oil price: http://EcoWin.com. All other numbers: The Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate.  
 
Our data set contains regional-specific information for discoveries and 
licensed exploration acreage, whereas our proxy for the marginal value of new 
reserves is the same across the three regions. We allow for regional variation 
in the constant term. At the same time, our model implicitly excludes any 
variation in economic effects across regions, as the coefficients are assumed 
to be the same for the three regions involved. In practice, a quite stable group 
of oil and gas companies have had comparable access to the three regions of 
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our data set over the sample period. The political and regulatory regime is also 
the same for the three regions, producing a unified business framework. We 
therefore assume that the underlying economic behaviour represented by our 
data set does not vary across regions.17  
 
Our choice of number of wells as the dependent variable is a result of tests 
and comparisons of a variety of activity measures. An econometric appraisal 
of various activity measures in NCS exploration reveals that a model 
explaining drilling activity in terms of number of wells outperforms 
specifications with alternative activity measures, including drilling footage, 
annual number of drilling days and annual exploration expenditures. Annual 
well-count is a simple and plain activity measure, has an easy interpretation, 
and agrees well with our theoretical specification. The two top panels of 
Figure 3 illustrate how exploration drilling on the NCS has been on a 
downward trend over the last 10 years, in spite of the recent increase in oil 
prices. NPD’s data base system provides characteristics of 3840 wells over the 
period 1965-2004. 30 per cent (1201) of these wells relate to exploration. 
Further, exploration wells are split between wildcats (844) and appraisal wells 
(367). Some exploration wells are oil-prone and others are gas prone, but the 
ex ante uncertainty is very large when it comes to expected type of 
hydrocarbons that is likely to be found. A typical feature for decision 
concerning exploration activities on the NCS is that no clear distinction is 
made between exploration wells for oil and exploration wells for natural gas. 
Consequently, specific data for oil- or gas-targeted exploration is not 
available. We therefore regress the total sum of exploration wells, as well as 
the two specific subgroups (wildcats and appraisal wells), against the 
explanatory variables.   
 
The first explanatory variable is the oil price, as illustrated by the left-hand 
bottom panel of Figure 3. Our choice is Brent blend, the standard reference 
for North Sea crude oil. Preliminary estimations were run on both NOK and 
USD denominations for the oil price, and we have tested the properties of 
nominal versus the real price. Based on these tests, we have come to prefer a 
real USD denomination.18 The result is the oil price series illustrated Figure 3.  
                                                 
17 Ringlund et al. (2004) demonstrate that the oil price sensitivity of exploration drilling may 
vary across regions in an international context. However, they also argue that regulatory 
heterogeneity across countries is the most likely explanatory factor behind the regional 
variation in the economics of the exploration process. 
18 Statistical inference was the key criteria for this selection. However, we also looked at the 
explanatory power of the various model versions, and how different oil price variables 
interfered with the quality of the other coefficient estimates of the model. Based on these 
considerations, the real USD denomination was selected for our preferred versions of the 
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We would also like to include a variable for the cumulation of oil and gas 
resources. Based on various econometric specifications and definitions, we 
arrived at NPD’s estimate for total oil and gas resources on the NCS net of 
undiscovered resources and historic production as the best suited resource 
variable for our modelling purpose. In other words, our resource variable 
(rest) include estimates for recoverable resources in fields and discoveries as 
defined by the NPD. Resource estimates for fields include reserves and 
contingent resources, where contingent resources also include estimates for 
IOR potential. Based on alternative sources, we find that changes in our 
resource variable closely resemble the history of discoveries on the NCS.19 
The development of our measure of cumulated discoveries (net of production) 
is illustrated in the bottom right-hand panel of Figure 3. Strong resource 
growth was provided by huge discoveries during the 1970s and 1980s, but 
over the last 15 years, the stock oil and gas resoures has stagnated, due to 
falling drilling activity and poor exploration results. At the same time, solid 
production rates now contribute to gradual depletion. These are typical 
symptoms of a maturing oil and gas province.  
 
Finally, the bottom right-hand panel of Figure 3 illustrates how exploration 
acreage (acrt) has been regulated by the Norwegian Government. Some 
42,000 km2 were awarded in the 1st licensing round in 1965, ahead of the 
opening of the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Licenses that were handed back 
to the Government towards the mid 1970s reduced the cumulative open 
exploration acreage, before new licensing rounds added new frontier acreage 
in the Norwegian Sea and in the Barents Sea from 1980. Licensing policies 
have been adjusted over the last few years to spur exploration activity, and 
large areas were awarded in mature areas and frontier areas both in 2003 and 
2004.  
 
 
6. Estimation and testing  
 
As described in Section 5, our econometric model consists of two parts. First, 
we have the long-term structural relation between drilling efforts and the 
                                                                                                                    
model. Our choice of oil price denomination also secures consistency of measurement in our 
econometric model – as the left-hand variable is a true volume term. 
19 This resource estimate has been subject to revisions (including re-statements), due to 
technological progress, new information and changes in economic conditions. However, the 
NPD does not provide detailed historical information on these revisions. We therefore have to 
rely on the most recent estimates, including their updated historical records. 
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explanatory variables, as represented by Equation (6). Second, we have the 
econometric specification of the error-correction model, to capture short-term 
dynamics and sluggishness. This approach allows a separation between 
temporary and persistent (structural) effects, as well as an explicit 
representation for the adjustment process towards the structural equilibrium. 
All estimations are performed with fixed-effects panel data procedures, 
whereby regional dummy variables are included and suppressed through 
normalisation around sample means (DVLS).20 Further, our estimation 
strategy follows a general-to-specific approach, starting out with a full-blown 
model, including all explanatory variables. We have tested for a variety of lag 
specifications, and have retained variables and lags that could justify a 
position in the model based on estimated coefficient qualities and more 
general model diagnostics.   
 
Before we present the estimates for the structural and dynamic models, we 
include a note of caution with respect to co-integration. Our hypothesis is that 
the structural equilibrium of our exploration model can be described as a 
cointegrating vector, and we would like to specify a dynamic representation of 
the relationship as an error-correction model. A critical requirement in this 
respect is that our structural equilibrium is indeed characterised by co-
integration.   
 
Strictly speaking, our data set is a panel – consisting of three time series over 
40 years. A consensus is yet to be reached on how to test for co-integration in 
heterogeneous panel data. Some tests have been developed (e.g., Levin and 
Lin 1993; Banerjee 1999) for balanced panels, but challenges remain 
unsettled for our data set due to varying starting points for our time series, as 
well as several gaps.21  We have therefore tested the stationarity properties of 
all our explanatory variables separately for each of the three regions, applying 
both Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron procedures and test statistics.22 
                                                 
20 Our approach is a dynamic econometric model for a panel data set, with large T and small N. 
Modern estimation procedures for dynamic panel data models often involves the GMM 
estimators introduced by Arellano and Bond (1991). However, as pointed out by Bond (2002), 
fixed-effects least squares estimates are consistent in the case of large T panels. 
21 For the first 15 years of our data period (1965-1979), regular drilling took place only in the 
North Sea. In the Norwegian Sea, exploration wells have been drilled every year since the 
opening of the area in 1980. The Barents Sea was also opened in 1980, but since 1994, 
exploration activities in this northern region have been interrupted by both voluntary and 
regulated interludes (cf. upper right-hand pan in Figure 3). 
22 Dickey and Fuller (1981) introduced a popular procedure to test that a variable follows a 
unit-root process.  The null hypothesis is that the variable is contains a unit root, with a 
stationary data-generating process as the alternative. With the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, a 
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Detailed results from these stationarity tests are presented in Appendix 2, 
including results also for the aggregate series for the total NCS. The null of 
non-stationarity is rejected on a 99 per cent significance level for all 
dependent variables (well categories) in all the three regions, as well as for the 
respective aggregate series for the total NCS. Non-stationarity is also rejected 
for the explanatory variables, on a 99 per cent significance level in 11 out of 
12 cases. These results suggest that we have the necessary support for our 
specification of error-correction models for NCS exploration efforts.  
 
We now regress the change in drilling activity (Dlndt) against the change in 
the oil price (Dlnpt), lagged discoveries (Dlnrest), lagged changes in available 
exploration acreage (Dlnacrt), as well as lagged levels of all explanatory 
variables (cf. Equation [7]). Full-blown estimated versions of Equation [7] 
with all explanatory variables are presented in Appendix 3. A time trend was 
also included in our initial estimations (cf. Appendix 3). However, a position 
for this variable could not be justified in our preferred models.23  
 
In our general-to-specific estimation approach, the models have been 
narrowed down, based on parameter inference and general model diagnostics. 
Preferred estimates for the error-correction models are presented in Table 1, 
with p-values of the respective estimates in brackets. Parameter inference is 
                                                                                                                    
regression is run of the differenced variable on its lagged level, as well as its lagged differences 
(sometimes also with a time trend): 
 
 
tjtj
j
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A significant negative parameter estimate for g1 will be supportive of stationarity in Dxt, 
implying that the variable expressed in levels (xt) is integrated of degree 1 (I(1)). The Dickey-
Fuller test accounts for serial correlation by use of additional lags of the first-difference 
variable. Phillips and Perron (1988) introduced a modified variant of this test, whereby a non-
parametric correction of the standard errors is applied to capture serial correlation of the above 
regression. 
23 Various categories of seismic surveying activity have also been tested as proxy variables for 
technological progress in our drilling equations – without success.  As argued by a number of 
authors (e.g, Forbes and Zampelli 2000, 2002; Managi et al. 2005), technological progress 
clearly plays an important role for the productivity of oil and exploration. The development of 
new technologies and competence has contributed to more efficient exploration efforts, also on 
the NCS. New technologies have enabled the companies to drill deeper and more advanced 
wells, increasing their reach and precision. To this end, technological progress has also caused 
NCS success rates to increase over the years. However, the focus of our econometric model is 
not on productivity (success), but on activity (effort). The absence of a time trend in our 
estimated drilling equations is therefore not an argument that technological progress is 
unimportant for oil and gas exploration on the NCS. 
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based on robust standard errors, to adjust for the potential bias arising from 
heteroskedasticity or remaining serial correlation in the residuals.24  
 
When Phillips Petroleum discovered the first huge oil field (Ekofisk) on the 
NCS back in 1969, estimates for recoverable oil and gas reserves on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf were multiplied 15 times from one year to 
another. With the log of cumulative discoveries as one of our explanatory 
variables, the Ekofisk discovery creates a disturbing outlier in our data set. 
We have therefore introduced a dummy variable (Dtres) that takes the value 0 
for years before 1970, and 1 for all years after 1970. The change in this 
variable takes a highly significant parameter estimated in our models, and 
improves the quality both on the parameter estimates and the general model 
diagnostics.  
 
Table 1 shows significant short-term effects on drilling efforts from all our 
explanatory variables, whereas longer-term effects are restricted to the oil 
price and cumulative oil and gas discoveries. According to R2, our models 
account for 50-64 per cent of the variation in the data set.25  Test statistics for 
joint parameter significance are robust, and the null hypothesis that all 
parameters equal zero is rejected on a 99 per cent significance level for all 
three models.  Observe that that the error-correction coefficient is highly 
significant for all models, lending additional support to our hypothesis of co-
integration in NCS exploration efforts. The estimated error-correction 
coefficients also suggest a very rapid adjustment process, as they indicate that 
84 to 89 per cent of last year’s deviation from the structural equilibrium is 
eliminated every year. Short-term oil price effects are significant only for 
appraisal wells, whereas a significant persistent oil price effect is detected also 
for wildcat wells. 
                                                 
24 Estimated standard errors are based on the so-called Huber-White or Sandwich ariance 
estimator (Huber 1967; White 1984). 
25 This may not seem very impressive. However, NCS activity is very volatile, both over time 
and across our three regions. According to rig count data from Baker Hughes over the last 25 
years, average NCS rig activity is below 50 per cent of corresponding activity on the UKCS, 
and less than 15 per cent of the corresponding activity in the Gulf of Mexico. These larger 
provinces also show less relative variation in drilling and rig activity. It is therefore no big 
surprise that the explanatory power is lower for our models on NCS data set than for some of 
the previous time series studies on US and UKCS data. 
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Table 1. Estimated error-correction models for NCS exploration efforts 
 
E&A wells Exploration wells Appraisal wells 
 Estimated coefficients a) 
Intercept   0.51
* 
(0.07) 
    1.18*** 
(0.00) 
   -2.60*** 
(0.00) 
D ln pt 0.20 (0.19)  
    0.57*** 
(0.01) 
D ln rest-1      0.88
*** 
(0.00) 
    0.64*** 
(0.00) 
    1.48*** 
(0.00) 
D Dtres    -1.90
*** 
(0.00) 
   -1.81*** 
(0.00) 
   -2.04*** 
 (0.07) 
D ln acrt-1   0.31
* 
(0.10) 
 0.37* 
(0.07) 
 0.72* 
(0.04) 
ln dt-1 (l)    -0.84
*** 
(0.00) 
   -0.89*** 
(0.00) 
   -0.86*** 
 (0.00) 
ln pt-1     0.21
** 
(0.03) 
   0.18** 
(0.04) 
  0.35* 
 (0.07) 
ln rest-2   0.10
* 
 (0.07) 
     0.34
*** 
(0.01) 
 Model diagnostics 
R2 0.51 0.50 0.61 
Joint 
significance 
F(7, 60) 
= 14.52 
F(5, 62) 
= 10.54 
F(7, 42) 
= 94.08 
Obs. (#) 70 70 51 
Derived structural coefficients (cf. Equation [9]) 
ln pt    0.25
** 
(0.03) 
   0.20** 
(0.03) 
  0.41** 
(0.07) 
ln rest-1    0.12
* 
 (0.06) 
     0.40
*** 
(0.00) 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) p-values in brackets.   
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Figure 4. Estimated NCS drilling efforts  
Model 1: E&A wells 
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7. Discussion of results  
 
Figure 4 illustrates how the model captures the pattern in NCS exploration 
drilling efforts. The structural model for the sum of exploration and appraisal 
wells forms a smoothing trajectory through the more volatile pattern for the 
observed number of wells. The estimated error-correction model picks up 
some of the volatility around the structural relation, but we have to admit that 
some the peaks and troughs in exploration drilling remain unexplained.  
 
Some of our explanatory variables take on robust coefficients in the 
econometric models. But in general, their magnitude is modest. Our structural 
relations imply a long-term elasticity from oil prices between 0.20 and 0.41. 
According to Dahl and Duggan (1998), the average of estimated oil price 
elasticities of US exploration activity exceeds 1. This suggests that the 
exploration response to price changes is lower in a regulated, high-tax 
environment like the Norwegian than for USA. In a recent study of 
exploration activity on the UKCS, Kemp and Kasim (2006) also find the oil 
price influence on exploration efforts to be modest. Ringlund et al. (2004) 
estimate error-correction models for rig activity in six global regions. Their 
results indicate that oil price elasticities oil and gas exploration vary inversely 
with the degree of regulation.   
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Figure 5. Simulation of marginal effects   
E&A Wells: percentage deviation from reference scenario  
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Simulated drilling efforts based on coefficient estimates from Table 1.  
 
Figure 5 illustrate some marginal effects of shifts in the explanatory variables. 
Again, we apply the estimated model for the total sum of exploration wells 
(wildcats + appraisal wells) as a reference, and compute the effects of 3 
different shifts on a 10-year horizon. The first scenario illustrates the effect of 
a 10 per cent permanent increase in the oil price. With an error-correction 
coefficient above 0.8, the adjustment process towards the structural 
equilibrium is rapid, and 99 per cent of the full effect is realised by the end of 
year 3.  
 
The estimated structural relations do not establish a persistent effect between 
available exploration acreage (acrt-1) and exploration drilling. This is the case 
for all our structural relations, and the non-persistent impact of new 
exploration acreage is also clearly illustrated by the second scenario of Figure 
5. However, there are temporary effects from licensing rounds that provide 
interesting insights. A 10 per cent increase in exploration acreage will 
increase the drilling of exploration and appraisal wells by 3 per cent in the 
short-term. This suggests that there are short-term stimulative effects on 
exploration activity, whenever the Government offers new, unexplored 
acreage. But the effect dwindles rapidly, as only the most attractive prospects 
are drilled immediately. Hendricks and Porter (1996) offer support for this 
kind of result in a non-cooperative model of drilling timing, with an 
application for the Gulf of Mexico.  
 
State variables for industrial maturity are usually included in empirical studies 
of exploration behaviour and reserve additions (Dahl and Duggan 1998). An 
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important reason for the inclusion of cumulative discoveries (rest) and open 
exploration acreage (acrt) in our analysis has been to capture the vintage 
dynamics of the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Figure 5 also illustrates the 
effect on drilling efforts from a year with total discoveries of 1.5 bn boe.26 
This representation of exploration success provides an immediate stimulus to 
drilling efforts of nearly 4 per cent. But most of the effect dwindles over time, 
leaving a long-term impact 0.5 per cent. Without new discoveries the stock of 
recoverable oil and gas reserves is reduced continuously through production. 
Accordingly, our estimated coefficients for cumulative discoveries also imply 
that exploration drilling is suppressed when the oil and gas province matures, 
ie. when new discoveries are dominated by depletion.   
 
Finally, observe that our estimated model predicts an increase in exploration 
drilling since the late 1990s (Figure 4), based on observed values for the 
explanatory variables. This is sharply at odds with the realised development, 
as exploration drilling has trended down both in Norway and elsewhere in the 
world over the last 5 years. On the NCS, we saw a record low level of 12 
exploration and appraisal wells in 2005. This stagnation in exploration 
spending has developed in spite of increasing oil prices, reduced production 
costs and substantial offers of new exploration acreage through several 
licensing rounds. One explanation might be a shift in industry behaviour over 
the last few years. After the Asian economic crisis in 1998, temporary 
financial distress led to a strong focus on cost discipline and short-term 
profitability across the oil and gas industry. Companies have also been slow to 
update price expectations after 1998, suggesting that the low oil price 
environment of the late 1990s may have had persistent effects on exploration 
behaviour. We believe that this situation is temporary, and that exploration is 
set to rise as price expectations adjust to the current market situation and the 
focus among oil and gas companies shift back to long-term reserve-generation 
and production growth.27  
 
                                                 
26 Or 240 M scm, which corresponds approximately to the annual production rates over the last 
years. In other words, this is the annual discovery rate required to replace reserves. 
27 See Osmundsen et al. (2006a, 2006b) for recent studies of the links between financial market 
pressures and investment behavior. 
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7. Conclusion  
 
During the last 40 years, exploration activities on the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf have produced enormous oil and gas reserves, and laid the foundations 
for the Norwegian oil and gas industry. The Norwegian government has 
played an active role in the development of the offshore oil and reserves since 
the mid 1960s. The regulatory approach has been guided by prudent 
gradualism, and market forces have not been allowed to dominate the 
industrial arena. Careful industrial, regulatory and macroeconomic 
management has proved successful. During the last years, the Norwegian 
Model for petroleum and resource management has attracted interest in many 
resource-rich non-OECD countries. Norwegian authorities and Norwegian 
companies cooperate actively with the governments of these countries – on 
regulatory framework conditions, technology, and industrial development 
opportunities. We believe that our analysis is relevant for the type of business 
framework many international oil and gas companies will meet in the years 
ahead. 
 
Our models are estimated for a regulated market regime, and the results reveal 
new and interesting insights with respect to exploration behaviour. We 
establish economic effects that are quite robust, but their magnitude is rather 
small compared to previous studies. As found by Ringlund et al. (2004), we 
argue that cross-country variation in exploration behaviour may well be due to 
variation in the degree of regulation.  We establish a robust, long-term impact 
from the oil price, whereas the estimated short- term effects are rather weak. 
Our results also illustrate how new licensing rounds stimulate exploration 
drilling in new attractive prospects. Discoveries are also shown to provide 
additional feedback to exploration drilling, but this drilling response quickly 
culminates in anticipation of new licensing rounds. Our models are quite 
successful in accounting for dynamics and sluggishness in the exploration 
drilling behaviour, and the estimated error-correction models suggest a rapid 
adjustment process. 
 
This paper has addressed one component of resource growth. In addition to 
exploration efforts, resource growth will depend on exploration success and 
average discovery size. Modern investment theory provides interesting themes 
for further empirical research on exploration efficiency and its relation to 
economic variables. Issues of uncertainty, irreversibility and asymmetry could 
be also relevant for the exploration process, but econometric evidence is still 
pending. In a wider perspective, oil and gas companies balance their drilling 
efforts between exploration and production drilling. A topic for further 
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research would also be to study how production drilling has contributed to 
reserve growth on the NCS, and at best, to analyse total drilling efforts in a 
combined framework of investment behaviour.   
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Appendix 1: Offshore regions on the Norwegian Continentals Shelf   
 
 
 
Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate.   
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Appendix 2: Tests for stationarity in ECM variables  
Dickey-Fuller (DF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) test ratios computed in Stata 
 
 
Series 1 Series 2 Series 3 Series 4 
 
 Total 
NCS North Sea 
Norwegian 
Sea 
Barents 
Sea 
Dependent variables 
D ln eawkt 
DF 
PP 
-6.90*** 
-7.25*** 
-6.10*** 
-6.44*** 
-5.90*** 
-5.99*** 
-4.99*** 
-5.59*** 
D ln awkt 
DF 
PP 
-9.63*** 
-11.78*** 
-9.17*** 
-10.57*** 
-5.01*** 
-5.68*** 
..  a) 
..  a) 
D ln ewkt 
DF 
PP 
-6.76*** 
-7.30*** 
-5.55*** 
-5.77*** 
-6.79*** 
-7.20*** 
-5.04*** 
-5.80*** 
Explanatory variables 
D ln pt 
DF 
PP 
-5.96*** 
-5.96*** 
-5.96*** 
-5.96*** 
-5.96*** 
-5.96*** 
-5.96*** 
-5.96*** 
D ln reskt 
DF 
PP 
-5.03*** 
-5.01*** 
-4.97*** 
-4.95*** 
-2.79* 
-2.84* 
-5.97*** 
-5.96*** 
D ln acrkt 
DF 
PP 
-5.69*** 
-5.76*** 
-5.36*** 
-5.48*** 
-4.29*** 
-4.29*** 
-4.93*** 
-4.93*** 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) p-values in brackets.   
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Appendix 3: Full-blown ECM models for NCS exploration efforts  
 
E&A wells Expl. wells Appraisal wells 
Estimated coefficients a) 
Intercept 0.71 
(0.69) 
 0.83 
 (0.73) 
-1.32 
 (0.71) 
D ln pt 0.21 (0.21) 
 0.05 
 (0.78) 
0.51 
(0.04) 
D ln rest-1      0.98
*** 
(0.00) 
     0.76*** 
 (0.01) 
    1.54*** 
(0.01) 
D Dtres    -2.29
*** 
(0.00) 
   -2.09*** 
(0.00) 
-2.19 
 (0.17) 
D ln acrt-1  0.35  (0.17) 
  0.47* 
(0.10) 
  0.73* 
 (0.08) 
ln dt-1 (l)     -0.88
*** 
 (0.00) 
   -0.92*** 
 (0.00) 
   -0.91*** 
 (0.00) 
ln pt-1   0.17  (0.15) 
 0.13 
 (0.43) 
 0.20 
 (0.39) 
ln rest-2   0.26
* 
(0.07) 
 0.21 
 (0.24) 
 0.54 
 (0.08) 
Dt-1res -0.56  (0.20) 
-0.45 
 (0.42) 
-0.41 
 (0.68) 
ln acrt-1 -0.03  (0.85) 
 0.00 
 (1.00) 
-0.15 
 (0.63) 
Trend -0.01 
 (0.20) 
 -0.02* 
 (0.09) 
-0.01 
 (0.33) 
Model diagnostics 
R2 0.52 0.53 0.62 
F( * ) 7.39 8.13 22.32 
Obs. (#) 70 70 51 
Derived structural coefficients (cf. Equation [9]) 
ln pt  0.20 (0.17) 
 0.14 
 (0.44) 
 0.22 
 (0.41) 
ln rest-1     0.30
** 
(0.05) 
 0.23 
 (0.22) 
 0.59* 
(0.06) 
Dt-1res -0.64 (0.19) 
-0.49 
 (0.41) 
-0.45 
 (0.67) 
ln acrt-1 -0.03  (0.85) 
-0.00 
 (0.99) 
-0.16 
 (0.62) 
Trend -0.01 
 (0.18) 
 -0.02* 
 (0.08) 
-0.01 
 (0.31) 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) p-values in brackets.   
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Abstract1 
 
High oil prices and gradual resource depletion have raised global concerns for 
security of energy supply. Successful exploration activity is a critical factor 
for future oil and gas production. Based on standard assumptions of 
neoclassical producer behaviour and modern time series econometrics, this 
study reveals new insights into the process of oil and gas exploration. I find 
that reserve additions are enhanced by an increase in the oil price, due to 
responses both in effort and efficiency of exploration. Moreover, oil 
companies accept higher exploration risk when the oil price is high, implying 
lower success rates and higher expected discovery size. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C22, G31, Q38 
 
Key words: Oil exploration, industrial economics, econometrics 
 
                                                 
1 This study has gained significantly from comments and suggestions from Frank Asche, Petter 
Osmundsen, Knut Einar Rosendahl, seminar participants at the University of Stavanger, 
Statistics Norway, The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, The Norwegian School of 
Economics and Business Administration, and from delegates at the 29th IAEE International 
Conference in Potsdam, 7-10 June 2007. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. Introduction  
 
With brisk economic growth and high oil prices, issues of energy supply have 
ascended on the geopolitical agenda. Global oil demand has been fuelled by 
strong growth, both in the OECD area and in emerging economies – like 
Brazil, Russia, India and China. Consequently, the sharp increase in the oil 
price over the last years has raised concerns among consumer interests about 
the security of supply (e.g., IEA, 2006). However, no oil and gas can be 
produced before the reserves are uncovered and proved through exploration 
activities. It is therefore interesting that the most important strategic challenge 
for the oil industry also relates to reserve replacement. Oil and gas reserves in 
market-oriented economies like USA, Canada, United Kingdom and Norway 
are faced with depletion, and exploration activities are gradually redirected 
towards resource-rich regions of the world (e.g. Russia, Latin America, and 
the OPEC countries). Unless production volumes are replaced through 
successful exploration efforts, the basis for future production will be 
undermined. 
 
The reserve concept is one of the factors that distinguish non-renewable 
resource industries from other industries. Due to this defining property, oil 
companies engage in extremely risky exploration activities to support and 
grow their base of oil and gas reserves, and to sustain production activity over 
the longer term. Among the oil companies, the set of exploration opportunities 
is subject to continuous evaluation and management based on a range of 
criteria relating to geology, technology, economic factors, and public policies. 
The result of this balancing act is a dynamic exploration strategy. Moreover, 
the implied portfolio of exploration drilling activities yields a certain average 
finding rate, a particular distribution of discovery size, and ultimately, a 
specific rate of gross reserve additions. Consequently, the data we observe for 
efforts and efficiency in oil exploration are formed through simultaneous 
decisions in each company. This simultaneity should be appreciated also in 
econometric models of the exploration process. 
 
Drilling efforts have been subject to a wide range of econometric studies since 
the mid 1960s, especially for the US (Dahl and Duggan, 1998). Less attention 
has been paid to the success and efficiency of oil and gas exploration, not to 
mention the interaction between efforts and efficiency. Moreover, only a few 
empirical exploration studies cover more than one oil price cycle. To bridge 
these gaps in the empirical literature on oil and gas exploration, this study 
examines three components of reserve growth simultaneously in an integrated 
novel modelling approach. A simple model for reserve-generation is derived 
Efforts and efficiency in oil and gas exploration 
 84 
from standard neoclassical assumptions of producer behaviour. Fisher’s 
(1964) decomposition of reserve growth is then applied to specify annual 
reserve additions as a result of drilling activity, success rates and average 
discovery size. Co-integration techniques (Engle and Granger, 1987; 
Johansen, 1995) are applied to estimate a vector error-correction model with 
three simultaneous equations for drilling activity, success rates and average 
discovery size, linking the three components of reserve-generation to relevant 
economic, geological and technology variables.  
 
The under-explored data set of the econometric application covers the full 
history of oil and gas exploration on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (1969-
2004), including the last oil price increase. The estimated model gives a 
breakdown of effects from explanatory variables between key components of 
reserve-generation, as well as a systematic separation between short-term 
(temporary) effects and long-term (persistent) effects in the exploration 
process. The proposed model framework allows a detailed analysis of factors 
behind exploration behaviour and reserve generation, including effects of oil 
price changes, historical exploration success, licensing policies, seismic 
surveys, depletion, and technological progress. 
 
In terms of results, the preferred econometric models suggest that reserve-
generation from exploration is influenced by variables of economics, 
regulation, technology, and geology. In the short-term, drilling success has a 
temporary feedback effect on subsequent drilling activity and reserve 
additions. Licensing policies has a potential to stimulate efforts and efficiency 
of exploration, with somewhat higher impact in the short term than in the 
longer term, according to the results. Moreover, accelerating seismic 
surveying activities have had a positive influence on exploration success, 
which may be seen as a reflection of the importance of technological progress 
in the oil exploration process. Finally, the results also suggest that an increase 
in the oil price has a positive effect on both efforts and efficiency in oil 
exploration. The estimated model provides a strong indication that the 
companies’ appetite for exploration risk is increasing in the oil price. 
Specifically, an oil price increase has a negative effect on average success 
rates, but a positive effect on average discovery size. Still, the net effect is an 
increase in yield per effort. Consequently, the results for oil price effects 
suggest a pro-cyclical pattern not only for exploration drilling, but also for 
exploration risk and reserve additions. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of 
previous literature on exploration productivity. A simple model of exploration 
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is outlined in Section 3, before the econometric model is specified in Section 
4. The data set is presented in Section 5, before econometric results are 
outlined and discussed in Section 6. Concluding remarks are offered in 
Section 7.  
 
 
2. Previous research  
 
The combination of geological and economic variables in empirical models of 
exploration dates back some 40 years. Fisher (1964) opened this field of 
research with his seminal econometric studies of US oil and gas exploration, 
estimating equations for the drilling rate, success rate and the discovery rate 
for different US Petroleum Administration Defence Districts (PADD) over the 
period 1946-1955.2 Explanatory variables included oil prices, seismic crews 
and proxy variables for drilling costs. Based on extended versions of the same 
data set, refined updates of the Fisher framework were presented in a range of 
papers for the US oil and gas industry over the following 15 years  (e.g., 
Erickson and Spann, 1971; Pindyck 1974, 1978; Kolb, 1979). Gradual 
improvements were due to improved data availability, more sophisticated 
modelling and additional explanatory variables.  
 
Into the 1990s, some studies also emerge for the exploration and production 
of oil and natural gas on the United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS; e.g., 
Pesaran, 1990; Favero and Pesaran , 1994). These models depart from an 
integrated, dynamic optimisation problem, and produced plausible 
econometric equations for exploration, development and production. 
However, their explanations of exploration efficiency are quite simple, and 
they also fail to establish robust estimates in support of inter-temporal 
maximisation. Later studies, especially for the US oil and gas industry, have 
therefore relaxed the assumption of inter-temporal behaviour, and several 
have returned to the period-by-period optimisation approach (e.g., Iledare and 
Pulsipher, 1999; Farzin, 2001). Implicitly, this behavioural assumption is also 
adopted by Ringlund et al. (2007). Still, their econometric specification of 
                                                 
2 A requirement for theory-based econometric research on the oil and gas industry is that the 
data set is generated in an industrial environment mainly guided by commercial principles. 
Further, the quality of the data will usually increase, the longer the history of the actual activity. 
This explains why most of the work that has been done on the application of economic theory 
to observed exploration behaviour is based on data from USA. 
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oilrig activity for a panel of non-OPEC countries is indeed dynamic. The 
present study follows a similar line of thought3. 
 
Empirical exploration models for the US oil and gas industry are surveyed by 
Dahl and Duggan (1998), who conclude that acceptable models have been 
obtained for drilling efforts, with long-term oil price elasticities above one. 
On the other hand, Dahl and Duggan recommend that more work should be 
done on drilling efficiency. The role of the oil price and technological change 
is especially interesting in this respect, as a role for these variables would 
open for policy implications beyond the stimulation of drilling efforts. Iledare 
(1995) include exploration efficiency (yield per drilling effort) in a two-
equation system of reserve generation. However, economic variables are 
restricted to the drilling equation in his model, with no effects from the oil 
price on yield per effort. Kemp and Kasim (2006) estimate a system of 
equations for the exploration process based on data for five regions on the 
United Kingdom Continental Shelf (UKCS), and also do not include oil price 
variables in the equations for the discovery process. As oil companies adapt 
their exploration strategies according to changes in economic and financial 
conditions, recordings of exploration efficiency will also reflect oil price 
changes. To some extent, this point is acknowledged by Iledare and Pulsipher 
(1999), who estimate drilling effort and efficiency in onshore gas exploration 
in Lousiana (USA). In their estimated equation for drilling efficiency, the oil 
price takes a negative coefficient, and the authors suggest that the reason is a 
negative link between the oil price and average discovery size. However, 
without a split of exploration efficiency between the discovery rate and 
average discovery size, such an assertion remains conjectural. 
 
Learning-by-doing and technological advances play an important role in the 
exploration process (e.g., Quyen, 1991; Hendricks and Porter, 1996). 
However, finding variables to identify these effects precisely remains an 
unresolved issue. A key problem is that variables that capture technological 
progress tend to move monotonically over time, and therefore correlate with 
indicators of maturation and depletion. Moreover, the explanatory content of 
trending explanatory variables may also be mixed. As an example, cumulative 
drilling may be seen both as an indicator of accumulated knowledge (Uhler, 
1979; Iledare, 1995), and a measure of depletion (e. g., Pesaran, 1990). Thus, 
a statistically significant time trend, as well as any other trending variable 
may combine the information of different (opposing) effects. These 
                                                 
3 To test the validity of this assumption, a variety of interest rate variables were included in 
preliminary estimations. However, plausible and robust estimates could not be established for 
any of their coefficients. 
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challenges are hardly overcome by the recent studies of success rates in US 
oil and gas exploration by Forbes and Zampelli (2002, 2002), who suggest the 
use of annual time dummies to assess theimpact of technology change. A 
more promising attempt is offered by Managi et al. (2005), who construct an 
exploration-specific index of technology diffusion for their econometric 
studies of yield per effort in GoM exploration. A natural extension of this 
approach is to study the impact of specific technologies through special 
variables. Still, Forbes and Zampelli (2000, 2002) and Managi et al. (2005) 
limit their scope to exploration efficiency. An econometric model of the 
exploration process should acknowledge the simultaneous interaction between 
efforts and efficiency, and reveal responses from economic, geological and 
technological variables in the short term as well as in the long term. The 
modelling approach of the present study represents an indicative step in this 
direction.  
 
 
3. A simple model of exploration behaviour   
 
The reserve concept is a key characteristic of the production technology in the 
oil and gas industry. Oil companies invest in risky exploration activities to 
grow their reserve base, a critical requirement to sustain production over the 
longer term. Over the last years, markets have developed for oil and gas 
reserves, license shares and other petroleum assets. The implication is that 
exploration decisions do not necessarily require future development and 
production. Rather, any discovery may well be evaluated on its own merit, 
and a range of strategies is available for value optimisation. Oil exploration 
may therefore be studied as a distinct profit-generating activity among oil 
companies.   
 
A simple model for oil exploration may therefore be based on the technology 
structure of reserve-generation. With gross reserve additions (R) as the output 
of the exploration process,  the point of departure for our theoretical model is 
a well-behaved neo-classical production function ),,,( tHXLFR = , where 
L represents variable inputs, X represents fixed inputs and state variables, H is 
an indicator for the depletion of exploration opportunities, and t is an index of 
technological progress, usually represented by a simple time trend. Both the 
efficiency of this process and the accumulation of oil and gas reserves 
contribute significantly to the value of the firm. Consequently, oil companies 
maximise profits from reserve generation subject to output prices, input 
prices, and constraints relating to policy regulations and technology. 
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Under these assumptions, a restricted profit function (P( )) of reserve 
generation may be derived from a representative oil company’s profit 
maximisation problem:  
 
{ }
,),,,(..
max),,,,( ,
RtHXLFts
LWRPtHXWP LR
³
×-×=P=P
     [1] 
 
where P is the marginal value of new oil and gas reserves4 and W represents 
traditional input prices. Previous literature suggests that the role of traditional 
inputs is dominated by other factors in the process of oil and gas exploration 
(e.g., Dahl and Duggan, 1998).  
 
More sophisticated models of capital inputs normally involve explicit 
dynamic behaviour in terms of intertemporal profit maximisation. However, 
the assumption of period-by-period optimisation is justified on several 
grounds. First, this kind of myopic behaviour is well supported by previous 
studies of exploration behaviour, whereas the hypothesis of dynamic 
optimisation is not. In an econometric study of US oil and gas supply, Farzin 
(1986) obtains estimates for the discount rate among 33.4 per cent, implying a 
time horizon of approx. 4 years for their extraction decisions. Another 
example is a study of exploration and production in the United Kingdom by 
Pesaran (1990), where present-value maximisation is also not supported by 
the data. Second, the reserve definition of my study requires that recovery is 
highly likely at current economic and operating conditions. This definition 
implies a higher degree of flexibility than geological definition of reserves, 
and the deviation between the two concepts is determined by continuous 
development in variables relating to economics, policy and technology. Third, 
the hypothesis of discretionary profit-maximisation does not entirely exclude 
the idea of dynamic optimisation. As pointed out by Farzin (2001), period-by-
period maximisation may rather be seen as a special case, whereby the flow of 
future profits is expected to grow at a rate below the discount rate.  
 
                                                 
4 The price of crude oil serves as a proxy in this respect. Following Iledare (1995), econometric 
tests have been performed for a variety of more sophisticated unit cash-flow variables, 
including a variety of adaptive expectations hypotheses for the oil price. These variables are 
typically put together in relations like: Ve = Pe(1-c)(1-t), where Ve is a proxy for the expected 
marginal value of reserves, Pe is the expected oil price, c is a unit cost variable and t is a 
corresponding unit tax. However, none of the measures that incorporate various types of 
adaptive price expectations, unit costs and tax payments were able to outperform the simple oil 
price variable in the estimated models. The outlined plain formulation is therefore maintained. 
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A few theoretical studies of oil exploration have been occupied with human 
capital and learning-by-doing. Quyen (1991) stresses that the discovery of 
new reserves is only one of the motives of oil exploration. In addition, 
exploration drilling will reveal information and insights that may prove useful 
for future exploration activities.5 These learning-by-doing mechanisms are 
linked to key personnel in the exploration process. At the same time, the 
information revealed through drilling efforts has a potential value for both 
partners and competitors in the actual exploration area. Hendricks and Porter 
(1996) apply a game-theoretical modelling framework to analyse how 
information externalities and potential free-riding affect the optimal timing of 
drilling decisions. As expected gains from drilling have to be balanced against 
expected gains from waiting for drilling information in neighbouring areas, 
the result is a war of attrition, giving rise to U-shaped patterns of drilling 
activity in each tract. Strategic interaction also provides an important role for 
human resources in the exploration process. Still, a clear role for labour and 
labour costs in models of exploration behaviour is yet to be established (Dahl 
and Duggan, 1998).  
 
The simple theoretical model of this paper it therefore assumes that costs 
associated with capital and labour stem from a standby capacity, and that they 
are insensitive to fluctuations in exploration activity from one year to 
another.6 The implication is that the portfolio of exploration activities is 
subject to discretionary evaluation and adjustment from year to year, based 
market developments and other changes in the opportunity set – given a fixed 
capacity of capital and labour. Consequently, variable inputs (L) and their 
prices (W) are disregarded in the further development of our model.  
 
To approach the empirical specification, we now assume the following 
multiplicative form for the profit function in Equation [1]:  
 
,),,,(
1
* * tH
n
i
i eXPKtHXP i
dgqa +
=
Õ=P       [2] 
                                                 
5 A popular analogy is found in the classic board game “Battleship”. In the early phases of the 
game, with many ships on the board, expected rewards from bombing are high, with major 
learning effects involved whenever a new ship is hit. However, expected marginal gains, as 
well as the learning effects, drop towards the end of the game, when the majority of ships have 
been sunk. 
6 Wage and interest rate variables were included in preliminary stages of the estimation process. 
However, based on statistical evaluation, none of these variables could justify a position in the 
preferred empirical models. 
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where K is a constant term, and a* and qi* represent elasticities of profit with 
respect to the oil price (P) and state and policy variables (Xi), respectively. 
With a negative coefficient for g, the specified mechanism implies an 
exponential decline in the exploration opportunity set. As found by Iledare 
(1995), this physical rate of decline could potentially be offset by 
technological progress, captured in Equation [2] by the simple time trend t. 
Hotelling’s lemma may no be applied to the restricted profit function in 
Equation [2] to derive the optimal supply schedule for gross reserve additions. 
Specifically, differentiation in Equation [2] with respect to the marginal value 
of new reserves (Pt) yields:   
 
,),,,(
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i
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     [3] 
 
where K = Ka* and a = a*-1. An asterisk is added to R* to distinguish desired 
reserve requirement from the observed level. Equation [3] may be interpreted 
in terms of optimal supply, and establishes a theoretically consistent 
relationship between reserve generation on the one hand and the oil price and 
various state variables on the other, derived directly from the company’s 
profit maximisation problem.7 Positive changes to the marginal value of 
reserves (P) are expected to stimulate reserve additions and exploration 
efforts. The marginal impact of changes to the state variables (X) will depend 
on the specific nature of these variables. The depletion mechanism (H) is 
expected to have a dampening effect on reserve-generation, partially offset by 
technological progress (t).  
 
In a number of previous empirical studies of exploration behaviour, oil price 
effects are confined to drilling activities, whereas success rates and discovery 
size are determined by physical variables (e. g., Pesaran, 1990; Iledare, 1995; 
Kemp and Kasim, 2002, 2006). However, there is reason to believe that oil 
price fluctuation has a direct effect also on the productivity of the exploration 
process, as suggested by equations [10] and [11] (see also Iledare and 
Pulsipher, 1999; Forbes and Zampelli, 2000). Decision-makers in the oil 
companies face a set of exploration opportunities which is subject to 
continuous shocks, due to market developments, changes in regulations, new 
information, and technological innovations. Consequently, the portfolio of 
                                                 
7 The equivalent dual approach is to depart from the cost-minimisation problem of exploration 
activities, and derive a similar relation from the corresponding first-order conditions, whereby 
the marginal value of gross reserve generation is equated to its marginal cost (e. g., Farzin, 
2001). 
Efforts and efficiency in oil and gas exploration 
 91 
exploration activities requires continuous evaluation and management. The 
outcome of this balancing act is a dynamic exploration strategy. Moreover, 
any established combination of drilling activities will yield a certain expected 
finding rate, a particular distribution of discovery size, and ultimately, a 
specific rate of reserve additions.   
 
For these reasons, the data we observe for efforts and efficiency in oil 
exploration are a result of simultaneous decisions in each company. To grasp 
the complexity of the exploration process, we need a model that takes explicit 
account of both the breakdown of reserve-generation and the simultaneity 
between its components. We therefore apply the useful decomposition 
introduced by Fisher (1964), whereby gross reserve additions (R) may be seen 
as the product of the rate of drilling activity (D), the success rate (S), and 
average discovery size (M):  
 
       ),,,(),,,(),,,(),,,( tHXPMtHXPStHXPDtHXPR ××=     [4] 
 
Potentially, the oil price (P) and the vector of state variables (X) may 
influence the growth of oil and gas reserves via each of these three 
components, and an integrated model should provide a portrayal of each of 
these variables. Equation [4] implies a relationship like Equation [3] for each 
of the components of gross reserve generation: 
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where superscripts d, s, and m is introduced to separate coefficients accociated 
with drilling efforts (d) from the corresponding coefficients of the drilling 
success (s) and discovery size (m) equations, respectively. With small-caps for 
natural logs, gross reserve-generation can now be represented by the 
following sum: 
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where: 
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Consequently, the elasticity of reserve additions (Rt) with respect to the 
different explanatory variables may now be studied as the sum of three partial 
elasticities. With small caps as natural logarithms, this implies for the oil price 
elasticity (ep): 
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Corresponding relations apply for the vector of state variables 
( mi
s
i
d
ixi
qqqe ++= ), and for the semi-elasticities associated with depletion 
( msdH ggge ++= ) and technological progress (
msd
t ddde ++= ). 
 
This integrated approach to the exploration process should be fruitful both for 
industry leaders and policy-makers. As an example, consider the influence on 
the exploration process from an increase in the oil price. An oil price increase 
is likely to stimulate drilling efforts. However, if the general risk inclination 
in the industry is affected by the oil price, an oil price increase may also 
induce oil and gas companies to take on higher exploration risk. This could 
imply a selection of more risky exploration wells, a potential reduction in 
discovery rates, and an increase in average discovery size. In turn, these 
processes could very well influence on subsequent drilling efforts. The 
outcome in terms of reserve generation is unclear. However, the involved 
effects may be addressed explicitly within the outlined model specification. 
 
We now proceed to an econometric specification that expands the modelling 
approach even further, to take account of potential interaction between the 
three components of reserve-generation, as well as sluggishness and dynamics 
in the underlying data-generating process.   
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4. The vector error-correction model    
 
Drilling efforts (Dt), drilling success (St) and average discovery size (Mt) are 
the endogenous variables of our model. I propose an econometric 
specification that meets requirements of tractable estimation, takes proper 
account of the dynamics of the data-generating process, and appreciates the 
simultaneity of efforts and efficiency in oil and gas exploration.   
 
From the oil companies’ point of view, the set of available exploration 
opportunities is subject to constant change in external conditions. Examples 
include oil price shocks, changes in regulations, new information, and 
technological advances. Managers respond to these changes through a 
continuous management of their exploration portfolio. The presence of price 
expectations and/or adjustment lags in the impact of the explanatory variables 
may also cause deviation between the actual level of reserve generation and 
the desired level. More specifically, the process of oil exploration may be 
disturbed by contractual obligations, leads and lags in the development of new 
technology, uncertainty about future prices, as well as regulatory constraints 
and other economic, psychological, and technological factors. Thus, the data-
generating process may well be characterised by sluggishness and dynamics, 
even if the data is not the result of a dynamic optimisation procedure. 
 
With annual time series, the variables of my model are also likely to be non-
stationary. Moreover, their linear combination may also be non-stationary. In 
that case, direct estimation of regressions on variable levels yields inefficient 
coefficient estimates, threatening the validity of statistical inference. Simple 
estimation in the levels of the variables will also fail to describe the dynamics 
of the data-generating process. However, if the variables are integrated of 
degree 1 (I(1)), their difference will be stationary: yt ~ I(1) Þ  D yt ~ I(0). A 
corollary from the literature on co-integration is that a linear combination of 
co-integrated non-stationary variables will produce a stationary error-term. A 
pioneering reference to this literature is Engle and Granger (1987), who also 
demonstrate that any set of co-integrated variables has a valid error-correction 
specification.8  The point of departure for the econometric specification is 
given by the following system of dynamic equations: 
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8 Hendry and Juselius (2000, 2001) provide a modern introduction to the econometrics of co-
integration and error-correction models. 
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where yt = [ dt, st, mt  ]´ is the vector of endogenous variables and 
xt = [ pt, et, zt, Ht, t ]´ is the vector of explanatory variables, including the oil 
price (pt), the depletion indicator (Ht) and the technology index (t) for 
simplicity of exposition. Other explanatory variables include a variable for 
licensed exploration acreage (et) at the beginning of year t, a measure of 
seismic surveying activity (zt), and a proxy for maturation/depletion (Ht). All 
these variables will be explained in further detail below. Lag coefficients on 
endogenous variables and exogenous variables are given by the fi and qj 
matrices, respectively. Finally, ut is a 3x1 vector of white-noise residuals. If 
the variables of Equation [13] are co-integrated, both the dynamics and the 
underlying structure of its data-generating process may be estimated in a 
vector error-correction model (VECM) with n lags:  
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where ai are 3x3 matrices of short-term coefficients from lagged changes in 
endogenous variables, and the bi matrices contain short-term coefficients from 
other explanatory variables. The 3x3 matrix of error-correction coefficients is 
given by the 3x3 l matrix, whereas persistent effects from the explanatory 
variables are represented by the 3x5 d matrix. Equation [14] contains a large 
number of variables and coefficients, with high requirements for the data set. 
Our application is based on annual time series data from 1969-2004 (n = 36), 
and the modelling ambitions will have to be adjusted accordingly. With one 
lag and five exogenous variables the following model version is the starting 
point for our econometric application:9 
 
  tttttt uxyxyy +++D+D=D ---- 1111 dlba      [15] 
 
With variables in natural logs, the coefficients of Equation [15] can be 
interpreted in terms of short-term and long-term elasticities. More 
specifically, the b vector contains short-term elasticities of drilling efforts, 
discovery rates and average discovery size with respect to the explanatory 
variables of the model. In the long run, all change variables in Equation [14] 
approach zero. This property can be utilised to bring out the long-term 
                                                 
9 Contemporaneous changes in the explanatory variables were also evaluated in the process of 
estimation. However, based on statistical inference, a position could not be justified for any of 
these variables in the preferred model. For simplicity of exposition, they are therefore left out in 
Equation [15]. 
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parameters (q ) directly from the estimated error-correction model (Bårdsen 
1989). Eliminating all changes and solving for the dependent variables, the 
matrix of long-run coefficients can be derived as: dlq 1--= .  
 
Following Equation [4], total elasticities of reserve generation are computed 
as the sum of partial elasticities, both for short-run (temporary) effects and for 
long-term (persistent) effects. Let ejs , ejl represent total elasticities of reserve 
generation (Rt) wrt. to explanatory variable j in the short run and long run, 
respectively. This yields: 
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Where bji and qji represent short-term and long-term effects on variable i from 
variable j. The calculation of total elasticities of reserve generation gives a 
systematic account for the interaction between efforts, efficiency, and other 
explanatory variables in the exploration process.  
 
 
5. Data set and variables   
 
Time series are retrieved from the data bases of The Norwegian Petroleum 
Directorate, who has collected and processed information and statistics on 
Norwegian oil and gas activities since the mid 1960s. Figure 1, Panel 1 
illustrates total efforts in terms of exploration wells drilled per year (Dt), along 
with accumulated number of exploration wells (Ht), a common proxy for the 
depletion mechanism involved in the exploration process (e. g., Pesaran, 
1990; Iledare and Pulsipher, 1999). Annual well-count is a simple and plain 
activity measure, has an easy interpretation, and agrees well with the selected 
theoretical specification. A typical feature for the NCS is that no clear ex-ante 
distinction is made between exploration wells for oil and exploration wells for 
natural gas. In the present study, the total annual sum of exploration wells 
therefore serves as the key indicator for exploration efforts. Exploration 
activity peaked during the 1980s. Over the last 20 years, exploration efforts 
have stagnated, and so has the number of discoveries.10   
                                                 
10 Observe that the annual number of discoveries (Ft) is given by the product of annual drilling 
activity (Dt) and the annual success rate (St): Ft = Dt 
. St . In a similar fashion, exploration 
efficiency (Gt), or yield per effort, may be defined as the product of the annual success rate (St) 
and average discovery size (Mt): Gt = St 
. Mt . 
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Figure 1. Key variables of the data set 
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Sources: Oil price: www.EcoWin.com. All other numbers: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate. 
 
Key components of exploration efficiency, the average success rate (St) and 
average discovery size (Mt) are illustrated in Figure 1, Panel 2. The largest 
discoveries were made between 1969 and 1980, and recent discoveries are 
miniscule compared to the typical field size of the 1970s. On the other hand, 
the discovery rate has not come down. This suggests that shortage of 
opportunity is offset by improved exploration technology and the 
development of specific geological competence (Forbes and Zampelli 2002, 
2002; Managi et al. 2005). As oil and gas companies minimise their costs of 
reserve generation, the most prospective areas are normally drilled first (e. g., 
Iledare, 1995). The result is large average discoveries and high reserve growth 
in the early phases of an oil and gas province. Over time, the pool of 
undiscovered resources is gradually depleted by exploration activities. 
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Success rates may be upheld through learning-by-doing and technological 
progress, but average discovery size will normally fall.  
 
The first exogenous variable is the oil price (Pt). The preferred choice for this 
study is Brent blend, the standard reference for North Sea crude oil. 
Preliminary estimations were run on both NOK and USD denominations for 
the oil price, and the properties of nominal versus the real price have been 
thoroughly tested. Based on these tests, a real USD denomination is 
favoured.11  
 
Technological progress is captured by a linear time trend. However, the model 
also includes a variable for the intensity of information gathering and 
processing, measured by seismic surveying activity.12 The Zt variable 
represents annual seismic activity measured as square kilometres of survey 
coverage per year. As we see from Figure 1, Panel 3, the Zt variable has a 
significant time trend, and therefore correlates with common measures of 
depletion, which also tend to move monotonically over time. A widely 
applied indicator of depletion is accumulated drilling activity (e. g., Iledare 
and Pulsipher 1999; Managi et al. 2005; Kemp and Kasim 2006), illustrated in 
top left panel of Figure 1. 
 
The right-hand bottom panel of Figure 1 also illustrates how exploration 
acreage (Et) has been regulated by the Norwegian Government. Some 42,000 
km2 were awarded in the 1st licensing round in 1965, ahead of the opening of 
the Norwegian Continental Shelf. Licenses that were handed back to the 
Government towards the mid 1970s reduced the cumulative open exploration 
acreage, before a series of licensing rounds added new frontier acreage in the 
Norwegian Sea and in the Barents Sea from 1980. Licensing policies have 
also been adjusted over the last few years to spur exploration activity, and 
large areas were awarded in mature areas and frontier areas both in 2003 and 
2004. Descriptive statistics for all model variables are offered in Table 1.  
 
                                                 
11 Statistical inference was the key criteria for this selection. However, I also looked at the 
explanatory power of the various model versions, and how different oil price variables 
interfered with the quality of the other coefficient estimates of the model. Based on these 
considerations, the real USD denomination was selected for the preferred versions of the 
model. 
12 Seismic profiles of the underground are acquired by transmitting sound waves from a source 
above or in the substratum. The sound waves travel through the rock layers which reflect them 
up to sensors on the sea bed or at the surface, or down in a borehole. This enables an image of 
formations in the substratum to be formed. The seismic mapping of the Norwegian continental 
shelf started as early as 1962 (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2005). 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for data sample 
 
Variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
Dt 36 27.000 12.89 0 50 
St 36 0.3575 0.1364 0.09 0.71 
Mt 36 53.632 81.385 1.74 335 
Pt 36 31.201 19.179 8.8 81.2 
Et 36 38348 14874 0 65335 
Zt 36 213787 249760 48 803936 
Ht 36 486.55 367.87 0 1080 
 
Source: Norwegian  Petroleum Directorate (D, S, M, E, Z, H; http://www.npd.no), 
ReutersEcowin (P; http://www.ecowin.com).  
 
 
6. Estimation and results   
 
The econometric analysis aims at establishing robust statistical relations for 
the three endogenous variables of the exploration model, explaining their 
development over time in terms of dynamic interaction and influence from 
explanatory variables.i13 As described by Equation [14], changes in drilling 
efforts (Ddt), discovery rates (Dst) and average discovery size (Dmt) are 
regressed against both the changes and the lagged levels of the dependent 
(dt-1, st-1, mt-1) and independent variables (pt-1, et-1, zt-1,Ht-1, t). The error-
correction approach allows a separation between short-term effects, and long-
term impact from the explanatory variables. Further, the error-correction 
model provides explicit estimates for the interlinked adjustment pattern of the 
data-generating process. Due to excessive volatility in drilling rates, discovery 
                                                 
13The size of my data set suggests that a simpler model with one or two equations might 
involve gains both in terms of economic explanation and not least in terms of statistical quality. 
Consequently, my estimations were supplemented with a corresponding single-equation ECM 
model for gross-reserve growth (Rt), as well as a two-equation VECM model for efforts (Dt) on 
the one hand and efficiency (Gt = St
.Mt) on the other. However, none of these alternative 
specifications of gross reserve growth offers an explanation that could be preferred to the 
presented three-equation model. Rather, these simpler specifications show weaker econometric 
performance, and seem to blur the behavioural detail and complexity of the exploration process. 
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rates, and average discovery size (cf. Figure 2), the estimated models are 
based on three-year moving averages for the endogenous variables. All 
estimation procedures are performed with the full-information maximum 
likelihood procedures for dynamic VAR models, as implemented in PcGive 
10 (Dornik and Hendry 2001). 
 
A requirement for our econometric model specification is that the variables 
are non-stationary, and integrated of the same order. We therefore stop for a 
moment to investigate the stationarity properties of the model variables. 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests, Dickey-Fuller generalised least squares tests, 
and Phillips-Perron tests are carried out for all model variables, and their 
results are presented in Appendix 1. Non-stationarity is rejected in only 2 out 
of 21 cases, and we therefore conclude that the variables of our model are 
indeed non-stationary. To rule out higher order integration, the same battery 
of tests is run on the changes of our model variables. Non-stationarity in the 
changes of the variables is rejected for 19 out of 21 cases. Consequently, we 
base our subsequent analysis on the presumption that the variables contain a 
unit root, and specify the exploration process as a model of three simultaneous 
error-correction equations. 
 
The estimation procedure draws on the general-to-specific approach (Hendry 
1995). The starting point of this procedure is a full version of the econometric 
model, including the full set of variables and lags. A sequential reduction is 
then pursued, whereby parameter estimates are eliminated one by one, based 
on statistical significance and their contribution to the general quality of the 
model. However, the present data set calls for modification, as a full-fledged 
version of Equation [14] would exhaust the degrees of freedom. Starting with 
the error-correction matrix (l), the various coefficient matrices have therefore 
been exposed to estimation, testing, and reduction in a sequential procedure.14 
The result was a reduced version of Equation [14], with a narrow set of 
significant parameters and favourable econometric properties. To control for 
potential interaction between groups of variables, each of the previously 
removed variables were re-entered one by one in the final parsimonious 
model, to verify that they really had no significant role to play in the preferred 
model.  
 
                                                 
14 For the nested models in each of these stages, elimination of variables was based on 
consistently calculated confidence levels. Each of the stages in the reduction procedure was 
also monitored and estimation results were recorded for progress appraisal. Improvement in 
model quality was evaluated through the log-likelihood, as well as the Schwartz, Hanna-Quinn, 
and Akaike information criteria. 
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The result of this process is a parsimonious preferred model, represented by 
the following three estimated equations: 
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*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
    p-values in brackets. 
 
The estimated system of equations passes the usual specification tests for 
autocorrelated residuals (LM test statistic: 0.84; p-value = 0.65), normality of 
residuals (LM test statistic: 9.65; p-value = 0.14), and heteroskedasticity (F 
test statistic: 0.38; p-value = 1.00).15 Estimated parameters take plausible 
values and signs. Note that the error-correction coefficients are negative and 
highly significant for all the three equations. This is also an indication for co-
integration (Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado 1992), and therefore supports our 
VECM specification.  
 
Short-term dynamics play a modest role in the exploration process, with an 
exception for drilling activity (dt). Long-run oil price effects are significant in 
all three equations, but not in the short run. New exploration acreage (Det-1) 
largely has a temporary effect on drilling efforts (dt) and success rates (st), 
whereas the impact on average discovery size (mt) is persistent. Moreover, 
drilling efforts seem insensitive to changes in average discovery size. On the 
other hand, an increase in average discovery size has a weak positive effect on 
subsequent success rates.16 
                                                 
15 See Dornik and Hendry (2001) for theoretical background and specific procedures for 
standard specification tests and model diagnostics in PCGive 10. More detailed specification 
tests are presented in Appendix 2. 
16 With a p-value of 0.16, the coefficient on mt-1 in Equation [18] is barely significant in 
statistical terms. However, the variable is still retained in the preferred model to accommodate 
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Changes in the oil price (Dpt-1) have no short-term effect on either of the three 
components of reserve generation, according to the results. On the other hand, 
licensing rounds (Det-1) exert a significant short-term impetus to drilling 
efforts (0.26), to the discovery rate (0.33), and thereby also to reserve 
generation. Following Equation [17], the short term elasticity of reserve 
generation with respect to new acreage (ees) can be computed to 0.68 (p-value 
< 0.00).  This suggests an effective role for licensing policies in the short-
term.17 Finally, an increase in seismic surveying activity (Dzt-1) has a modest, 
instant effect on the finding rate (st), but no effect on drilling activity (dt) or 
average discovery size (mt). 
 
Observe also that the estimated drilling equation implies a significant 
temporary impulse from historical drilling success. As the number of 
discoveries (Ft) is the product of drilling efforts (Dt) and the success rate (St), 
the impact on drilling from historical exploration success can be caluculated 
as the sum of the two relevant short-term elasticities. For the short-term 
elasticity of drilling (Dt) with respect to lagged exploration success (Ft-1), this 
yields: 0.23 + 0.28 = 0.51 (p < 0.00). A temporary feedback from exploration 
success on subsequent drilling efforts and reserve additions is in accordance 
with previous results by Mohn and Osmundsen (2008). 
 
Based on the theoretical model specification, a time trend was entered in 
preliminary estimations, to allow for technological progress. However, this 
variable could not be retained in the preferred system of estimated equations. 
Technological progress plays a potentially important role in the exploration 
process. However, the exact identification of the empirical effects remains an 
unresolved issue (e. g., Forbes and Zampelli, 2000, 2002; Managi et al. 2005). 
The reason is that variables that capture technological progress tend to move 
monotonically over time, and therefore correlate with indicators of maturation 
and depletion.  
 
In the presented model, there is reason to believe that technological progress 
is captured by the variable for seismic surveying activity (Zt). Costs of seismic 
surveying activity have collapsed over the 40-year history of the Norwegian 
Continental Shelf. Previous simple and costly methods have gradually been 
replaced by modern technologies for the collection and processing of 
                                                                                                                    
our hypothesis of three co-integrating vectors, as indicated by preliminary tests of cointegration 
rank performed on the full set of time series variables. 
17 Historically, access to exploration acreage on the Norwegian Continental Shelf has been 
subject to strict regulations and gradual opening of new areas. See Ministry of Petroleum and 
Energy (2005) and Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (2005) for details. 
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enormous amounts of geological information. As we see from Equation [18], 
these activities have a positive and highly significant effect on the success rate 
in NCS oil and gas exploration. 
 
On the other hand, the results do suggest a significant role for the depletion 
mechanism. As we see from Equations [17]-[19], the depletion indicator (Ht) 
is retained only for the field-size equation. As drilling activities cumulate, 
average discovery size tends down. This follows from an exploration 
behaviour whereby prospects with high reserve potential are drilled first. 
Moreover, this part of the results also indicates that the most important role 
for the depletion mechanism in NCS oil and gas exploration relates to 
exploration success, and not to drilling efforts. At this point, the results differ 
from the greater part of previous research on drilling activity (e. g., Dahl and 
Duggan, 1998; Mohn and Osmundsen, 2008). 
 
One possible explanation for this result relates to differences in modelling 
approach. Previous studies have typically focused on single-equation models 
of drilling activity, whereas the present study captures effort and efficiency in 
a simultaneous model. Another possible explanation may be due to 
institutional differences between the NCS and other more market-oriented 
petroleum provinces. Specifically, the gradual opening and strict regulation of 
exploration activities on the NCS may act as a disturbing factor for the 
structural depletion mechanism observed in other less regulated petroleum 
provinces. Finally, depletion mechanisms may also be picked up by the 
increase over time in the success rate (st), which again exerts a negative 
influence on drilling efforts, according to the results. 
 
Persistent effects on the three components of reserve generation from the 
exogenous variables are defined by the co-integrating vectors of the estimated 
system, and correspond directly to the long-term elasticities presented in 
Table 3. Partial and total effects are also illustrated in Figure 2. Following 
Equation [16], significance tests for the long-term parameters are computed 
by testing the validity of equivalent general restrictions on the estimated 
system. The first line of Table 3 contains a summary of estimated oil price 
elasticities (Appendix accounts for the derivation). The oil price exerts a 
persistent influence on all the three components of reserve generation in the 
exploration process (Dt, St, and Mt). As illustrated by Equation [17], the total 
elasticity of reserve generation with respect to the oil price is given by the 
sum of the three partial elasticities. The results imply that an oil price increase 
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of 1 per cent will produce an increase in annual reserve additions by 0.89 per 
cent in the long term.18  
 
Table 3. Long-term elasticities of reserve-generation 
 
 
Reserve 
generation 
(R) 
Exploration 
drilling 
(D) 
Success 
 rate 
(S) 
Field 
size 
(M) 
Oil price (P)     0.89
***
   
(0.00) 
    0.51*** 
(0.00) 
-0.17* 
(0.10) 
  0.55** 
(0.02 ) 
Licensed acreage (E)     0.44
*** 
(0.00) 
0.11 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.28) 
   0.29*** 
(0.00 ) 
Seismic surveys (Z) 0.05 
(0.62) 
-0.16 
 (0.16) 
 0.22*** 
(0.00)   
Depletion (H)    -1.29
*** 
(0.00) 
 0.13 
 (0.35) 
-0.17 
 (0.26) 
  -1.25*** 
(0.00 ) 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. p-values in
 brackets. 
a) Semi-elasticity: percentage change in dependent variable from absolute change in depletion
 indicator. 
 
However, Table 3 and Figure 2 also illustrate that the oil price effect varies 
distinctly across the three equations. Obviously, drilling efforts are 
invigorated by oil price increases, although the effect is quite modest.19 On the 
other hand, discovery rates are suppressed when the oil price increases.  
                                                 
18 Recent trends in oil and gas exploration activity indicate that companies respond swiftly to 
any oil price drop, whereas the reaction to an oil price increase is more sluggish.  This suggests 
the presence of asymmetries in oil and gas exploration behaviour, feeding into oil and gas 
supply (e. g., Kaufmann and Cleveland, 2001). Previous econometric applications include 
studies of price transmissions in commodity markets (e. g., Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel, 
2004; Grasso and Manera, 2006). Due to the limitation of the present data set, these ideas are 
left for future research. 
19 Surveying econometric studies of US exploration activity, Dahl and Duggan (1997) find the 
average corresponding elasticity to exceed one. However, our results resemble previous studies 
of the Norwegian Continental Shelf (Mohn and Osmundsen, 2008) and also compare well to 
international assessments of exploration drilling activity (Ringlund et al., 2007). Both these 
studies suggest that the oil price elasticity of drilling could vary inversely with the degree of 
regulation. With high tax protection (78 per cent marginal tax), oil companies tend to shift 
exploration spending into Norway when the oil price is low, and out of Norway when the oil 
price is high. This tendency contributes to the explanation of moderate oil price elasticities of 
exploration drilling on the NCS. 
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Finally, a positive and highly significant link is established between the oil 
price and average discovery size. A likely interpretation is that oil companies 
adjust their portfolio of exploration activities according to changes in 
economic and financial conditions (Reiss, 1990). In times of high oil prices, 
high cash-flows and high risk appetite, companies tilt their exploration 
activities towards risky areas (frontier exploration), with relatively low 
discovery rates, and with high average discovery size. When oil prices are 
low, cash flows are constrained, and the risk appetite is more modest, 
exploration strategies are typically more cautious. Exploration efforts are 
reduced, and focused in areas with higher discovery rates – and smaller 
expected field sizes (mature areas).20 
 
Figure 2. Decomposed elasticities of reserve generation 
 
Estimated partial and total elasticities by explanatory variable (per cent) 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
Average discovery size
Drilling success
Drilling efforts
0.89
0.05
-1.29a)
Oil price Licensed acreage Seismic surveys Depletion
0.44
 
 
a) Semi-elasticity: percentage change in dependent variable from absolute change in depletion 
 indicator. 
 
The second line of Table 3 summarises the role of access to exploration 
acreage. In the long run, an increase in the amount of available exploration 
acreage by 1 per cent will produce an increase in annual reserve additions by 
                                                 
20 As opposed to frontier exploration areas, mature areas are typically characterized by proven 
exploration models, producing fields, well-developed infrastructure, transport facilities and 
market access. Moreover, exploration activities in these areas are usually directed at smaller 
satellite fields which can be tied back to already producing facilities of larger reservoirs (in 
decline), without the large investments involved by stand-alone field developments in new oil 
and gas regions (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, 2005). 
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0.44 per cent, according to the results. This effect has two significant sources. 
First, a modest increase in drilling activity is sustained even in the long-term 
when new acreage is offered, although the long-term impact is far smaller 
than the short-term effect. Second, new licensing rounds have a positive effect 
on average discovery size. With drilling efforts focusing on the most 
prospective available blocks at any time, it is natural that new licensing 
rounds will result in higher average discovery size. 
 
 
7. Conclusion   
 
An accurate understanding of the economics of oil and gas exploration is 
crucial to provide a complete representation of oil and gas supply. Based on 
standard assumptions of neoclassical producer behaviour and modern time 
series econometrics, this study reveals new insights into the process of oil and 
gas exploration. The estimated model produces plausible and robust estimates 
for short-term and long-term effects from the oil price, licensing rounds and 
seismic surveying activity, and provides a full breakdown of the potential 
sources of growth in oil reserves. 
 
The proposed econometric model provides a framework for specific analysis 
of exploration behaviour, allowing detailed studies of oil price changes, 
exploration success, licensing policies, technological progress, and resource 
depletion. The application on NCS data suggests that material contributions to 
total resource growth work via exploration efficiency, and that studies of 
exploration efforts fall short of explaining the full process of reserve 
generation. The results establish a relation between exploration efficiency, oil 
price, licensing policies and seismic surveying activity. These insights from a 
highly regulated oil and gas province are useful both for companies and 
policy-makers, as oil and gas investment now find their way into new regions, 
with a higher degree of regulation and government intervention than Western 
oil and gas companies have been used to.  
 
My results clearly suggest that variables relating to economics, regulation, and 
technology play an important role for reserve generation through exploration, 
in addition to the physical process of geological depletion. Specifically, short-
term fluctuations in drilling and reserve-generation are influenced by 
historical exploration success. Moreover, licensing policy also has a potential 
to affect both drilling activity and success rates in the short-term, but without 
continuous addition of new acreage, the long-term effects are muffled. The 
estimated effects for seismic surveying activity on the development of the 
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success rate also suggest a significant role for technological progress in the 
model.  
 
According to the preferred econometric model, reserve-generation is 
enhanced by an increase in the oil price, with a long-term elasticity of 0.89. 
Both effort and efficiency in oil exploration is stimulated by an oil price 
increase, according to the results. When the oil price increases, oil companies 
take on more exploration risk. Consequently, discovery rates will fall whereas 
the average discovery size will increase. The net effect is an increase in yield 
per effort. The implication is a pro-cyclical pattern for both exploration risk 
and reserve-generation. 
 
There are also interesting policy implications to be made. First, our modelling 
approach clearly illustrates that policy measure need not and should not be 
limited to the regulation of drilling activity. With reserve additions as the 
ultimate target, the potential gains from measures to stimulate the success rate 
or average field size may well exceed the importance of drilling activity. 
Second, our results suggest that annual reserve additions are procyclical, due 
to the strong positive link between the oil price and average discovery size. If 
the government interest is to stabilise reserve growth over time, this result 
provides a case for countercyclical exploration policies. 
 
A caveat of the present study relates to data sufficiency. The presented 
application is done on a rather small data set from the Norwegian Continental 
Shelf. The estimated models provide interesting new insights on the process 
of oil and gas exploration, but the empirical foundation of the results calls for 
additional assurance. An appraisal of the usefulness of the proposed 
modelling framework should therefore await the application of the model to 
other non-OPEC oil and gas provinces. 
 
A interesting route for further sophistication is to test the symmetry of the 
various sources of oil and gas resource growth. As an example, we suspect 
that an oil price drop has a different effect on exploration activity than an 
equivalent increase, at least in the short term. Corresponding asymmetries 
may also be relevant for accumulated discoveries and exploration acreage. To 
develop their base of oil and gas reserves, oil and gas companies balance their 
drilling efforts between exploration and production drilling. A topic for 
further research would also be to study how the balance between production 
and exploration drilling is affected by economic, geological and policy 
variables – at best in a combined framework of investment behaviour. 
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Appendix 1. Stationarity tests for model variables   
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (ADF), Dickey-Fuller GLS tests  (DF GLS),  
and Phillips-Perron tests (PP).  
 
Levels of variables*) 
 
 dt st mt pt et zt ht 
ADF  -0.16 0.82 -1.06 0.36 0.45 0.83 3.38 
DF GLS -1.01 -3.32* -3.67* -1.59 -1.42 -2.17 -0.56 
PP 0.39 -1.29 -1.08 0.36 0.40 0.74 1.20 
 
Changes in variables*) 
 
 Ddt Dst Dmt Dpt Det Dzt Dht 
ADF  -3.1*** -4.1*** -5.1*** -4.3*** -3.7*** -6.3***  -4.7*** 
DF GLS -3.1** -2.9 -5.2*** -4.3*** -4.1*** -8.3***   -1.41 
PP -3.4*** -8.0*** -6.2*** -6.0*** -5.8*** -9.3*** -11.7*** 
 
Note: Dickey and Fuller (1981) introduced a popular procedure to test that a variable follows a 
unit-root process.  The null hypothesis is that the variable is contains a unit root, with a 
stationary data-generating process as the alternative. With the augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(ADF), a regression is run of the differenced variable on its lagged level, as well as its lagged 
differences (sometimes also with a time trend): 
 å
=
-- +D++=D
n
j
tjtjtt vxxx
2
110 fff
 
The unit root test involves a null hypothesis that f1 = 0, against f1 < 0. Non-rejection of the 
null is an indication that the variable expressed in levels (xt) is non-stationary. Elliot, 
Rothenberg and Stock (1996) propose a modified version of the Dickey-Fuller test, based on 
detrending via generalised least squares (DF GLS), for improved power and precision. The 
Dickey-Fuller test accounts for serial correlation by use of additional lags of the first-difference 
variable. Phillips and Perron (1988) introduced a modified variant of this test (PP), whereby a 
non-parametric correction of the standard errors is applied to capture serial correlation of the 
above regression. 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) All variables in natural logs; drilling effort (dt), success rate (st), average field size (mt), 
 real oil price (pt), licensed exploration  acreage (et), seismic surveying activity (zt), 
 depletion indicator (ht). 
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Appendix 2. Specification tests and model diagnostics 
 
 
 Drilling 
activity 
dt 
Success 
rate 
st 
Discovery 
size size 
mt 
Full 
model 
VECM 
LM (1,2) F(*,*) 2.64
* 
(0.09) 
2.92* 
(0.08) 
1.64 
(0.22) 
0.85 
(0.63) 
ARCH (1,2) F(*,*) 0.56 
(0.58) 
1.51 
(0.24) 
0.35 
(0.71) .. 
Normality (LM) c2(*) 6.19
* 
(0.05) 
0.37 
(0.83) 
5.64* 
(0.06) 
9.94 
(0.13) 
Heteroskedasticity F(*,*) 0.39 
(0.96) 
1.21 
(0.47) 
0.19 
(1.00) 
0.38 
(1.00) 
 
Note: LM (1,2) represents the Lagrange Multiplier test for autocorrelated residuals (Dornik and 
Hendry 2001), whereby estimated residuals are regressed on original variables and lagged 
residuals. The null is no autocorrelation. There are weak indications of autocorrelation in the 
drilling and success rate equations, but not for the systems version (VECM) of the test. The 
second line is the autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) test (Engle, 1982). The 
present form tests the joint significance of lagged squared residuals in the regression of squared 
residuals and lagged squared residuals. Again, the null is that the model is well-behaved. The 
ARCH test can not reject the null that the model is ok for any of the equations of the system. 
The third line is the Lagrange multiplier test for normality of the residuals. This follows the 
procedure by Doornik and Hansen (1994), and tests whether the skewness and kurtosis of the 
residuals correspond to those of a normal distribution. Under the null, the residuals comply 
with the normal distribution. Again, we have indications of non-normality in the drilling and 
field-size equations. However, normality of the residuals is not rejected for the systems version 
of the test. The fourth line presents the test for heteroskedasticity proposed by White (1980). 
An auxiliary regression is involved, whereby the squared residuals are regressed on the original 
variables and their squares. By rejection, this test implies that the variance of the error process 
depends on the regressors and their squares. Non-rejection implies that the model is all right. 
No indications of heteroskedasticity are revealed by this test. 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively 
a) p-values in brackets.   
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Appendix 3. Long-term elasticities of reserve generation   
 
Letting all changes in Equations [17]-[19] approach zero, and solving for the 
dependent variables yields the following system of long-term equations: 
 
tttt epsd
**
)01.0(
**
)01.0(
*
)09.0(
14.038.076.0ˆ ++-=              [A4.1] 
 
tttt zpms
***
)00.0(
*
)08.0()26.0(
22.024.014.0ˆ +-=              [A4.2] 
 
 tttt Hepm
***
)00.0(
***
)00.0(
**
)02.0(
25.129.055.0ˆ -+=             [A4.3] 
 
*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
    p-values in brackets. 
 
The long-term impact on reserve generation from a change in the oil price is 
the sum of the impact on each of the three long-term equations (cf Equation 
[12]). The straightforward solution would be to pick out the oil price 
coefficients directly from the long-term equations and calculate their sum. 
However, this approach will neglect the simultaneity of the three equations, 
and more sophistication is therefore required. As an example, the oil price 
effect on drilling activities (dt) will depend not only on the estimated direct oil 
price effect (0.38), but also on repercussions via the success rate (st) and 
average discovery size (mt). Accordingly, the overall oil price effect on 
drilling is calculated as: 
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Applied to the estimated system of long-term equations, this yields: 
 
55.014.076.0)24.0(76.038.0 ××--×-=
D
D
p
d
            [A4.5] 
 
The result is an estimated long-term oil price elasticity of drilling at 0.48. A 
restriction that this combined coefficient equals zero is clearly rejected 
(p < 0.00). Consequently, the estimated long-term oil price elasticity of 
drilling is significant at a 99 per cent confidence level. For the success rate 
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equation ( tsˆ ), this procedure gives an estimated long-term oil price elasticity 
at -0.15 (p = 0.13), and 0.69 (p < 0.00) for the field size equation ( tmˆ ). In 
summary, we now have: 
 
***
)00.0(
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This is the procedure applied to derive the long-term elasticities of Table 3. 
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Abstract1 
 
Standard theory of irreversible investments and real options suggests a 
negative relation between investment and uncertainty. Richer models with 
compound option structures open for a positive relationship. This paper 
presents a micro-econometric study of corporate investment and uncertainty 
in a period of market turbulence and restructuring in the international oil and 
gas industry. Based on data for 170 companies over the period 1992-2005, we 
estimate four different specifications of the q model of investment, with 
robust results for the uncertainty variables. The estimated models suggest that 
financial market volatility creates a bottleneck for oil and gas investment and 
production, whereas oil price volatility has a stimulating effect. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C32, G31, L72 
 
Key words: Capital formation, uncertainty, dynamic panel data models.  
                                                 
1 The authors would like to thank Frank Asche, Petter Osmundsen, Knut Einar Rosendahl, 
Sigbjørn Sødal, seminar participants at the University of Stavanger, delegates at the annual 
conference of the Norwegian Economist Association in Tromsø (4-5 January 2007) and at the 
9th IAEE European Energy Conference in Florence (10-13 June 2007) for valuable comments 
and discussions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. Introduction   
 
Economic theory is yet to produce a clear-cut conclusion on the sign of the 
investment-uncertainty relationship. Standard theory of irreversible 
investment and real waiting options suggest that the relationship is negative 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). However, recent contributions (e.g., Smit and 
Trigeorgis, 2004) point out that investment implies not only the sacrifice of a 
waiting option, but also a potential reward from the acquisition of future 
development options. For the oil and gas industry, increased oil price 
volatility will increase the value of both these types of real options. Thus, the 
theory of compound options may give rise to a positive relationship between 
investment and uncertainty (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Sarkar, 2000). 
Empirical studies are therefore required to settle the question.  
 
Our study combines investment theory with modern econometric procedures 
to test the impact of industry uncertainty and market turbulence on total 
investment expenditures in the oil and gas industry. Applying modern panel 
data estimators on a data set covering 170 companies over the period 1992-
2005, our approach draws on recent empirical research of the relation between 
investment and uncertainty.2 A Q model of investment is derived and 
augmented with measures for overall risk and industry-specific risk. The 
inclusion of stock market and oil price volatility in our econometric model 
produces highly significant parameters, suggesting that Q does not offer the 
exhaustive prediction of investment implied by theory. Still, our results are 
unanimous on the sign of the investment uncertainty relationship. General 
financial market uncertainty seems to be negatively related to investment 
among the companies in our sample, well in line with theoretical results from 
the irreversibility literature. On the other hand, industry-specific uncertainty 
may be under the influence of compound options, as an increase in oil market 
volatility has a highly significant and positive effect on capital formation in 
the oil and gas industry.  
 
A growing mistrust developed between oil companies and the capital markets 
over the 1990s, as the management of the companies had offered inferior 
investment returns for several years (Antill and Arnott, 2002). Triggered by 
the temporary oil price collapse in 1998, pressures for operational and 
financial performance in the short term were coupled with demands for 
increased dividends to shareholders. A combined result of these developments 
                                                 
2 Carruth, Dickerson and Henley (2000) offer a comprehensive survey of the empirical 
literature on investment and uncertainty. See Bond et al. (2005) for a recent overview of studies 
based on company data. 
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was a wave of mergers and acquisitions that erased former prominent 
independent names such as Elf, Fina, Mobil, Amoco, Arco, YPF, Texaco, 
Phillips, Lasmo, and Unocal. The international oil and gas industry entered a 
new stage towards the end of the 1990s, with heavy focus on production 
growth, cost-cutting, operational efficiency and short-term profitability. Huge 
cash-flows were building when the oil price started increasing at the turn of 
the century, and a large share was returned to shareholders, through 
comprehensive share buyback programmes and extraordinary dividends. 
 
Figure 1. Oil price and financial market volatility 
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Volatility: Annualised standard deviation of daily price/index change (250 days rolling data 
window). See Section 5 for details. 
Source for oil price and stock market data: Reuters Ecowin (http://www.ecowin.com). 
 
A reflection of these events and trends is that international oil and gas 
companies were faced with increasing uncertainty over the 1990s. This mirror 
image can be traced in relevant commodity and financial markets. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, a period of oil price stability was succeeded by 
increasing volatility from the mid 1990s, culminating with the oil price slump 
caused by the Asian economic crisis in 1998. The scope of this study is to 
explore how these developments influenced the formation of capital in the oil 
and gas industry. More precisely, our econometric assessment may be seen as 
a test of how the industrial upheaval of the late 1990s may have affected 
investment, production and oil supply from the international oil and gas 
companies in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief review of previous 
research on investment and uncertainty, focusing especially on empirical 
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studies. Our econometric specification is outlined in Section 3. A brief tour of 
the data set is the subject of Section 4. Estimation procedures and results are 
presented and discussed in Section 5, before some concluding remarks are 
offered in Section 6.  
 
 
2. Previous research  
 
The sign of the investment uncertainty relationship has received interest from 
theorists and empirical researchers for many years. Early theoretical 
contributions (e.g., Oi 1961; Hartman 1972; Abel 1983) stress the 
implications of convexity of the profit function. This property stems from 
standard neoclassical theory of producer behaviour, and implies that price 
variation may be exploited for profit maximisation. In this framework, an 
increase in uncertainty will raise the marginal valuation of investment, giving 
a positive link between capital-accumulation and uncertainty.  
 
Academic interest in theories of investment behaviour was spurred by 
theoretical work in the early 1980s, when Cukierman (1980), Bernanke 
(1983), McDonald and Siegel (1986) studied the implications of irreversibility 
and waiting options for investment decision-making. Irreversibility provides 
firms with a real option to defer investment. Any increase in the uncertainty 
around future profitability will enhance the value of this waiting option, 
implying a negative investment response to increased uncertainty. However, 
this conclusion is relaxed in recent contributions to the literature on strategic 
investment and real options. As pointed out by Smit and Trigeorgis (2004), 
the decision to invest implies not only the sacrifice of a waiting option, but 
also a potential reward from the implicit acquisition future development 
options.3 Higher uncertainty will increase the value of both these types of real 
options (Kulatilaka and Perotti 1998; Sarkar 2000).4 At the same time, the 
value of waiting options is also eroded by imperfect competition and strategic 
investment (Grenadier 2002; Akdogu and MacKay 2007). Empirical studies 
are therefore required to determine the sign of the investment-uncertainty 
relationship.  
 
                                                 
3 See Schwartz and Trigeorgis (2004) for an updated compilation of the relevant literature on 
real options and investment under uncertainty. 
4 This is also in line with recent contributions to the theoretical investment literature, where 
asymmetries relating to irreversibility do not hold independent of decision horizon. In a model 
with (long) investment lags, Bar-Ilan and Strange (1996) conclude that uncertainty may have an 
invigorating effect on capital formation.  
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According to a survey by Carruth, Dickerson and Henley (2000), empirical 
studies confirm a quite robust negative link between investment and 
uncertainty, with more clear-cut results for studies of micro data than for 
aggregate data. Modern panel data techniques have also stimulated a variety 
of empirical studies, and most of these are also supportive of a negative 
impact of uncertainty on investment. See Bond et al. (2005) for a recent 
overview.  
 
A range of options is available for uncertainty indicators, and no consensus is 
yet obtained for the appropriate way to proxy uncertainty in empirical models. 
Fuss and Vermeulen (2004) applies business sentiment surveys to address 
price and demand uncertainty, as perceived by company managers in 
Belgium. Guiso and Parigi (1999) retrieve their measures for demand 
uncertainty from an investment survey among Italian business leaders. Bond 
et al. (2005) derive proxies for uncertainty from the observed spread in 
analysts’ earnings forecasts. An alternative method is to incorporate risk 
measures embedded in the term structure of relevant prices, like interest rates 
or option prices (e.g., Ferderer 1993).  
 
Volatility forecasting models are common in early empirical studies of 
investment and uncertainty, whereby expectations were approached through 
predictions from ARCH or GARCH models estimated on high-frequency data 
(e.g., Price, 1996). The strength of this approach lies in the explicit address of 
expected volatility. However, this strategy also introduces model uncertainty 
in two stages.5 Furthermore, ARCH and GARCH models estimated on high-
frequency data will usually imply a low persistence of shocks for our purpose. 
The majority of recent work therefore relies more directly on observed 
uncertainty measures, and so will our modelling approach. However, our 
approach does not rest on a single scalar measure of uncertainty, like share 
price volatility. Rather, we define uncertainty variables to enable an 
independent address of two distinct sources of uncertainty, in the capital 
market on one hand, and the oil market on the other. 
 
A few econometric studies have also addressed the development of oil and gas 
fields in the context of irreversible investments, but the empirical findings are 
mixed for the influence of uncertainty. In a study of UK oil and gas fields, 
Favero, Pesaran and Sharma (1992) conclude that uncertainty plays an 
important role for the appraisal lag. Hurn and Wright (1994) find no statistical 
                                                 
5 Volatility predictions become sensitive to model choice and exhibit substantial variation 
across alternatives. The validity of the model specification becomes momentous to the validity 
of the predictions. See also Engle (1982) for instructive reflections on this point.  
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significance of oil price variability in their investment equations for oil and 
gas fields in the same region. We are not aware of previous micro-
econometric studies of company data that address investment and uncertainty 
specifically for the oil and gas industry.  
 
 
3. Econometric model specification  
 
Tobin (1969) gave rise to one of the currently most popular models of modern 
empirical investment research, relating investment to the ratio (q) of market 
value of capital to its replacement value. This model is simple and has an 
intuitive appeal. Moreover, theory implies that Tobin’s q represents a 
sufficient statistic for investment, a property that has been tested in a range of 
empirical applications. Popular applications include studies of capital market 
imperfections (Hubbard 1998) and uncertainty (Carruth, Dickerson, and 
Henley, 2000) in investment behaviour.  
 
With standard neoclassical behavioural assumptions, Bond and Van Reenen 
(2007) show that the following linear relationship is implied by the q model of 
investment:6 
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Kt represent the stock of fixed capital, and It is gross investment, Qit = qit - 1, 
and eit is an additive shock to adjustment cost function, normally treated as a 
residual in the econometric specification. We include fixed effects (hi) and 
time-specific error-components (zt) in this error-term according to the 
following structure: eit = hi + zt + eit. Equation [1] is also augmented with a 
vector of uncertainty indicators (st). The first is the volatility of overall stock 
market returns, measured as the annualised standard deviation of daily returns 
on the S&P500 index. We will refer to this measure as general market risk – 
or extrinsic risk. To capture industry-specific or intrinsic risk, we include a 
corresponding volatility measure for the crude oil price. Both variables will be 
defined and discussed in the data section below. 
 
With company data over 14 years, it is hard to believe that the idiosyncratic, 
time-varying error-component (eit) is serially uncorrelated. We therefore 
                                                 
6 See Appendix 1 for the full derivation of the Q model of investment. 
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include lags of both endogenous and exogenous variables, yielding for the 
econometric equation:  
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Based on this specification, we may now test whether the investment impact 
of an increase in uncertainty is temporary ( 0;0 544 =+¹ bbb ) or 
persistent ( 054 ¹+ bb ). Obviously, the same test procedure is available for 
the Qit variable. 
 
Rather than a general investigation of the Q model, the key objective of this 
study is to test the impact of uncertainty on oil and gas investment. We will 
therefore test the robustness of the relationship between investment and 
uncertainty with a variety of control variables. Standard econometric 
procedure is to approach Q via the market-to-book ratio. However, this 
approach involves pitfalls of measurement error, jeopardising not only the 
coefficient estimate for Qit but also the validity of the econometric model 
(e.g., Erickson and Whited 2000). If the ratio of market value to fundamental 
value has a constant expectation, Bond and Cummins (2001) demonstrate that 
q may be identified in a semi-log specification (see Appendix 2 for a formal 
exposition). Our first alternative to Equation [2] is therefore to replace Qit and 
Qit-1 with lnQit and lnQit-1, respectively. With efficient markets, the sharp rise 
in the oil price over the last 10 years should be reflected in company 
valuations, book values, and consequently also in our Qit variable. However, 
this might not be the case in the presence of financial market bubbles and 
noisy share prices. In alternative specifications, we therefore augment both the 
above versions of the model with a cash-flow variable. As we will see, the 
role of our uncertainty variables is quite robust across these specifications. 
 
As shown by Nickell (1981), the lagged endogenous variable does not have 
the desired exogeneity properties in dynamic panel data models. A variety of 
instrumental variable techniques have been developed to handle this 
endogeneity bias. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) propose a 2SLS estimator for a 
transformation in first differences, with instruments that are correlated with 
the transformed lagged dependent variable and orthogonal to the differenced 
error term. Lagged levels of the lagged dependent variables are valid 
instruments to obtain consistent estimates of the dynamic model, according to 
this approach. In a corresponding first-difference GMM framework, Arellano 
and Bond (1991) show that deeper lags of the dependent variables are also 
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valid as instruments. A problem with the original Arellano Bond framework is 
that lagged levels of the dependent variable make poor instruments for first 
differences of persistent time series, and especially for variables that are close 
to a random walk.7 In meeting this challenge, Arellano and Bover (1995) 
demonstrate that additional moment conditions may be provided by the 
inclusion of the original level equations in the system of equations to be 
estimated, with significant efficiency gains. This estimator is referred to as the 
system GMM estimator, and is further refined by Blundell and Bond (1998), 
and Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000). We take advantage of these 
developments in the estimation of Equation [2].   
 
 
4. Data   
 
Our data sample is an unbalanced panel of oil and gas companies (1992-2005) 
drawn from the JS Herold oil and gas financial database.8 We utilise the 
following data items denoted in USD; market capitalisation, total assets, long-
term debt, and capital expenditure. In line with previous literature we use the 
sum of market capitalisation of equity and long term debt in year t divided by 
total assets in year t-1 as our proxy for Tobin’s q. The model variable Qit is 
then defined as: Qit = qit - 1. Investment (Iit) is measured by total capital 
expenditure and the capital stock (Kit) is represented by total assets.9  
 
The JS Herold database consists of financial and operating data from annual 
financial statements of 542 publicly traded energy companies worldwide. 
From this universe we select firms mainly engaged in exploration and 
production (E&P or upstream) activities. This leaves us with 169 oil and gas 
companies, resulting in 169x13 = 2197 potential firm years. Out of these, 827 
                                                 
7 Persistent time series are defined by the role of history for their development, with positive 
correlation between current and lagged values. As an example, consider the simple AR(1) 
process: 
ttt vyy += -1a . Subtracting yt-1 from both sides now yields: tttt vyyy +-=- -- 11 )1(a . 
Consequently, as the autoregressive coefficient a approaches 1, Dyt (= yt – yt-1) will approach a 
random walk (vt). In general, a random walk process (I(0)) for the difference implies that the 
level of the same variable is integrated of degree 1 (I(1)).  
8 Founded in 1948, John S. Herold Inc. is an independent research firm that specialises in the 
analysis of companies, transactions, and trends in the global energy industry. JS Herold serves a 
global client base with analyses and key financial and operational data on the valuation, 
performance, and strategy of more than 400 oil and gas companies (http://www.herold.com/). 
9 Our investment variable is the sum of exploration and development spending. In preliminary 
estimations, separate equations for these to investment types were estimated in a less 
sophisticated specification, with robust results for the uncertainty variables. However, our data 
source does not permit the specification of a Q model for each of these investment types. 
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observations are missing. On the original sample, we apply a number of 
additional sample selection criteria. First, we exclude non-positive values of 
total assets, investment and Q. Second, we leave out observations where firms 
are likely to have undergone substantial changes due to mergers, acquisitions 
or divestments. Using the annual growth rate in total assets as a signal of 
restructuring, we remove observations where companies show annual growth 
in excess of 33 per cent. This particular screening procedure reduces the 
number of observations by 554. This is quite a substantial reduction, and is a 
result of certain characteristics among oil and gas companies.   
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for data sample 
 
 Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
(I/K)it 778 0.183 0.116 0.000 1.108 
(CF/K)it 778 0.072 0.305 0.000 3.385 
Qit 778 0.817 1.080 0.000 9.212 
stm 14 15.411 5.971 7.887 26.081 
stp 14 36.16 10.378 20.149 52.573 
 
Source: JS Herold (http://www.herold.com). 
 
As illustrated in the introduction, our data set covers a period of massive 
restructuring in the oil and gas industry (Weston, Johnson, and Siu, 1999). 
Furthermore, many of the companies use a particular accounting method 
called the successful efforts method (FASB, 1982). Under this method only 
cost incurred from the exploration of successful oil wells are capitalised and 
included on the firms’ balance sheets. Hence, the drilling of a successful oil or 
gas well may result in a substantial change in the balance sheets, especially 
for smaller firms. On a data set of US manufacturing firms, Baum et al. 
(2006) trim by the 5th and 95th percentiles. A similar approach to our data set 
would result in the inclusion of firms with asset growth in excess of 150 per 
cent. We deem our somewhat conservative approach more appropriate for our 
purpose.  
 
After this screening procedure, the data set is down to 778 firm years, or 35 
per cent of the original total. A reduction of 827 (38 per cent) is due to 
missing data, 554 (25 per cent) is due to exclusion of firm-years with extreme 
asset growth, and 38 (2 per cent) is due to other screening procedures. Lags 
and differences shave off another 335 observations, taking the number down 
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to 443 for the estimation of the dynamic model. Descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 1. The average 
investment rate for our sample is about 18 per cent. This is somewhat higher 
than for other comparable studies, due to material capacity growth and 
increasing development costs in the oil and gas industry.  
 
To address general financial market risk as well as industry-specific risk, we 
calculate two different measures of aggregate uncertainty. The first is the 
volatility of the S&P 500 index of the US stock market. The underlying index 
value is adjusted for divident payments, to portray total investment returns. 
The second is a corresponding volatility measure for the oil price. We 
illustrate the methodology for the oil price. Based on daily price (pkt) data for 
the brent blend quality for each of the last 14 years, we calculate annualised 
standard errors of daily returns (rkt=Dpkt, k = 1, 2 . . N, t = 1992-2005):  
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where N is the annual number of trading days (~ 250) and the average daily 
change in each year is used as a proxy for E(rkt). Corresponding volatility 
measures are calculated for S&P 500 index, to produce two annual volatility 
variables for our model. Daily calculations of these volatility measures with a 
rolling window of 250 trading days are illustrated in Figure 1 in the 
introduction. This methodology is according to financial market practice, and 
in line with previous studies (e.g., Paddock, Siegel, and Smith, 1988; Hurn 
and Wright, 1994).  
 
Oil price volatility has increased from an annualised level of 20-30 per cent 
during the early 1990s to 40-50 per cent during 1998-2002, when the oil 
industry was  substantial restructuring and a severe oil price drop occurred 
during the Asian economic crisis (Weston, Johnson, and Siu, 1999). Since 
then, oil price volatility has fallen to levels just below 40 per cent, which is 
slightly higher than average levels from the 1990s.10 From moderate levels 
around 10 per cent, the volatility of US stock market returns increased 
                                                 
10 A standard result from the literature is that the oil price responds positively to increases in 
volatility, due to increased demand for storage (Pindyck, 2001; Geman, 2005). At historically 
high prices, the recent drop in oil price volatility may therefore seem like an oxymoron. One 
possible interpretation is that the oil market has gone through a structural shift. In that case, the 
established new long-term price level may have broken the historical connection between price 
level and price volatility. 
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gradually towards 20 per cent at the end of the 1990s. This volatility increase 
coincided with the “New Economy” optimism, which created a pricing bubble 
in large parts of the equity market at the turn of the century (Shiller, 2000). 
After a temporary peak at approx. 25 per cent in 2003, stock market volatility 
has fallen sharply over the last couple of years, to levels more typical for the 
1990s.   
 
 
5. Estimation and results   
 
We acknowledge the potential endogeneity challenges in our modelling 
framework. First, an endogeneity bias for the lagged endogenous variable of 
dynamic panel data models is firmly established in the literature (e.g., 
Arrellano 2003), as discussed above. Second, there may well be endogeneity 
challenges involved for the Q variable as well. For the last 10 years or so, 
Osmundsen et al. (2006) argue that oil and gas companies have been rewarded 
by the equity market for strict capital discipline. Pressures from financial 
markets have probably put a lid on investments to support the short-term key 
performance indicators in the oil and gas industry, especially return on 
average capital employed (RoACE). As market valuation is the numerator of 
our Q, this variable might therefore also not have all the desired exogeneity 
properties. Consequently, both the lagged endogenous variable and the Q ratio 
are treated as potentially endogenous variables in our estimation framework. 
 
The standard textbook solution to endogeneity is to apply additional 
exogenous variables (which by assumption are uncorrelated with the error 
term) to instrument the suspected endogenous predictor. Unfortunately, 
independent instrumental variables are usually hard to find for the typical 
microeconometric study of company data, and our analysis is no exception. 
However, Arellano and Bond (1991) show that a range of instruments is 
available in the lagged differences and levels of endogenous and 
predetermined variables. We therefore rely on the GMM approach suggested 
by Arellano and Bond, and refined by a range of subsequent contributions. 
See Arellano (2003) for an updated overview.  
 
As pointed out by Bond (2002), instruments in first differences are likely to 
be weak when the individual time series have near unit root properties. The 
original Arellano Bond estimator therefore requires autoregressive parameters 
to be significantly less than one in simple autoregressive specifications. 
Before we proceed to the estimation of the dynamic Q model, we therefore 
check the dynamic properties of our series. A simple AR(1) specification is 
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regressed for each of the variables in our model, using the OLS levels and the 
fixed effects (FE) estimators. Coefficient estimates and p-values for the lagged 
dependent variable are reported in Table 3.  
 
Table 2. AR(1) estimates for model variables 
 
Depvar/ 
Estimator (I/K)it (CF/K)it Qit 
m
ts  
p
ts  
OLS 0.477
*** 
 (0.000) 
0.928*** 
 (0.000) 
0.759*** 
    (0.000) 
0.684*** 
 (0.010) 
  0.302 
   (0.261) 
FE 0.078
*** 
 (0.022) 
0.958*** 
 (0.000) 
0.424*** 
   (0.000) 
  
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) p-values in brackets.   
 
The persistence is highly significant for all variables, but the results do not 
suggest the presence of a unit root for any of them. We therefore apply the 
system version of the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995), including 
the original level equations in the estimated system of equations. Applying an 
instrument matrix with deeper lags of both first-differences and levels of the 
predetermined variables, this procedure provides improved efficiency to the 
original Arellano Bond framework. 
 
The original Arellano Bond procedure involves a two-step GMM estimator, 
whereby a consistent estimate for the weight matrix from a first step is applied 
to obtain the asymptotically efficient estimator in the second step.11 The two-
step estimator involves efficiency gains in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
On the other hand, it has a downward bias, especially in small samples. 
However, Windmeijer (2005) proposes a finite-sample correction of the two-
step covariance matrix, showing substantial accuracy gains in Monte Carlo 
simulations. Our results are based on the small sample adjustment 
recommended by Windmeijer.12 Table 3 presents estimates for four different 
model specifications, the simple Q model with and without the cash-flow 
variable, and the semi-log Q model with and without the cash-flow variable.13  
                                                 
11 All the presented estimations are performed with robust estimators for the covariance matrix. 
12 See Bond (2002) for a discussion of strengths and weaknesses of one-step versus two-step 
GMM estimators. 
13 The models are estimated in Stata 9.0, using the xtabond2 estimator developed by Roodman 
(2006). 
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Table 3: Estimation results, dynamic investment model 
 
 Model 1 Model2 Model 3 Model 4 
Estimated parameters 
(I/K)it-1     0.514
*** 
(0.000) 
     0.432*** 
(0.000) 
     0.474*** 
(0.000) 
    0.346*** 
(0.008) 
Qit, -0.005 (0.523)  
 -0.016* 
(0.059) 
 
Qit-1 0.006 (0.645)  
-0.010 
(0.275) 
 
lnQit,   0.003 (0.555)  
-0.006 
(0.288) 
lnQit-1  -0.002 (0.759)  
0.009 
(0.304) 
(CF/K)it,    0.410 (0.085) 
0.245 
(0.179) 
(CF/K)it-1   -0.433 (0.089) 
-0.263 
(0.176) 
m
ts  
   -0.047*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.037** 
(0.026) 
   -0.048*** 
(0.003) 
  -0.045** 
(0.004) 
m
t 1-s  
    0.034*** 
(0.002) 
   0.027** 
(0.034) 
     0.033*** 
(0.008) 
  0.031* 
(0.054) 
p
ts  
   -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
  -0.009** 
(0.019) 
  -0.011** 
(0.012) 
  -0.012** 
(0.034) 
p
t 1-s  
    0.030*** 
(0.002) 
   0.022** 
(0.048) 
   0.030** 
(0.003) 
  0.028* 
(0.054) 
Model diagnostics 
Wald c2   179.96
*** 
        (0.000) 
  101.22*** 
    (0.000) 
  201.97*** 
    (0.000) 
   71.88*** 
  (0.000) 
Hansen J 67.12 
   (0.246) 
35.05 
    (0.138) 
47.05 
    (0.429) 
30.34 
   (0.299) 
AB AC(1)     -3.72
*** 
  (0.000) 
    -3.26*** 
   (0.001) 
  -1.88* 
   (0.060) 
   -2.23** 
    (0.026) 
AB AC(2) -1.51 
  (0.131) 
 0.13 
  (0.895) 
-1.43 
   (0.152) 
  1.24 
   (0.215) 
Firms 115 99 67 56 
Obs (#) 443 335 220 150 
 
Note: All estimates obtained from the System GMM estimator, as implemented in Stata 9.0 by 
Roodman (2006). The lagged investment rate (I/K)it-1 is treated as endogenous, and 
instrumented according to GMM procedures. The instrument matrix includes lagged differences 
and levels of all explanatory variables in each model. To avoid the problems relating to too 
many instruments (Roodman, 2007), a maximum lag length for instrument variables is set to 3.  
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) p-values in brackets.   
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Explanatory variables include lagged levels of the endogenous variable, as 
well as current and lagged levels of all explanatory variables. The Wald c2 
statistic is a test for joint significance of all model parameters. The Hansen J 
test is a test for the validity of the over-identifying restrictions implied by the 
instrument matrix.   
 
Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend the Sargan statistic to test the 
exogeneity properties of the instruments as a group, with a null of invalidity. 
However, the Sargan statistic is sensitive to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, and tends to over-reject in the presence of either. We 
therefore follow Roodman’s (2006) advise and report the Hansen J statistic,14 
which is robust. AB AC(n) is the Arellano-Bond test for nth-order 
autocorrelation in the differenced residuals, with a null of no autocorrelation. 
Non-rejection of 1st order autocorrelation is as expected, and not critical for 
the validity of the differenced equations. 2nd order autocorrelation in the 
residuals of the differenced model would be more troublesome, as it would 
imply a breach of the assumption of well-behaved residuals in the level 
representation of our model, as specified by Equation (2). 
 
All four specifications pass the battery of specification tests, and show 
satisfactory general performance. Tests for joint parameter significance are 
highly significant and the inclusion of time dummies is strongly justified. 
According to the Hansen J statistic, the validity of our over-identifying 
restrictions can not be rejected for any of the four models. The Arellano Bond 
test statistics suggests 1st order autocorrelation in the residuals of our 
differenced equations, but 2nd order autocorrelation does not seem to be a 
problem. 
 
Observe that the Q ratio does not contribute significantly to the explanation of 
investment rates, according to our results. Estimated parameters for the Qit 
and lnQit variables are highly unstable and statistically insignificant, with one 
exception – where the estimated coefficient takes the wrong sign. 
Consequently, our results suggest that the Q ratio is a poor indicator for 
investment in the international oil and gas industry. Results for the cash-flow 
variable suggest a temporary effect from cash-flow on investment rates, but 
no persistence. The estimated sum of the two cash-flow variables is 
statistically insignificant for both Model 2 and Model 4.  
 
                                                 
14 The Hansen J statistic is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function 
(Hansen, 1982). 
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On the other hand, both volatility measures take stable and highly significant 
parameter estimates across all the four model specifications. The immediate 
investment response to an increase in stock market volatility is negative. 
However, this negative effect is dampened over time, due to the positive 
coefficient of lagged stock market volatility. In contrast to the results for the 
Q ratio, the sum of the two coefficients for stock market volatility is negative 
and highly significant.  
Based on Model 1, various effects of volatility changes are calculated and 
presented in Table 4. From Column 1, we see that the cumulated effect of an 
increase in stock market volatility can be calculated to –0.013, with a p-value 
of 0.001. The implication is that an increase in our annualised volatility 
measure of 1 percentage point will reduce average the average investment rate 
by 1.3 percentage points. Thus, we establish a highly significant negative 
effect between oil and gas investments and extrinsic risk. Abel and Eberly 
(1999) argue that real investment options are appreciated by rational agents, 
and that the effects of uncertainty are embedded in the Q ratio. However, our 
result indicates that company valuation does not fully reflect the influence of 
aggregate uncertainty. This result could be evidence that company managers 
are more sensitive to extrinsic risk than analysts and investors.15  
 
Table 4. Estimated investment-uncertainty effects   
Model 1 
 m
ts  
p
ts  
p
t
m
t ss +  
Contemporaneous effect    -0.047
*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.010*** 
(0.002) 
   -0.057*** 
(0.002) 
Lagged effect     0.034
*** 
(0.002) 
    0.030*** 
(0.002) 
     0.064*** 
 (0.002) 
Long-term effect    -0.013
*** 
(0.001) 
    0.020*** 
(0.003) 
     0.007*** 
 (0.027) 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) p-values in brackets.   
 
As illustrated in the second column of Table 4, results are quite different for 
oil price volatility, our intrinsic (industry-specific) risk indicator. In the short-
term, an increase in oil price volatility of 1 percentage point will reduce the 
                                                 
15 This is not in conformity with the standard result (Cadsby and Maynes, 1998), whereby 
managers are seen as more risk-averse than shareholders, causing investment behaviour 
characterised by inertia and myopic loss aversion. Rather, our result suggests some form of 
over-confidence among managers in the oil and gas industry, along the lines of Malmendier and 
Tate (2005).  This also corresponds well with  
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average investment rate by 1 percentage point. Moreover, the lagged effect of 
oil price volatility takes a positive sign, and is higher in magnitude than the 
current effect. The sum of the two effects is 0.020, with a p-value of 0.003. 
This implies that the longer-term effect of an increase in oil price volatility by 
one percentage point is an increase in the average investment rate by 2 
percentage points.  
 
A simultaneous increase in both uncertainty indicators by one percentage 
point, will produce an immediate reduction in investment. This is in 
accordance with the real options approach to investment, where negative 
effects on investment from uncertainty are especially important in the short 
run (Bloom 2000; Carlsson 2007). However, note also that a persistent 
increase of 1 percentage point in both our volatility indicators produces a 
lasting positive impulse to investment rates (p = 0.027). Our overall results 
are therefore not supportive of the standard result of theories of irreversible 
investment, which normally suggest a negative relationship between 
investment and uncertainty. 
 
Our key findings are also at odds with the bulk of the empirical literature, 
which are dominated by reports of a negative investment-uncertainty 
relationship (Carruth, Dickerson, and Henley, 2000; Bulan, 2005; Bloom et 
al., 2007). Traditionally, the oil and gas industry has a prominent place in the 
investment literature on irreversible investments, and irreversibility is usually 
connected to a negative relationship between investment and uncertainty. 
Favero, Pesaran and Sharma (1992) and Mohn and Osmundsen (2007) are 
examples of previous econometric studies that have detected a negative 
influence from oil price variability on investment in the oil and gas industry, 
although in a quite different context.16 
 
Oil price shocks are usually temporary, and oil companies may therefore 
consider any increase in oil price volatility as a transitory phenomenon. In that 
case, peaking oil price volatility will usually be followed by a period of 
stimulating relief, resulting in a positive lagged effect of oil price volatility 
                                                 
16 Favero, Pesaran and Sharma (1992) apply field data from 53 oil fields on the United 
Kingdom Continental Shelf, and estimate the effect of uncertainty on the appraisal lag (i.e. the 
time span between discovery and development). Mohn and Osmundsen (2007) specify and 
estimate an econometric model of exploration and appraisal drilling on aggregate drilling data 
from the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) over the period 1965 to 2004. The present study 
applies investment data from companies with a live portfolio of projects and assets with a 
variety of regional, technological and maturity characteristics. The approach of this paper is 
probably the best approximation of investment decisions and management behaviour among 
international oil and gas companies. 
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changes. In other words, irreversibility issues may dominate if the increase in 
volatility is viewed as temporary. On the other, the impact of profit convexity 
and/or compound options dominates for any permanent increase in 
uncertainty. We find it interesting that the modern approach to strategic 
investments and compound options is supportive of this kind of result (e.g., 
Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004).  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
 
Over the last 15 years, international oil and gas companies have gone through 
a period of industry upheaval, restructuring and escalating market turbulence. 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, business principles have gradually gained 
additional ground, and today competition among international oil companies 
is more aggressive than ever (Weston, Johnson, and Siu, 1999). Easily 
accessible oil and gas reserves in market-oriented economies like USA, 
Canada and United Kingdom are faced with depletion. Oil and gas 
investments are now gradually redirected in a rat race for increasingly scarce 
oil and gas resources. Our results should therefore be interpreted in the 
context of strategic investments (Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004). 
 
Modern literature of strategic investment embeds issues like real options, 
game theory and imperfect competition, and may therefore be seen as an 
extension of the irreversible investment theory. As pointed out by Kulatilaka 
and Perotti (1998), fixed investment implies not only the sacrifice of a waiting 
option, but also a potential reward from the acquisition of future development 
options. For the oil and gas industry, an increase in the oil price volatility will 
increase the value of both these types of real options. Thus, the theory of 
compound options may give rise to a positive relationship between investment 
and uncertainty.  
 
We specify and estimate a dynamic Q model of investment, augmented with 
various uncertainty indicators as well as a cash-flow variable. The model is 
estimated on a panel of company data over the period 1992-2005, applying 
modern GMM techniques for dynamic panel data models. The model 
performs satisfactory, in terms of parameter significance, specification tests, 
and general model diagnostics. The estimated Q model do not offer a 
satisfactory empirical explanation for oil and gas investments, as suggested by 
theory. Thus, our results suggest that the Q ratio is a poor indicator for 
investment in the international oil and gas industry.   
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Still, we establish a robust link between investment and two sources of 
uncertainty. General financial market risk is negatively related to investment 
among the companies in our sample. On the other hand, oil price volatility 
takes a highly significant and positive parameter value. A possible 
interpretation of this result is the revitalisation Oi’s (1961) argument for “the 
desirability of price instability . . .”. This study therefore suggests a 
revitalisation of return convexity issues in studies of investments, based on 
modern theories of compound options.  
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Appendix 1. Derivation of the Q model 
 
We follow Bond and van Reenen (2007), and consider the profit function of a 
representative firm, given by:  
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F(Kt) is a well-behaved neoclassical production function, Kt represent the 
stock of fixed capital, and It is gross investment. The firm puts its product at 
the market at the price pt. G(It, Kt,et) is an adjustment cost function, ptI is the 
price of investment goods, and et is a stochastic shock to the adjustment 
process. Under standard neo-classical behavioural assumptions, the firm’s 
dynamic optimisation problem is stated as: 
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where Vt is firm value, r+= 11b  is a constant discount factor, and Et[.] denotes 
the expected value conditional on information available in period t. Firm 
value as defined by Equation [2] is maximised subject the usual constraint on 
capital accumulation:  
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where d is an exogenous and fixed rate of depreciation for capital. First-order 
conditions are given by: 
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where the Lagrange multiplier ( )
11
1
-¶
¶
-= t
t
K
V
t dl  represents the shadow value 
associated with capital accumulation. Equation [A1.4] sets this shadow value 
equal to the marginal cost of acquiring an additional unit of capital in period t. 
The first-order condition [A1.5] describes the relation between shadow values 
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in period t and future shadow values. Linear homogeneity of the profit 
function implies:  
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The first-order conditions of Equations [A1.4]-[ A1.5] are now combined with 
[A1.3] to yield: 
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Solving this equation forward we obtain for the value of the firm: 
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We now define marginal qt as the ratio of the shadow value of capital to 
purchase cost I
t
t
pt
q lº . Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that under linear 
homogeneity of the profit function marginal q equals average q. A useful 
implication of the Hayashi conditions is that the unobservable shadow value 
of capital can be related to an observable average q ratio, namely the ratio of 
total asset value to its replacement cost: 
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Equation [9] presents marginal qt as the ratio of Vt to the replacement cost 
value of the capital stock from the previous period. The numerator (Vt) 
represents the sum of discounted cash-flows from the existing capital stock, 
and captures changes in current and expected product prices, production 
plans, unit costs and discount rates. The denominator represents the cost of 
replacement for the capital stock. Thus, Tobin’s q theory of investment 
suggests that companies with superior investment returns (high q) attract more 
capital and spend more on capital investment than underperforming firms.  
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We follow the mainstream approach to adjustment costs, (e.g., Bond et al., 
2005), and assume a quadratic adjustment cost function: 
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where b is a coefficient to represent the importance of adjustments costs. 
Equation [A1.10] states that the unit cost of capital adjustment is a convex 
function of the investment rate, that adjustment costs kick in as soon as some 
investment threshold (a) is passed, and that the investment process is 
disturbed by stochastic shocks (et). With this specification, the first-order 
condition in Equation [4] can be modified into a simple relation between 
investments and the q ratio in company i: 
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where Qit = qit-1, and a and b are parameters of the adjustment cost function. 
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Appendix 2. A specific form of measurement error 
 
A potential wedge between market value (Vt) and fundamental company value 
(VtF) represents the core of the problem of measurement error. With mt as the 
measurement error, the key idea may be summarised as: 
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Noisy share prices and stock market bubbles increases the hazard of relying 
uncritically on market values for the estimation of the Q model. Bond and 
Cummins (2002) propose a modified specification to identify the investment 
model in the presence of measurement error. Their point of departure is a 
specific multiplicative form of measurement error, whereby: 
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The scaling factor follows an AR(1) process with an autoregressive parameter 
equal to one. Taking logarithms now yields: 
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As the applied GMM estimators are based on differences, [A2.1] further 
implies: 
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F
tt VV lnln D=D                [A2.4] 
 
To simplify, if the measurement error is represented by a scaling factor with a 
constant expectation, the percentage change in market value will equal the 
percentage change in the fundamental value. Consequently, a semi-log 
specification of the Q model will allow identification of Q even in the 
presence of measurement error. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Shifting sentiments in firm 
investment: an application 
to the oil industry 
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Abstract1 
 
Recent developments in the oil and gas industry suggest that investment 
behaviour is not necessarily changeless over time. We propose a micro-
econometric procedure to investigate the stability of investment behaviour. 
Applying system GMM methods on a panel data set for 253 oil and gas 
companies over 14 years, we estimate accelerator models of investment with 
error-correction. Robust econometric evidence indicates a structural break in 
oil and gas investment in 1998. The process of capital formation over the last 
years is more flexible than before, with significant and material changes in the 
role of explanatory factors like cash flow and uncertainty. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C32, G31, L72 
 
Key words: Capital formation, dynamic panel data models, structural break 
                                                 
1 This study has gained from comments and suggestions from Frank Asche, Petter Osmundsen, 
Knut Einar Rosendahl, seminar participants at the University of Stavanger, Statistics Norway, 
and Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway) and conference participants at the 2008 FIBE 
conference at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration Bergen. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The process of company investment expenditure and capital formation is 
influenced by a range of internal and external variables, covering aspects of 
economics, policies, institutions and technology. Changes and shocks in 
prices, liquidity and uncertainty may carry over to management mentality. 
Moreover, substantial shifts in the economic environment of the firm may 
also induce changes in the underlying models of investment behaviour. We 
propose a micro-econometric framework to assess how the process of capital 
formation at the firm-level might be affected by a period of far-reaching 
industrial upheaval and restructuring.  
 
This is the first study to apply company data in a micro-econometric 
assessment of investment behaviour in the oil and gas industry. Based on 
accounting information for 253 companies over the period 1992-2005, we 
specify the process of capital formation as an accelerator model with error-
correction (Bean, 1981), whereby investment is explained as a continuous 
adjustment process towards a long-term equilibrium relation between capital 
and output. The error-correction process is disturbed by temporary shocks, 
and by variation in a set of financial and operational control variables. The 
dynamic panel data model is estimated with GMM techniques introduced by 
Arrellano and Bond (1991). Based on the industrial restructuring of the late 
1990s, we apply a flexible dummy-variable technique to test for the presence 
of a structural break in oil and gas company investment.  
 
Our results provide robust evidence for two historical regimes of investment 
behaviour in the international oil and gas industry over the last 15 years; one 
from 1992 to 1997, and one from 1998-2005. Interesting insights are revealed 
by the shift in various coefficients of our model. Specifically, the late rise in 
oil price and cash-flows has had a far smaller impact on investment rates than 
what was typical before 1998, suggesting that financial market pressures in 
the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis have caused tightened capital 
discipline in recent years (Osmundsen et al., 2006). Moreover, the early 1990s 
were characterised by a negative relationship between investment and 
uncertainty, whereas the recent increase in oil price volatility has spurred 
investment over the last few years. This result is at odds with the vast majority 
of previous studies of investment and uncertainty (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Carruth et al., 2000), but well in line with recent development of theories of 
compound options and strategic investment (Abel et al., 1996; Smit and 
Trigeorgis, 2004). As far as we can see, this kind of robust empirical support 
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for a positive investment/uncertainty relationship is unprecedented in 
econometric studies. 
 
Figure 1. Investment indicators in the international oil and gas industry 
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Oil price volatility: Annualised standard deviation of daily price change (250 days rolling data 
window). 
Sources: Investment indicators: Deutsche Bank (2005), oil price and stock market data: Reuters 
Ecowin (http://www.ecowin.com). 
 
From around 1985 and towards the end of the 1990s, the international oil and 
gas companies were exposed to extensive changes in their market, business 
and political environment. Oil and gas production temporarily lost its former 
national, political and strategic superstructure, and financial principles gained 
ground. Processes commonly referred to as globalisation advanced rapidly, 
with far-reaching implications in terms of economic and financial integration, 
intensified restructuring and improvement efforts, accelerating technology 
diffusion, enhanced competition and increased uncertainty. International oil 
and gas companies were hesitant in responding to these changes, and were 
outpaced by the emerging industries of telecom, media and technology 
(TMT).  
 
Towards the end of the 1990s, oil companies’ failure to deliver satisfactory 
investment returns triggered a massive pressure for restructuring, strategic 
change and improved financial performance (Weston et al., 1999). A 
combined result of these developments was a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions that erased former prominent independent names such as Elf, 
Fina, Mobil, Amoco, Arco, YPF, Texaco, Phillips, Lasmo – and recently also 
Unocal. The international oil and gas industry entered a new stage towards the 
end of the 1990s, with heavy focus on production growth, cost-cutting, 
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operational efficiency and short-term profitability. Scorecards of key 
performance indicators were presented to the financial market, as an implicit 
incentive scheme between investors and senior management in the companies. 
Osmundsen et al. (2007) discuss potential implications for capital formation 
and oil supply, but an empirical analysis of investment behaviour through the 
period is yet to be published. 
 
Due to strengthened capital discipline (Dobbs et al., 2006), oil and gas 
exploration and production activities has failed to respond to increasing oil 
prices over the last years. Figure 1 illustrates that production growth among 
Western major oil and gas companies has remained low in the aftermath of 
the Asian Economic Crisis in 1998. The figure also shows that the share of 
exploration spending in total E&P investments has been cut back substantially 
since 1990. However, an increasing share of oil industry investments has been 
directed at short and medium term development projects rather than long-term 
reserve replacement. 
 
These developments clearly suggest that the mechanisms of investment 
behaviour are not necessarily stable over time. Financial friction may both be 
raised and resolved by exogenous disturbances. Similarly, demand and price 
shocks, changes in industry structure and competition, financial market 
pressures and policy changes may change company managers’ attitudes to risk 
and uncertainty.  The role of these variables in investment behaviour should 
therefore be addressed in terms of regime-shifting behaviour. The paper is 
organised as follows. Section 2 provides a selective overview of recent 
contributions to the micro-econometric investment literature, with a special 
focus on financial friction, real options and uncertainty, dynamic panel data 
models, and oil and gas applications. The econometric model is derived in 
Section 3, whereas the data set is introduced and discussed in Section 4. 
Estimation and results are presented in Section 5, before some concluding 
remarks are offered in Section 6. 
 
 
2. Previous research 
 
Based on early theoretical contributions from pioneers like Haavelmo (1960), 
Jorgenson (1963) and Tobin (1969), empirical interest in investment 
behaviour has a long tradition in economic research. Chirinko (1993) offers a 
survey of modelling strategies and results up to the early 1990s, exploring a 
range of applications of neo-classical models, models with explicit dynamics 
and various reduced-form models. An essential conclusion from Chirinko’s 
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(1993) study is that user cost variables tend to be less important for capital 
formation at the firm level than revenue and cash-flow variables, casting 
doubt on the empirical performance of the standard neo-classical investment 
model. The development of dynamic panel data techniques has resulted in a 
number of micro-econometric investment studies, developed for general 
representations of investment behaviour,2 but also for topical studies like 
capital market imperfections (Hubbard, 1998) and irreversibility/uncertainty 
issues (Carruth et al., 2000). 
 
In more recent years, important questions have been raised regarding the role 
of cash-flow variables in structural models of investment. Critics argue that 
the common interpretation of cash-flow effects as evidence of capital market 
imperfections (Hubbard, 1998) is seriously flawed, due to measurement error 
in market valuation variables (Erickson and Whited, 2000), model 
specification, and identification problems (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; 
Gomes, 2001). Consequently, the attraction has increased for non-structural 
models (Bean, 1981; Mairesse et al., 1999; Bond et al., 2003), with less 
theoretical restrictions and without the standard source of measurement error 
from traditional q models. In a reconciling modelling approach, Moyen (2004) 
asserts that financially constrained firms actually require another investment 
model than non-constrained firms. Our econometric approach extends this line 
of thought, investigating the possible regime-shifting behaviour in the oil and 
gas industry between periods with more and less financial restriction.  
 
Standard theories of irreversible investment and real waiting options imply a 
negative investment-uncertainty relationship (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), 
contesting the traditional neoclassical “desirability of price instability” 
argument (Oi, 1961; Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983). However, a reconciling 
study by Abel et al. (1996) illustrates how both these perspectives can be 
accommodated in modern theories of investment. Adding future put options 
of contraction to the traditional call options of deferral, ambiguous results are 
produced for the sign of the investment/uncertainty relationship. Recent 
applications in management and finance (e.g., Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; 
Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004) also stress that investment implies not only the 
sacrifice of a waiting option, but also a potential reward from the acquisition 
of future development options. Increased uncertainty will increase the value 
of both waiting and development options. Moreover, the value of waiting 
options is also eroded by imperfect competition and strategic investment 
                                                 
2 See Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for a general overview. 
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(Grenadier, 2002; Akdogu and MacKay,  2007). Empirical studies are 
therefore required to settle the investment-uncertainty relationship.3  
 
In terms of econometric specification, there is a separation in the empirical 
investment literature between structural models and reduced-form models. 
Structural models are derived directly from the firm’s dynamic optimisation 
problem, with explicit mechanisms for adjustment costs and intertemporal 
behaviour. On the other hand, reduced-form models are usually derived from 
general auto-regressive distributed-lag (ADL) models, relating current and 
lagged investment to current and lagged values of various explanatory 
variables. As these models are not linked explicitly to an underlying theory of 
investment behaviour, coefficients from these models do not have a 
straightforward interpretation.  However, several researchers (e. g., Oliner et 
al., 1995); Mairesse et al., 1999) note that reduced-form models tend to 
perform better for forecasting purposes than structural models. Consequently, 
ADL models remain the preferred choice among forecasters. Chirinko et al. 
(1999) conclude that “the applied econometrician must choose between 
distributed lag models that are empirically dependable but conceptually 
fragile and structural models that have a stronger theoretical foundation but an 
unsteady empirical superstructure”. 
 
The development of panel data methods has facilitated a change of 
perspective from macroeconomic to microeconomic behaviour. Panel data 
sets enable the researcher to account not only for the dynamics of the 
investment process, but also for cross-sectional variation between companies. 
A key challenge with dynamic panel data models concerns the simultaneity 
issues that arise in models with fixed effects and lagged dependent variables. 
Starting with Anderson and Hsiao (1981), a variety of instrumental variable 
techniques has been suggested to resolve this issue. A widely employed 
approach is the generalised method of moments (GMM) procedure originally 
suggested by Arrellano and Bond (1991), refined in a range of subsequent 
contributions, and applied in the majority of modern micro-econometric 
investment studies. See Bond (2002) and Arrellano (2003) for updated 
reviews. 
 
The typical panel data set for company data contains information for a 
relatively large number of companies (large N) over a limited number of time 
periods (small T). This restricts the potential for a robust portrayal of dynamic 
behaviour over longer time periods. Small T panels also reduce our ability to 
                                                 
3 According to Carruth et al. (2000), econometric studies are supportive of a quite robust 
negative link between investment and uncertainty. 
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uncover trends and shifts in parameters over time, and to study structural 
breaks in the data set with stringent methods. With 253 companies over 14 
years, our data set is generated over a full financial and oil market cycle, 
covering periods of consolidation, restructuring, stability, vulnerability, 
suppression – and “irrational exuberance” (Shiller, 2000).  
 
Previous studies of oil and gas investment have been occupied with various 
types of aggregate data (e.g., Pesaran, 1990) or field-specific data (e.g., Hurn 
and Wright, 1988; Favero et al., 1992; Favero and Pesaran, 1994), with a 
more or less explicit concern for the exhaustibility issues of oil and gas 
resources. The capital stock in each of our data units represents a portfolio of 
reserves and fixed assets at various stages of development, and with various 
regional, technological and product characteristics. Consequently, our 
investment figures capture total investment in each company in a range of 
different projects. With such a genuine company perspective on oil and gas 
investments, the non-renewable properties of oil and gas investment become 
less apparent than in field-specific data and regional time series data. 
 
 
3. An accelerator model with error-correction 
 
The dynamics of capital formation is complex, and even more so when we 
consider investment at the company level as an aggregate of many types of 
capital. The vast empirical literature on structural investment models has not 
been convincing in terms of results. Bond and van Reenen (2007) survey 
empirical investment models derived from economic theory, and discuss a 
variety of the challenges and shortcomings related to models derived directly 
from the producer’s dynamic optimisation problem. Our data set does also not 
offer the richness in variables required for a full-blown structural modelling 
approach. As the accelerator model is also not plagued by the problems of 
measurement error in the traditional q models, we therefore base our study on 
a reduced-form approach. 
 
A common alternative is to rely on a dynamic econometric specification for 
the data-generating process that is not explicitly derived from structural 
relations for optimal adjustment behaviour. An example of such an approach 
is the accelerator model with error-correction, introduced into the investment 
literature by Bean (1981). More recent applications include Driver and 
Moreton (1991), Darby et al. (1999) and Mairesse et al. (1999).  
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A common starting point for these studies is a long-term relation between the 
desired capital stock (Kit*), output (Yit) and the user cost of capital (Jit): 
 
.* s-= ititiit JYAK          [1] 
 
This formulation is consistent with profit maximisation under CES production 
technology. According to common practice in the literature, we assume a 
long-term capital-output elasticity at unity. The special case of Cobb Douglas 
production technology would imply s = 1.  On the other hand, a fixed 
captital-output ratio implies that s = 0. Imperfect competition with firm-
specific mark-up can be reflected by the constant term Ai. Alternatively, the 
constant term may reflect a company-specific distribution parameter in the 
production function. Letting small-caps indicate natural logarithms, Equation 
[1] implies for the long-term equilibrium relation: 
 
.* ititiit jyak s-+=          [2] 
 
The property of a unity long-term elasticity between desired capital and 
output can now be exploited by letting the production level serve as a proxy 
for the desired capital stock. Our next step is to envelope Equation [2] in a 
general dynamic model, accounting for the sluggishness of adjustment of the 
actual capital stock. As noted by Bond et al. (2003), an implicit assumption of 
this approach is that the desired level of capital without adjustment costs is 
proportional to the desired capital level in the presence of adjustment costs. 
Further, we assume that any variation in the user cost of capital can be 
captured by the combination of firm-specific effects and time-specific dummy 
variables.4 Bearing this in mind, our point of departure is a standard 2nd order 
autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) for the capital stock (kit): 
 
,221102211 ittitiittitiit uyyykkk +++++= ---- bbbaa       [3] 
                                                 
4 The treatment of the user cost is in line with previous applications of accelerator models with 
error-correction for investment studies. Our specification allows for differences in user costs 
between companies, but the implicit assumption is that changes over time in the user costs are 
common to all companies. At this point it should also be noted that a key result from the 
empirical investment literature is that price and volume variables are far more important for 
capital formation than variables affecting user costs (Chirinko, 1993). Casual observation also 
suggests that capital costs play a subordinate role in the investment process of oil and gas 
companies. Management and financial market attention is rather focused oil price expectations, 
reserve and production potentials (in addition to various risk indicators). 
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where uit is an error term. Our assumption of a long-run unit elasticity of 
capital with respect to output requires that (b0 + b1 + b2 )/(1-a1-a2) = 1. We 
may therefore take differences and rearrange Equation [3] to obtain a standard 
error-correction model of the type: 
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where the bracketed term (kit-2 – yit-2) represents the error-correction term 
(eit-2). Error-correcting behaviour now implies that its coefficient is negative. 
This means that any deviation between the actual and the desired capital stock 
will be corrected through investment. To arrive at a specification in the 
investment rate (Iit/Kit-1), we follow the mainstream literature and approximate 
the change in the desired capital stock as Dkit = (Iit/Kit-1) – di, where di is a 
company-specific depreciation rate. For simplicity of exposition, we also 
define the investment rate (iit) as: iit º  Iit/K it-1. Further, we include xit as a set 
of control variables, to allow for the influence of cash flow measures, 
uncertainty proxies and operational indicators that may have an influence on 
investment. Finally, we include fixed effects (hi) and time-specific error-
components (zt) in the error-term according to the following structure: 
uit = hi + zt + eit, yielding for the equation to be estimated: 
 
,21101 ittiittitiittiit xeyyii ezhplggr +++++D+D+= ---       [5] 
 
where r is an autoregressive coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, l is 
the error-correction coefficient, indicating the speed of adjustment towards the 
long-term equilibrium. The deviation from the long-term equilibrium is 
represented by eit-2 = kit-2 - yit-2.  
 
The scope of our study is to investigate if investment behaviour among 
international oil and gas companies has changed over the last 14 years. To 
explore for structural breaks in the data-generating process, we need 
techniques that allow for parameter instability across historical sub-samples. 
Moreover, our model should be sufficiently flexible to account for a structural 
break that applies only to a subset of the variables involved. As an example, 
the autoregressive structure of the model (it-1) may well be stable, whereas 
behavioural change is observable for uncertainty variables (xit), and possibly 
also for the speed of adjustment, as measured by the estimated response to 
changes in the equilibrium error (eit-2). To open for this kind of instability, we 
employ a flexible dummy-variable technique on the parameters of the models. 
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We illustrate the technique for the p vector of the control variables (xit). 
Letting t* represent the year of the structural break, dummy variables are 
defined as follows: 
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Equation [6] introduces the shift variable to be applied for the subsequent 
years after the structural break. Now, the pxit term of Equation [5] is replaced 
by a composite term: 
 
,10 ittitit xdxx ppp +=          [7] 
 
A null of stability implies p1dt = 0, and the total impact of a change in the xit 
variable is represented by the parameter p0 for the full sample period. On the 
other hand, if p1 is statistically significant, the null is rejected, and we have 
evidence of a structural break for the variable in question. For this case, the 
sensitivity of investment rates with respect to changes in xit is still given by p0 
for the first period (t < t*). However, an additional shift parameter (p1) is 
introduced at the point of the structural break (t = t*), and the full effect is 
therefore p0 + p1 for the subsequent years of the sample. Statistical tests may 
now be applied to test for these structural breaks for each of the variables, and 
simultaneously for any (sub-) set of variables of our model. 5  
 
In addition to dynamic part of the model (iit, iit-1, Dyit, Dyit-1) and the error-
correction term (eit) of Equation [5], our estimated models also include four 
financial and operational indicators in the vector of control variables (xit). The 
first is a cash-flow measure (cit=CFit/Kit-1), to test for the impact of financial 
factors in the investment process (Schiantarelli, 1996; Hubbard, 1998). In 
addition, the cash-flow variable will capture the effect of oil price variation, 
including changes in adaptive oil price expectations.6 The next variable is 
                                                 
5 Based on the result from preliminary estimation, the shift is restricted to the error-correction 
term (eit) and the vector of control variables (xit). Econometric tests are not supportive of a 
structural shift for the dynamic part of the model (iit-1, Dyit, Dyit-1). 
6 A range of control variables has been tested, including various oil price variables, result 
variables and cash-flow variables. The best econometric results were obtained in a model with 
the described cash-flow indicator as the financial variable. Joint significance of model 
parameters of this version outperformed alternative specifications, and the sign and magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients allowed the most reasonable interpretation. We therefore assume 
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included to capture industry-specific risk, as proxied by oil price volatility 
(sit). As with the cash-flow variable, the econometric performance of this 
volatility variable is improved when divided by lagged capital stock (vit = 
sit/Kit-1), and this scaling procedure is therefore adopted in the estimated 
model. We also include a measure for individual company exposure to oil vs 
natural gas. Our oit variable represents the share of oil in total oil and gas 
reserves, and the variable is lagged one period in the estimated models, to 
capture the lag structure in the development of oil and gas reserves. Finally, 
the reserve replacement rate (rit) is included to test for the specific influence 
on investment from reserve replacement efforts.7  
 
 
4 Data 
 
Our data sample is an unbalanced panel of oil and gas companies (1991-2005) 
drawn from John S. Herold Company’s (JS Herold) oil and gas financial 
database.8 The JS Herold database consists of financial and operating data 
from annual financial statements of more than 500 publicly traded energy 
companies worldwide. From this universe we select firms mainly engaged in 
exploration and production (E&P or upstream) activities. This leaves us with 
253 companies and a sample of 3290 potential firm-years. 
 
On this initial sample we apply a screening procedure. First, we exclude all 
firms with less than 100 employees in the first year of observation. Second, 
we require at least six years of data from each firm, and firms not meeting this 
requirement are excluded. Third, firms that have undergone major 
restructuring, such as mergers and acquisitions or de-mergers, need to be 
excluded as the usual models of investment may not characterise these 
discrete adjustments well. We therefore remove observations where the 
                                                                                                                    
that all relevant financial information, including oil price variation, is captured by the cash-flow 
variable retained in the preferred model version. 
7 The key differentiating factor of the production technology among oil and gas companies is 
the reserve concept. The stock of oil and gas reserves represents a crucial input in this 
production process. But oil and gas reserves are not readily available in well-functioning input 
markets, like the case is for most other traditional inputs. Rather, oil and gas companies have to 
invest in very risky exploration activities, to support and grow the base of oil and gas reserves. 
Thus, our reserve replacement variable is included to capture the impact on total investment 
from companies’ efforts to sustain production activity over the longer term. 
8 Founded in 1948, John S. Herold Inc. is an independent research firm that specialises in the 
analysis of companies, transactions, and trends in the global energy industry 
(http://www.herold.com/). 
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change in sales from any one year to the next exceeded a factor of three.9 
Missing observations, lagged variables, and the screening procedure reduce 
the number of firm years to 1765, a total reduction of 46%.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for data sample 
 Obs. Mean St. dev. Min. Max. 
iit 1765 0.288 0.600 -0.913 12.801 
yit 1765 0.140 0.355 -0.837 5.300 
kit 1765 7.004 2.297 1.082 12.179 
cit 1765 0.211 0.323 -5.170 3.593 
vit 1765 0.372 1.079 0.000 17.549 
rit 1765 1.426 1.552 -14.490 19.171 
oit 1765 0.438 0.271 0.000 1.000 
 
Data source: JS Herold (http://www.herold.com). 
 
Following Miller (1990), the majority of investment studies combines 
stock and flow information using the perpetual inventory method to 
construct capital stocks (ptIKt):  
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Kit is the capital stock at current replacement cost, ptI is the price of 
investment goods,10 Iit represent real investment, and d is the constant rate of 
depreciation, assumed at 8 per cent.11 In line with previous research, we use 
the net book value of tangible fixed capital assets in the first observation in 
the sample period (adjusted for previous years’ inflation) as our initial value. 
Our proxy for the price of investment goods (ptI) is the implicit price deflator 
                                                 
9  A factor of 3 is only slightly higher than the maximum year-to-year change in oil price in our 
sample. A lower factor may therefore exclude observations not affected by a major 
restructuring, where annual sales growth is simply induced by oil price changes. 
10 Our proxy for the price of investment goods is the implicit price deflator for non-residential 
gross private domestic investment (structures, equipment and software) from the US national 
accounts. 
11 Bond et al. (2003) also assume a constant rate of depreciation of 8 per cent for manufacturing 
companies. For comparability, we assume the same rate of depreciation. 
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for non-residential gross private domestic investment (structures, equipment 
and software) from the US national accounts. Subsequent estimates of capital 
stocks were calculated according to Equation [8].   
 
Our investment variable (Iit) is based on financial statement data on capital 
expenditure and additions to property, plant and equipment (PP&E), 
acquisitions and proceeds from sales of PP&E (disposals). We apply a 
measure of investment including M&A (acquisitions and disposals) as this 
provides the best econometric results. The investment rate is calculated as 
investment divided by lagged capital stock. As Table 1 shows the mean 
investment rate is 0.288, which is higher than comparable studies of 
investment behaviour. In a study of European manufacturing companies, 
Bond et al. (2003) document investment rates of 0.110 to 0.125. With 
comparable rates of depreciation, this suggests a slightly higher rate of capital 
accumulation in our sample than in previous studies of manufacturing 
industries. This assertion is also supported by the fact that our sample reveals 
a higher average change in production (0.140) and cash flow rates (0.211) 
than comparable studies.  
 
Our estimated models also include four financial and operational indicators in 
the vector of control variables (xit). Cash-flow (CFit) is computed by adding 
back depreciation (as reported in the financial statements) to net income (as 
reported). In order to improve econometric performance, we scaled this cash 
flow with lagged capital, resulting in the cit variable of our econometric 
analysis. While the mean cit in our sample is 0.211, the investment rate iit is 
0.288 (Table 1). This indicates that the average oil and gas firm in our sample 
have been investing more money than it has been able to generate internally.  
 
The product mix (oit; oil exposure) is calculated as the ratio of oil reserves to 
total oil and gas reserves, as reported in the oil companies’ supplementary oil 
and gas disclosures. While oil is reported in million barrels (mmbbl), gas is 
reported in billion cubic feet (bcf). In order to calculate oil and gas reserves in 
barrels of oil equivalent (boe), a conversion factor of 6 is used (i.e. 6 bcf  = 1 
mmbbl). Our sample reveals that the mean oil share of total reserves is 
approximately 44 per cent.  
 
The reserve replacement ratio (rit) is calculated as the ratio of annual reserve 
additions to annual extraction. A reserve replacement ratio of 1.0 implies full 
replacement of the annual production volume (through exploration and/or 
acquisitions). A mean rit of 1.426 in our sample indicates that the average firm 
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has generated more reserves than they have decimated through production 
over the period (Table 1).   
 
Carruth et al. (2000) survey the variety of approaches to the measurement of 
uncertainty in empirical investment studies. To approach the most important 
source of uncertainty for international oil and gas companies, our point of 
departure is the historical volatility of the oil price.12 Based on daily price (pkt) 
data for the brent blend quality for each of the last 15 years, we calculate 
annualised standard errors of daily returns (rkt = Dpkt, k = 1, 2 . . N, 
t = 1992-2005):  
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where N is the annual number of trading days (~ 260) and the average daily 
change in each year is used as a proxy for E(rkt). This methodology is 
according to financial market practice, and in line with previous related 
studies (e.g., Paddock et al., 1988; Hurn and Wright, 1994). A running daily 
calculation of this volatility measure is illustrated in Figure 1 in the 
Introduction (p. 3). Oil price volatility has increased from an annualised level 
of 20-30 per cent during the early 1990s to 40-50 per cent during 1998-2002, 
when the oil industry endured substantial restructuring and a severe oil price 
drop during the Asian economic crisis (Weston et al., 1999). Since then, oil 
price volatility has fallen to levels just below 40 per cent, which is slightly 
higher than average levels from the 1990s.  
 
 
5. Estimation and results 
 
Our econometric model is a dynamic panel data model for investment 
behaviour, to be estimated with micro data for international oil and gas 
companies over the period 1992-2005. The introduction of the lagged 
dependent variable on the right hand side of the econometric equation 
introduces a potential endogeneity bias. The standard approach to potentially 
                                                 
12 A range of options is available for uncertainty indicators, and no consensus is yet obtained 
for the appropriate way to proxy uncertainty in empirical models of investment. Forward-
looking volatility forecasting models (Engle, 1982) are common in early empirical studies of 
investment and uncertainty. However, this strategy also introduces model uncertainty in two 
stages. Furthermore, ARCH and GARCH models estimated on high-frequency data will usually 
imply a low persistence of shocks for our purpose. The majority of recent work therefore relies 
more directly on observed uncertainty measures (Carruth et al., 2000).  
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endogenous explanatory variables is to augment the estimation procedure with 
additional exogenous instrumental variables. Bond (2002) show that a range 
of instruments is available in the lagged differences and levels of endogenous 
and predetermined variables. As additional instrument variables we also 
include total revenue, as well as annual dummy variables. We apply the 
general method of moments (GMM ) approach initially suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991), and refined by a range of subsequent contributions. See 
Arellano (2003) for an updated review. 
 
Our point of departure for the econometric estimation is the model specified 
in Equation [5]. Specifically, we regress the investment rate (iit) against 
lagged investment (iit-1), current and lagged production growth (Dyit, Dyit-1) 
and an error-correction term (eit-2 = kit-2 – yit-2) that captures the hypothesised 
equilibrium-correcting adjustment in the data-generating process. In addition 
to the dynamic part of the model (iit, iit-1, Dyit, Dyit-1) and the error-correction 
term (eit), we include four variables to control for the influence of cash-flow 
variations (cit), oil price uncertainty (vit), reserve-replacement efforts (rit) and 
product mix (oit).  
 
As pointed out by Bond (2002), the instruments available for the equations in 
first differences are likely to be weak when the individual time series are 
highly persistent, i.e. they have near unit root properties. The reason is that 
differenced unit root variables will approach random walks, offering limited 
information as instrumental variables.13 The original Arellano Bond estimator 
therefore requires autoregressive parameters to be significantly less than one 
in simple autoregressive specifications. Our specification of an error-
correction model also requires that the variables of the estimated equation are 
stationary. We therefore estimate a simple AR(1) specification for the 
variables in our estimated equation to test the dynamic properties of our 
model variables.  
 
Table 2 reports OLS, fixed-effects and GMM results for the estimated auto-
correlation coefficient from the AR(1) regression for all our model variables. 
The hypothesis of an exact unit root is rejected for all variables. These results 
are consistent with our dynamic modelling approach. Observe also that the 
                                                 
13 Persistent time series are defined by the role of history for their development, with positive 
correlation between current and lagged values. As an example, consider the simple AR(1) 
process: 
ttt vyy += -1a . Subtracting yt-1 from both sides now yields: tttt vyyy +-=- -- 11 )1(a . 
Consequently, as the autoregressive coefficient a approaches 1, Dyt (= yt – yt-1) will approach a 
random walk (vt). In general, a random walk process (I(0)) for the difference implies that the 
level of the same variable is integrated of degree 1 (I(1)).  
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derived error correction term eit (= kit – yit) is clearly less persistant than both 
of its two constituents kit and yit. As suggested by the error-correction 
literature (e.g., Engle and Granger, 1987; Hendry and Juselius, 2000), the 
combination of highly persistent variables in a cointegrating vector produces a 
variable with improved stationarity properties for econometric estimation. We 
take these results as support for our specification of investment as an 
accelerator model with error-correction.  
 
Table 2. AR(1) estimates for model variables 
 
Depvar OLS Fixed Effects System GMM 
   iit      0.063
*** 
(0.000) 
-0.037 
(0.477) 
  -0.253** 
(0.012) 
   yit      0.972
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.767*** 
(0.000) 
     0.960*** 
(0.000) 
  kit      0.965
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.840*** 
(0.000) 
     0.956*** 
(0.000) 
  eit (= kit - yit)      0.873
*** 
(0.000) 
     0.724*** 
(0.000) 
     0.748*** 
(0.000) 
  cit      0.347
*** 
(0.000) 
   0.013** 
(0.011) 
0.005 
(0.935) 
  vit      0.723
*** 
(0.000) 
    0.598*** 
(0.000) 
     0.574*** 
(0.000) 
  rit   0.039
* 
(0.086) 
-0.024 
 (0.648) 
   -0.141*** 
(0.001) 
  oit      0.914
*** 
(0.000) 
     0.469*** 
(0.000) 
     0.784*** 
(0.000) 
 
*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
 
Our next step is to test for the structural break we are hypothesising. At this 
point, our approach draws on a flexible dummy-variable approach equivalent 
to the framework introduced by Chow (1960), and refined in a series of 
subsequent contributions (e.g., Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988; Andrews and Lu, 
2001). Equation [5] is estimated with all control variables and all shift 
parameters (cf. Equations [6]-[7]). We then test the joint significance of all 
shift parameters, with a null of no structural break. Rejection implies 
statistical support for the presence of a structural break. Further, our testing 
procedure implies that the point of the structural break (t*) is endogenised, as 
the described stability test is repeated for all the possible break points (years) 
granted by our data set. We test for structural breaks in our model for all the 
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years between 1995 and 2004, one by one.14 Results from these tests provide 
valuable guidance in our selection of year for the structural break (t*), which 
we suspect took place sometime in the late 1990s. Relevant c2 test statistics 
from this procedure are illustrated in Figure 2, along with their respective p 
values.  
 
Figure 2. Detection of structural break 
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GMM estimation of Equation [5] with shift parameters for error correction term (eit) and the 
four control variables ( xit = [ cit, vit, rit, oit ]). 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that the likelihood of a structural break is at its maximum 
in 1997/1998. We also report the Hansen’s J statistic, from a test for the 
exogeneity properties of our instrument matrix. Rejection of the null implies 
that the validity of our over-identifying restrictions is threatened, which would 
be an indication of model misspecification. The power of this test is at its 
minimum in 1998, implying that the validity of our over-identifying 
restrictions is at its highest for the model with a structural break in 1997/1998. 
We take this as further support for the hypothesis of a structural break in 
investment behaviour. The assumption of a structural break in oil and gas 
investment in 1997/1998 is therefore adopted in the following econometric 
analysis.  
 
We now proceed to the estimation of our accelerator model with error-
correction, as stated by Equation [5]. Table 3 presents the result for three 
                                                 
14 The presence of lagged variables in the model, and the application of deeply lagged 
instruments, reduces the quality of this test procedure for breaking points further back than 
1995. 
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different model versions. Model 1 is the model in its simplest for, without any 
control variables (xit). Model 2 includes four financial and operational control 
variables as described above. The shift dummies of Equation [6] are applied 
in Model 3, to allow for variable-specific structural breaks in investment 
behaviour in the error-correction term (eit) as well as the control variables (xit), 
whereas stability over the period is assumed for the dynamic part of the model 
(it-1, Dyt, Dyt-1).15 
 
Table 3 also presents a selection of model diagnostics, which indicate 
satisfactory performance for all the three model versions. The Wald c2 
statistic is a test for joint signficiance of all model parameters. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) recommend the Sargan statistic to test the exogeneity properties 
of the instruments as a group, with a null of validity. However, the Sargan 
statistic is sensitive to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and tends to 
over-reject in the presence of either. We therefore follow follow Roodman’s 
(2006) advise and report the more robust Hansen J statistic as an indicator for 
the validity of the over-identifying restrictions.16 AB AC(n) is the Arrellano-
Bond test for nth-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals, with a null 
of no autocorrelation. Non-rejection of 1st order autocorrelation is as expected, 
and not critical for the validity of the differenced equations. 2nd order 
autocorrelation in the residuals of the differenced model would be more 
troublesome, as it would imply a breach of the assumption of well-behaved 
residuals in the level representation of our model.  
 
The lagged investment rate (iit) takes a small, negative and statistically 
significant coefficient, indicating that periods of high investment are normally 
followed by a downward correction, and vice versa. According to our results, 
production growth (Dyit, Dyit-1) is an especially important driver for 
investments among oil and gas companies, with sizeable, positive, and highly 
significant parameter estimates. On average, an increase in oil and gas 
production growth by one percentage point yields an increase in the 
investment rate of 0.67 percentage points (p value < 0.01) in our preferred 
model.  
                                                 
15 This assertion is supported by statistical inference from preliminary estimations, where the 
structural shift was allowed also for the dynamic part of the model. These full-fledged models 
produced more insignificant parameter estimates, and their overall quality diagnostics proved 
them inferior to the presented estimated models. 
16 The Hansen J statistic is the minimised value of the two-step GMM criterion function 
(Hansen, 1982). 
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Table 3. Estimated accelerator models with error-correction 
System GMM estimates obtained with Stata 9.0 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Estimated coefficients a) 
Intercept     2.116
*** 
(0.000) 
    2.382*** 
(0.001) 
1.175*** 
(0.004) 
iit-1  
-0.077* 
(0.081) 
 -0.083** 
(0.027) 
-0.127* 
(0.016) 
D yit 
    0.613*** 
(0.000) 
    0.504*** 
(0.000) 
    0.443*** 
(0.000) 
D yit-1 
    0.258*** 
(0.001) 
    0.204*** 
(0.005) 
   0.162** 
(0.033) 
eit-2 
   -0.184*** 
(0.000) 
  -0.201*** 
(0.001) 
-0.059 
(0.170) 
dt 
.eit-2
      -0.055
*** 
(0.001) 
cit-1  
    0.200*** 
(0.001) 
    0.979*** 
(0.000) 
dt 
.cit-1   
  -0.787** 
(0.027) 
vit
  -0.241 
(0.314) 
   -0.554*** 
(0.000) 
dt 
. vit
       1.128
*** 
(0.000) 
oit  
   -0.247*** 
(0.005) 
   -1.162*** 
(0.000) 
dt 
.oit   
    1.392*** 
(0.000) 
rit  
    0.028*** 
(0.005) 
    0.069*** 
(0.006) 
dt 
.rit   
 -0.058* 
(0.072) 
 Model diagnostics   
Wald c2     119.94
*** 
       (0.000) 
    220.77*** 
       (0.000) 
292.88*** 
(0.000) 
Hansen J 176.84 
      (0.133) 
158.50 
       (0.364) 
100.70 
(0.546) 
AB AC (2)  -0.01 
    (0.996) 
    0.03 
       (0.972) 
-0.37 
(0.709) 
Firms (#) 232 232 232 
Obs (#) 1737 1737 1737 
 
Dependent variable: Investment rate (iit). Explanatory variables: lagged investment rate (iit-1), 
production growth (Dyit, Dyit-1) error-correction term (eit-2 = yit-2- kit-2), cash-flow variable (cit), 
oil price volatility (vit), reserve replacement efforts (rit) and relative oil exposure (oit). See 
Section 3 and 4 for definition and description of model variables. 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively 
a) p-values in brackets.   
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Our choice of model specification is supported by the plausible and 
significant estimate for the error-correction coefficient (Kremers et al., 1992), 
except in Model 3. The parameter estimate of the error-correction term (eit) 
suggests that 12-20 per cent of any equilibrium error is adjusted every year. 
This may seem sluggish, but compares well with previous empirical studies 
for manufacturing industries (e.g., Mairesse et al., 1999; Bond et al., 2003). 
The structural break parameter suggests that the pace of adjustment was 
slower in the early 1990s than over the last years of the sample. This agrees 
well with industrial developments over the last 10 years or so; intensified 
restructuring and improvement efforts, accelerating technology diffusion, 
enhanced competition and increased uncertainty (Weston et al., 1999). 
Consequently, industrial upheaval contributed to a more flexible investment 
process, with higher rates of adjustment than in previous years.  
 
We also obtain material precise parameter estimates for the cash-flow variable 
(cit). A common interpretation used to be that these coefficients represent 
signals of capital market imperfection and financial friction (Hubbard, 1998). 
However, we recommend caution in the interpretation of these coefficients. 
Even without the common source of measurement error from the structural 
models (Erickson and Whited, 2000), critics have argued that significant cash-
flow coefficients might be due to model misspecification (e.g., Kaplan and 
Zingales, 1997; Gomes, 2001). Moreover, the fact that our reduced-form 
model is not explicitly linked to an underlying theory of investment behaviour 
also implies that the cash-flow coefficient does not have a straightforward 
interpretation. Still, our results provide econometric evidence that access to 
internal funds plays a role in the data-generating process of firm investment. 
Prior to the structural break in 1998, when the oil price was low, earnings 
were modest and profitability was moderate, our results suggest that 
availability of internal funds played a material and statistically significant role 
in capital formation. The estimated coefficient of 0.98 implies that variations 
in the cashflow rate produced similar changes in the investment rate during 
this period.  
 
This also corresponds well to casual observation across the industry in the 
aftermath of the Asian economic crisis and the subsequent oil price drop in 
1997-1998. However, sentiments changed in 1998, and the response in oil and 
gas investment to the subsequent oil price increase was muted. The shift 
parameter for our cashflow variable cuts the original coefficient by 0.79, 
suggesting that the connection between investment and internal funds has 
become weaker over the last 10 years. A likely interpretation is that financial 
market pressures for capital discipline in the aftermath of the Asian economic 
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crisis put a lid on oil and gas investments from the late 1990s (Osmundsen et 
al. 2006, 2007).  
 
The economic results may seem even more thought-provoking for our 
uncertainty indicator (vit). Table 3 suggests that the role of uncertainty in the 
investment process has changed markedly over the 15 years of our data 
sample. During the first period, an increase in uncertainty gives a statistically 
significant dampening effect on oil and gas investment, as implied by 
standard theory of irreversible investment and real waiting options (Dixit and 
Pindyck, 1994; Carruth et al., 2000). However, recent theoretical 
contributions (Kulatilaka and Perotti, 1998; Smit and Trigeorgis, 2004) point 
out that investment implies not only the sacrifice of a waiting option, but also 
a potential reward from the acquisition of future development options. For the 
oil and gas industry, an increase in oil price volatility will increase the value 
of both these types of real options. Aguerrevere (2003) also notes that long 
construction lags, which are typical for the oil and gas industry,  tend to 
undermine the net effect of uncertainty on investment. The reason is that the 
time-to-build factor increases the value and relevance of future development 
and growth options in the investment decision. Thus, the theory of compound 
options may give rise to a positive relationship between investment and 
uncertainty. With a positive and highly significant coefficient for the period 
after 1998,17 an increase in uncertainty seems to have had a stimulating effect 
on capital formation over the last few years. This result should be interpreted 
in the context of imperfect competition, resource scarcity and strategic 
investments, which have become increasingly important in the international 
oil and gas industry (see also Weston et al., 1999).18  
 
The estimated models also provide evidence that gas-prone companies are 
characterised by a higher rate of capital accumulation than companies 
dominated by oil reserves. This effect is captured by our oit variable, which 
represents the share of oil in the total reserve base. We see this as an 
indication of the huge investment requirements on the companies who shifted 
production from oil to natural gas over the 1990s. However, the difference in 
                                                 
17 Based on the far-right column of Table 3 (Model 3), the sum of the two estimated volatility 
coefficients is – 0.554 + 1.128 = 0.574, with p < 0.01. 
18 Boyle and Guthrie (2003) also suggest that financial frictions may increase the risk of future 
funding shortfalls. This will reduce the general value of waiting, and may therefore increase 
investment beyond the optimal level. Moreover, an additional source of a positive 
investment/uncertainty relationship is introduced. Based on this idea, an interaction term 
between cashflow and uncertainty has also been tested in our model. However, this combined 
variable did not produce significant parameter estimates, and could therefore not be included in 
the preferred model. 
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investment rates between oil-prone and gas-prone companies seems to be a 
phenomenon of the 1990s. More specifically, our results indicate that average 
investment rates of oil-prone companies have caught up with gas-prone 
companies since the turn of the century.   
 
Finally, our results suggest that reserve replacement efforts drew capital 
resources beyond the requirements of production growth over the first period 
of our sample. On the other hand, the effect is largely outweighed by the shift 
parameter for this variable, implying that no specific investment impulse can 
be attributed distinctly to reserve replacement in the period after 1998. The 
background for this development is related to the fact that accessible oil and 
gas reserves have become increasingly scarce. International oil and gas 
companies struggle to replace their production, at increasing access cost for 
new reserves. Even though reserve replacement rates have turned down, the 
involved capital requirements are probably upheld. This constitutes a likely 
explanation for the negligible impact on oil and gas investment from reserve 
replacement efforts over the last few years.  
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The process of capital formation in the oil and gas industry is an important 
part of the supply side dynamics in the oil market. Understanding how oil and 
gas companies think in terms of investment is therefore essential to develop 
and maintain the required insights for meaningful analyses of oil price 
formation. Over the last 15 years, international oil and gas companies have 
gone through a period of industry upheaval, restructuring and escalating 
market turbulence. Since the beginning of the 1990s, business principles have 
gradually gained ground, and today competition among international oil 
companies is more aggressive than ever. Easily accessible oil and gas reserves 
in market-oriented economies like USA, Canada and United Kingdom are 
faced with depletion. Oil and gas investments are now gradually redirected in 
a rat race for increasingly scarce oil and gas resources. On this background it 
should come as no surprise that investment behaviour among international oil 
and gas companies has changed gears.   
 
We provide firm econometric evidence that the investment process among 
international oil and gas companies changed significantly towards the end of 
the 1990s. The investment process over the last years is more flexible than 
before, with significant changes in the role of explanatory factors like 
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uncertainty, reserve replacement efforts and product mix. We find robust 
statistical support for cash-flow effects, with recent investment rates less 
sensitive to changes in oil price and cash flow than in the early 1990s. More 
surprisingly, we find that the investment uncertainty relationship changed sign 
in the late 1990s. Whereas an increase in oil price volatility would reduce 
investments in the early years of our sample, investment over the last few 
years has gained stimulus from increasing oil price uncertainty. We see this as 
empirical support for recent contributions on investment and compound 
options. Finally, our results suggest that operational factors like product mix 
and reserve replacement efforts have lost some of their historical influence on 
the investment process.   
 
Industrial leaders and their companies respond continuously to changing 
political and market environments. Their mindset and models may be stable 
for periods. However, from time to time their way of thinking is also 
challenged by external forces. And sometimes these pressures even bring 
about deeper changes. Our study demonstrates that such a change took place 
in the oil and gas industry in the 1ate 1990s, in response to the industrial 
upheaval and massive pressure from financial markets. A fruitful direction for 
future research would be to relate these changes to company characteristics, 
possibly within a structural model framework.  
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Abstract1 
 
According to economic theory, exploration and development of new oil and 
gas fields should respond positively to increasing petroleum prices. But since 
the late 1990s, stock market analysts have focused strongly on short-term 
accounting return measures, like RoACE, for benchmarking and valuation of 
international oil and gas companies. Consequently, exaggerated capital 
discipline among oil and gas companies may have reduced their willingness 
to invest for future reserves and production growth. Based on panel data for 
14 international oil and gas companies for the period 1990-2003, we seek to 
establish econometric relations between market valuation on one hand, and 
simple financial and operational indicators on the other. Our findings do not 
support the general perception of RoACE as an important valuation metric in 
the oil and gas industry. We find that the variation in company valuations is 
mainly explained by the oil price, oil and gas production, and to some extent 
reserve replacement. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C22, G31, Q38 
 
Key words: Oil exploration, Reserve generation; Industrial economics: 
Econometrics 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The authors are thankful for comments by anonymous referees, and would also like to thank 
seminar participants at the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, and 
delegates to the 7th IAEE European Energy Conference in Bergen 29-30 August 2005. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last few years, global energy demand has been fuelled by healthy 
economic growth, both in the OECD area and in emerging economies – like 
China. On the other hand, production among international oil and gas 
companies has been stagnant, and OPECs market share and influence has 
increased correspondingly. Tight market conditions, political unrest in 
important supplying regions and increasing concerns for security of supply 
have caused a sharp increase in oil prices. Commentators and analysts have 
linked the current high oil prices to a lack of investments in the oil sector: 
 
"I am disappointed about the shortfall of investments on the supply side. 
Large, international oil companies seem to prefer looking for oil at the 
NYMEX trading floor, instead of exploring for resources around the world. 
They have a social responsibility, but prefer to buy back their own shares,"  
 
Dr. Fatih Birol, Chief Economist, International Energy Agency (IEA). 
 
Casual observation and aggregate data support the view that oil and gas 
exploration and production has failed to respond to increasing oil prices over 
the last years. Figure 1 illustrates that production growth among Western 
major oil and gas companies has remained low. The figure also shows that the 
share of exploration spending in total E&P investments has been cut back 
substantially since 1990. Recent research has indicated a stronger relationship 
between cash-flow variables and investments (e.g. Caballero, 1999; Stein, 
2003; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2005). However, and increasing share of 
oil industry investments have been directed at short and medium term 
development projects rather than long-term reserve development (see also 
Dobbs et al., 2006). 
 
The industrial dynamics of oil and gas can shed light on the changes in 
company behaviour over the last years. From around 1985 and towards the 
end of the 1990s, the international oil and gas industry was subject to 
extensive changes in their market, business and political environment. 
Globalization advanced rapidly, and had far-reaching implications for 
politics, economics, technology, competence, communication and financial 
markets. Oil and gas production gradually lost much of its former national, 
political and strategic superstructure, and financial principles gained ground 
throughout nations, industries and companies. The investment universe of the 
international oil and gas industry expanded, as more and more countries 
opened their petroleum sector for foreign direct investments. Deregulation 
and market liberalization progressed, and former national oil companies were 
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privatised all around the world. Finally, the oil and gas industry’s failure to 
deliver satisfactory returns triggered a massive pressure for restructuring, 
strategic change and improved financial performance throughout the industry. 
 
Figure 1. Investment and production growth among Western oil majors 
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Data source: Deutsche Bank: Major Oils 2004. 
 
A combined result of these developments was a wave of mergers and 
acquisitions that erased former prominent independent names such as Elf, 
Fina, Mobil, Amoco, Arco, YPF, Texaco, Phillips, Lasmo – and recently also 
Unocal (see Weston et al., 1999). 
 
The international oil and gas industry entered a new stage towards the end of 
the 1990s, with heavy focus on production growth, cost-cutting, operational 
efficiency and short-term profitability. Scorecards of key performance 
indicators were presented to the financial market, as an implicit incentive 
scheme between investors and senior management in the companies. 
Communicated targets for short-term accounting returns (return on average 
capital employed) and production (cagr – compound annual growth rate) are 
listed for a selection of companies in Table 1.  
 
The single most important performance indicator among international oil and 
gas companies has probably been RoACE.2 This crude measure of capital 
return is a vital input to valuation analyses among stock market analysts. The 
measure has also been widely adopted by the international oil and gas 
                                                 
2 RoACE is defined as net income adjusted for minority interests and net financial items (after 
tax), as a percentage ratio of average capital employed. 
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companies, as illustrated in Table 1. As late as in March 2004, an investor 
presentation from Exxon argues the case for RoACE as a good indicator of 
financial performance.3 
 
Table 1. Operational and financial targets communicated in 2003 
Target year in brackets 
 
Targets RoACE Production (cagr) 
ExxonMobil “Slight increase” 3 % (2007) 
RD/Shell 13-15% (“longer term”) 3 % (2007) 
BP “Slight increase” 3-5 % (2005) 
ChevronTexaco 16-17 % .. 
Total 15.5 % (2005) 5 % (2007) 
ConocoPhillips 12-14% (2006) 3% (2006) 
Eni 13 % (2006) 6% (2006) 
BG Group 13% (2006) 12% (2006) 
Hydro 8.5 % (2006)*) 8 % (2007) 
Statoil 12.5 % (2007) 6 % (2007) 
 
Source: Company presentations.  
*)  Communicated in 2004. 
 
But RoACE has its flaws (e.g. Antill and Arnott, 2002). Inherent in the unit of 
production depreciation method in the oil sector, RoACE will fall in the first 
years of a project cycle. Later in the project cycle, when investments fall and 
the capital asset depreciates, RoACE will rise. Accordingly, RoACE is 
boosted in periods of divestment. As the lead times for exploration projects 
are long, the focus on short-term return on capital may have caused a shift in 
management attention to cost-cutting and value-maximization of existing 
reserves (efforts to increase oil recovery). The strong focus on RoACE and 
capital discipline by analysts and investment banks may thus have put a cap 
on oil companies’ investment budgets. This behaviour may not reflect a 
reasonable trade-off between short-term profitability and long run production 
growth (development of new reserves).  
 
                                                 
3 ExxonMobil Analyst meeting, presentation given to the financial community on 10 March 
2004, available at http://ir.exxonmobil.com/. 
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The intention of our paper is to study the interaction between the international 
oil and gas industry and the financial markets. We focus on international and 
integrated oil and gas companies, whereas previous studies have largely 
concentrated on US companies whose primary business involves exploration, 
development and production of oil and gas (e.g. Quirin et al., 2000; Berry et 
al., 2001; Bryant, 2003). Studies of the value relevance of accounting 
information from US E&P companies typically only consider 2-4 years of 
data. Our data set from 1990-2003 allows us to investigate market and 
company behaviour over 14 years, covering a full oil price cycle. This enables 
us to take advantage of the additional information in the time-series 
dimension. Additionally, our data set includes the recent period of substantial 
industrial restructuring. To our knowledge, no other study has examined the 
relationship between financial indicators and the financial markets for 
international oil and gas companies during this period. The most recent study 
covers the years 1994-1996 (Bryant, 2003), prior to the RoACE era of the 
latter part of the 1990’s. 
 
Our results have interesting implications for the understanding of empirical 
valuation mechanisms, and also shed additional light on supply-side dynamics 
in the oil market over the last few years.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the use of financial and 
operational indicators for valuation purposes among stock market analysts. 
Section 3 summarises relevant previous research on valuation and financial 
indicators. Section 4 presents a simple econometric model to test for the 
validity of the analysts’ approach to stock market valuation, based on panel 
data for 14 major oil and gas companies over the period 1990-2003. 
Econometric results are presented and discussed in section 5, before section 6 
concludes the study and points out possible directions for future research. 
 
 
2. Key performance indicators and stock market valuation  
 
Being a successful stock market analyst can be very rewarding, but is indeed 
also demanding. One single person often has to keep track of a wide range of 
companies, and provide superior advice and consistent investment 
recommendations to exacting investors with no concerns but to maximise 
their returns and to outperform their benchmarks. No wonder, therefore, that 
both analysts and investors have to relate to some simplified indicators that 
can help them in developing relative valuations and investment rankings. 
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Ideally, valuation should be undertaken by means of net present value 
analyses (cf. Antill and Arnott, 2000; Smith, 2004). The value of a company 
is then determined by the cash flow, growth and risk characteristics. 
However, stock market analysts often lack the necessary resources for 
continuous updates of detailed valuations, and therefore often resort to 
relative valuation (Damodaran, 2002). Relative valuation requires less 
assumptions, it is quick, and easy to communicate.  
 
A widespread approach among oil and gas analysts has been to plot key 
performance indicators (KPIs) among the companies against their respective 
market-based valuation multiples (e.g. EV/DACF). These KPIs are also 
subject to active communication and continuous follow-up from the majority 
of Western oil and gas companies. An example is illustrated in Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. RoACE and EV/DACF 2003 
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Data source: Deutsche Bank (2004), authors’ regression line (cf Table 2). 
 
RoACE is defined as net income adjusted for minority interests and net 
financial items (after tax), as a percentage ratio of average capital employed. 
Capital employed is the sum of shareholders’ funds and net interest-bearing 
debt. EV, or Enterprise Value, is the sum of the company’s debt and equity, at 
market values.4 DACF, or Debt-Adjusted Cash Flow, reflects cash flow from 
operations plus after-tax debt-service payments. 
                                                 
4 For total debt, book value is used as a proxy for market value. This is less of a problem than 
for equity, as the difference between market values and book values is quite moderate for 
corporate debt. 
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Simple correlations are illustrated and calculated by analysts, at best with a 
regression line for a cross-section of observations. Note that the fit is not very 
convincing (R2 below 0.5). Nevertheless, this method is applied to produce 
buying and selling signals for the companies’ stocks. The tractability of 
Figure 2 is that the estimated regression line will divide the “cheap” 
companies from “expensive” companies, paving the way for indicative 
investment recommendations. 
 
In their Global Integrated Oil Analyser, UBS Warburg (2003) state: “Our key 
valuation multiple is EV/DACF”. . . . Each of the stocks which we rate a 
‘Buy’ is trading below the average level relative to its returns. EV/DACF 
versus RoACE provides the key objective input into the process of setting our 
target prices.” Similar statements about valuation, multiples and return on 
capital are made in Deutsche Bank’s publication Major Oils, and related 
publications from other investment banks. 
 
Other common key performance indicators include oil and gas production 
(growth), unit production costs, unit finding and development cost, and 
various measures of reserve replacement. Such a set of indicators can be 
perceived as a simplified implicit incentive scheme presented to the 
companies by the financial market. In responding to these incentives, the 
companies strike a balance between short-term goals of return on capital and 
long-term goals of production growth and reserve replacement. 
 
 
3. Previous research 
 
The interest for the relationship between financial performance and valuation 
of oil companies is not new.5 A typical result from previous studies is that 
accounting information, such as earnings and book equity, is insufficient in 
the equity valuation process for oil and gas exploration companies. Although 
some studies have concluded that accounting information, such as net income 
and the book value of equity are value-relevant in cross-sectional studies, the 
dominating view has been that historical cost accounting is inappropriate for 
accurately conveying the oil and gas companies’ financial performance to the 
financial markets. The following quote from the US Financial Accounting 
Standards Board underscores this point: 
 
                                                 
5 For general analyses of valuation multiples, see Damodaran (2002), and  Liu et al. (2001). 
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“An important quality of information that is useful in making rational 
investment, credit, and similar decisions is its predictive value—specifically, 
its usefulness in assessing the amounts, timing, and uncertainty of prospective 
net cash inflows to the enterprise. Historical cost based financial statements 
for oil and gas producing enterprises have limited predictive value. Their 
usefulness is further reduced because a uniform accounting method is not 
required to be used for costs incurred in oil and gas producing activities.”  
 
(FASB, 1982). 
 
Thus, there is a potential hazard in relying solely on accounting measures, 
such as RoACE, in equity valuation. 
 
McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1998) point out particular problems in 
valuation of oil and gas companies, since the accounting information in the 
upstream sector “does a distressingly poor job of conveying the true 
economic results”. There are measurement errors in petroleum reserves. The 
response to new information is asymmetric; bad news is quickly reflected in 
the reserve figures whereas good news takes more time to be accounted. 
Moreover, reserves may be exposed to measurement errors since they are 
noted in current oil price (and not the mid cycle price), and since they do not 
include the value of any implicit real options. Finally, McCormack and 
Vytheeswaran claim a bias in the reported figures, as the large and profitable 
oil companies are more conservative in their reserve estimates than most of 
the others. This may explain the importance that many analysts have put on 
company reputation, a factor that has been partially jeopardised by the recent 
reserve write-down in Royal Dutch/Shell.  
 
As for depreciation, the successful-efforts method produces initial 
depreciations that are too high. The unit-of-production method also has the 
effect of depreciating assets too quickly. A possible implication is that an 
extra cost is added to new activity, whereas inertia is rewarded. Other 
measurement challenges specific to the oil business are cyclical investment 
patterns and long lead times; these features can exacerbate the measurement 
errors. Similar effects may occur from the fact that discoveries are 
discontinuous and stochastic. 
 
McCormack and Vytheeswaran (1998) perform econometric tests on financial 
relations for the largest oil and gas companies. Total shareholder return is 
tested against EBITA (earnings before interest, taxes and amortization), 
RONA (return on net assets), after-tax earnings, ROE (return on equity), and 
free cash flow. Estimated relations between valuation and financial indicators 
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were very weak or non-existent. More robust relations were established when 
Economic Value Added (EVA) and reserves were introduced in the model.6  
 
Antill and Arnott (2002) address the strategic dilemma between return on 
capital and production growth in the petroleum industry. They claim that the 
2002 RoACE-figures of some 15 % were due to the fact that the companies 
possess legacy assets that have low book values but still generate a 
considerable cash flow. If market values of the capital employed were 
applied, Antill and Arnott estimate that RoACE would fall to approximately 
8-9 %, which is more consistent with the cost of raising capital. One problem 
with RoACE, they add, is that capital employed will always reflect a mixture 
of legacy and new assets. The implication is that RoACE does not adequately 
reflect incremental profitability,7 and therefore falls short of being a good 
measure for current performance. Antill and Arnott (2002) argue that the oil 
companies should accept investment projects with lower internal rate of 
return (IRR), as the growth potential would add value to the companies.  
 
Chua and Woodward (1994) perform econometric valuation tests for the 
American oil industry, 1980-1990. They test P/E-figures for integrated oil 
companies against dividend payout, net profit margin, asset turnover, 
financial leverage, interest rate, and Beta. However, they fail to uncover 
robust relations in the data set. The estimated interactions are weak, and some 
of them even have “wrong” signs. Chua and Woodward do not find support 
for the P/E-model. They therefore go on to test the stock price against cash 
flow from operation (following year and preceding year), dividend payout, 
net profit margin, total asset turnover, financial leverage, interest rate, Beta, 
and proven reserves. Future cash flow and proven reserves are statistically 
significant explanatory factors, thus offering support for a fundamental 
approach to valuation. An increase in proven reserves of 10% produced an 
average increase in the stock price of 3.7%.  
 
Quirin et al. (2000), in their analysis of US oil and gas exploration 
companies 1993-1996, find that certain ratios such as the reserves 
replacement ratio, reserves growth, production growth and the finding 
costs-to-depreciation ratio are perceived by analysts as being instrumental 
during the equity valuation process of oil and gas companies. Their results 
indicate that these ratios provide incremental information over accounting 
                                                 
6 EVA is a trade mark of Stern Stewart & Co. 
7 Using measures as RoACE thus favors companies having a large fraction of legacy assets 
in their portfolio. 
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information, including earnings and book value of equity. Recently, 
Cormier et al. (2003) found that cash flows and changes in reserves 
provide incremental information over reported earnings for a data set of 
Canadian petroleum companies. 
 
 
4. Data and model specification 
   
Our data set consists of stock price and accounting information for 14 
international oil and gas companies over the period 1990-2003, as reported by 
Deutsche Bank (2004).8 The upper bound for the number of observations is 
14x14 = 196. However, ovservations are missing for some of the companies 
in some of the years. For example, data is not available for Statoil before the 
company was listed in 2001. Hence, the number of observations is 142. 
 
Key performance indicators in our data set include oil and gas production, 
reserve replacement ratios, unit production costs and unit finding and 
development costs. Oil and gas production (OGPit) is defined as total 
production of liquids and natural gas, as reported in financial statements (SEC 
10K reports).9 The reserve replacement ratio (RRRit) is calculated by dividing 
the sum of changes in proved reserves (discoveries plus revisions plus 
purchases minus sales as reported according to SFAS No. 69) by 
production.10 This ratio is an indicator of the companies’ ability to replenish 
annual production volumes and grow its reserves. Unit production costs 
(UPCit) is defined as production costs (as reported according to SFAS No. 69) 
divided by production. Production costs include the costs to operate and 
maintain producing wells and related equipment and facilities. Finding and 
development cost (FDCit) is defined as sum of costs incurred for exploration 
and development activities (as reported according to SFAS No. 69) divided 
by the changes in proved reserves from discoveries and revisions (total 
proved reserve additions). FDCit represents the cost of finding a barrel of oil 
equivalent (proved reserves), and preparing it for production. RoACE (Rit), 
enterprise value (EVit) and debt-adjusted cash flow (DACFit) are defined and 
discussed in section 2. Our oil price variable (Pt) is the annual average of 
daily quotes of dated brent (source: US Department of Energy (EIA)). 
                                                 
8 The selection of companies include Amerada Hess, BP, ConocoPhillips, ChevronTexaco, Eni, 
Exxon, Marathon Oil, Hydro, Occidental Petroleum, Petro-Canada, Royal Dutch/Shell, Repsol 
YPF, Statoil, and Total. 
9 Filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
10 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.69. “Disclosures about Oil and Gas 
producing activities”. 
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If a company’s stock is performing well, it is vital to know whether it is 
merely due to a favourable oil market sentiment, or if superior stock market 
performance can be attributed to real improvements in the company’s 
underlying operations.  In a cross sectional setting, variations in market 
multiples may be due to variations in upstream exposure among the oil and 
gas companies. Some oil and gas companies publish RoACE-figures that are 
normalised for oil and gas price volatility. However, normalization 
procedures and mid-cycle market assumptions will vary across companies. 
 
Figure 3. Oil Price and RoACE for Western Major Oil Companies 
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Data source: Deutsche Bank (2004). 
 
Figure 3 indicates that average non-normalised RoACE does not add much 
information beyond the oil price. Thus, the benefits of normalised return 
figures should be obvious. Normalised RoACE figures are not available in 
our data set. The oil price is therefore included in the model to control for the 
cyclical price influence in output markets, as underlying performance is the 
target of our analysis. Our basic econometric model is: 
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mit is the ratio between EV and DACF,11 Ai is the set of company-specific 
dummies (or fixed effects), Pt is the crude oil price (dated brent), KPIit is a 
                                                 
11 EV is enterprise value and DACF is debt-adjusted cash flow. Cf. section 2 for definitions and 
discussion. 
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vector of key performance indicators (e.g. production, unit production cost, 
finding and development cost, reserve replacement ratio etc.) and Rit 
represents RoACE.12 a , bi and g are the parameters to be estimated, and ut is 
an error term with the usual white noise characteristics. In some regressions, a 
subset of the parameters will be restricted to zero. 
 
Table 2. Cross-section regressions of EV/DACF against RoACE 
 
  Year RoACE coefficient p-value R2 Obs. 
1990  -0.166 0.399 0.18 6 
1991      -0.697***) 0.003 0.85 7 
1992      -0.439***) 0.009 0.78 7 
1993 -0.462 0.118 0.41 7 
1994 -0.749 0.107 0.43 7 
1995   -0.387*) 0.081 0.42 8 
1996 -0.240 0.214 0.24 8 
1997  0.096 0.378 0.08 8 
1998  0.308 0.193 0.16 12 
1999     0.841**) 0.011 0.46 12 
2000  0.136 0.471 0.05 13 
2001  0.136 0.559 0.03 13 
2002  0.088 0.705 0.01 14 
2003      0.359***) 0.002 0.56 14 
 
*)   Significant at 90, **) 95 and  ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
 
 
5. Estimation and results 
 
We start by estimating simple cross-section regressions of the market multiple 
against RoACE for each of the years in the panel. This provides evidence 
with respect to the reliability of simple plots and regressions like the ones in 
Figure 2 above, and which are commonly used by stock market analysts. 
Results from the initial cross-sectional regressions are presented in Table 2.  
                                                 
12 Various specifications have also been tested with expected oil price as the explanatory 
variable. We applied market expectations as observed in the futures market in preliminary 
regressions, as well as a range of weighted averages of historical prices (adaptive expectations 
hypothesis). In econometric terms, all these variables were outperformed by the observed oil 
price. 
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The number of observations vary from 6 (1990) to 14 (2003). The estimated 
RoACE coefficients measure the absolute response in EV/DACF to a change 
in RoACE of 1 percentage point. In general, these crude models perform 
rather poorly. The estimated coefficients are unstable, unfocused, and their t-
values vary significantly over time. The statistical fit of these cross-sectional 
models is also not very impressive. R2 varies from 0.01 to 0.56, with an 
average for the 13 equations at 0.34. The valuation relevance of simple cross-
sectional regressions of EV/DACF on RoACE is therefore not justified. 
 
Figure 3. Estimated RoACE coefficient from cross-section regressions 
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Still, there are a couple of insights that are worth mentioning. First, the 
estimated RoACE coefficient is negative (and significant) for a number of 
years early in the data period. For these years, the evidence suggests that the 
valuation impact from RoACE performance has actually been negative. 
Second, there is a positive trend in the estimated coefficients, as illustrated in 
Figure 3 (solid background on the bars indicates statistical significance at the 
95 per cent level). Although the estimated valuation impact of RoACE 
performance is negative for the first half of the 1990s, the negative effect 
dwindles over time, and is replaced by positive coefficients for the last part of 
the period. However, the positive valuation impact from RoACE is 
statistically significant for only two of the years, namely 1999 and 2003. 
 
To exploit the full power of our data set, we now estimate the simple 
formulation above for the full panel data set. The oil price is also introduced 
as an additional explanatory variable, in an attempt to correct for the 
influence on RoACE from fluctuating market conditions over the time 
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dimension of our data set. Estimated results from this specification are 
presented as Model 1 in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Estimated Panel Data Models for EV/DACF 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
OLS 
Pooled 
data 
OLS 
Company  
effects 
OLS 
Company  
effects 
2SLS 
Company 
effects 
    Estimated coefficients a)    
Oil price      -0.167
***) 
 (0.006) 
   -0.111*) 
  (0.093) 
    -0.270***) 
(0.000) 
  -0.332***) 
(0.000) 
RoACE 0.065 
(0.263) 
-0.004 
 (0.953) 
 0.056 
 (0.286) 
 0.042 
(0.758) 
Oil and gas 
production .. .. 
     0.004***) 
(0.000) 
    0.004***) 
(0.000) 
Reserve 
replacement  .. .. 
0.065 
(0.664) 
0.039 
(0.811) 
    Model diagnostics    
R2 0.05 0.89 0.94 0.50 
Joint 
significance 
F(2, 139) 
= 3.95 
p = 0.021 
F(16, 126) 
= 64.60 
p = 0.000 
F(18, 122) 
= 99.55 
p = 0.000 
F(16, 113) 
= 7.13 
p=0.000 
Obs. (#) 142 142 140 130 
 
*) Significant at 90, **) 95 and ***) 99 per cent confidence level, respectively. 
a) p-values in brackets.   
  
In Model 1, the RoACE coefficient takes the “correct” sign, but is statistically 
insignificant. On the other hand, a highly significant negative relationship is 
revealed between EV/DACF and the oil price. The oil price coefficient is also 
highly significant. A negative effect on the valuation multiple from oil prices 
may seem contra-intuitive. However, a positive (negative) oil price shock will 
tend to inflate (deflate) current DACF. For the multiple to stay constant, 
enterprise value (EV) will have to adjust accordingly. Mean-reverting oil 
price expectations will imply that an oil price shock is temporary. The effect 
on earnings will not be persistent, and the valuation response will be muted. 
On impact, EV/DACF will therefore move contrary to the oil price. 
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Model 2 introduces company-specific dummy variables by allowing the 
constant term to vary by company, in addition to RoACE and the oil price. 
With this specification, the estimated oil price coefficient is somewhat lower 
than for model 1, and statistically significant only at the 10% level. 
 
The estimated RoACE coefficient is now marginally negative, but the p-value 
is higher than in Model 1, and the statistical significance of this parameter is 
therefore also lower. However, the introduction of the company-specific 
effects adds substantial quality to the overall statistical explanation of 
EV/DACF. The estimated company-specific effects for Model 2 are 
illustrated in Figure 4. With t-values ranging from 4.26 to 9.15, the estimated 
coefficients are highly significant. An F(14, 126) test for the joint significance 
of the company-specific effects gives a test statistic of 8.16, with a p-value of 
0.0000. As expected, the company-specific constant terms of our model 
closely resemble the ranking of average EV/DACF for the companies over 
the period 1990-2004.  
 
Figure 4. Estimated dummy variable coefficients of Modell 2 
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With an R2 figure of 0.89, the explanatory power of Model 2 is good, and 
vastly improved from Model 1. The test statistic for joint significance of the 
model parameters also increases sharply, compared to the model without 
company dummies. This indicates that fixed company characteristics, like 
reputation, represent an important part of the explanation of the variation in 
EV/DACF across companies.  
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Model 3 introduces oil and gas production and the reserve replacement ratio 
as additional key performance indicators. The effect of RoACE on company 
valuation remains small and insignificant. The negative effect from current oil 
prices now increases, and the statistical robustness prevails. The estimated 
valuation impact from oil and gas production takes the correct sign, and is 
highly significant. Finally, the estimated coefficient for the reserve 
replacement rate is small, and its standard deviation is high. R2 now 
approaches 0.95, and the test-statistic for joint significance of the parameters 
is also even higher than in Model 2. 
 
Models 1, 2 and 3 implicitly assume that normal exogeneity requirements are 
met for the explanatory variables. However, key performance indicators may 
depend on management’s decisions. The potential problem is that those 
decisions are not exogenous. They are made by management, under the 
influence of financial markets. The simultaneity issue is therefore critical, and 
cannot be ignored.  
 
The problem of endogeneity has been discussed and addressed in a wide 
range of areas of the literature on accounting and capital markets, but a 
consensus on how to address the problem is not yet reached. Nikolaev and 
van Lent (2005) argue that there is no clean-cut statistic or diagnostic 
instrument available to test for endogeneity. The general advice from the 
econometrics literature is to apply introspection (Wooldridge, 2002) and 
reasonableness (Greene, 2000; Kennedy, 2003) as a way to determine 
whether there is an endogeneity problem.  
 
The standard textbook solution to endogeneity is to apply additional 
exogenous variables (which by assumption are uncorrelated with the error 
term) to instrument the suspected endogenous predictor. Unfortunately, 
adequate instrumental variables are usually hard to find for the typical 
accounting study, and our analysis is no exception.  
 
There are several measures that researchers should report in order to help the 
reader assess the reasonableness of an IV application (Larcker and Rusticus 
(2005)). First, it is crucial that the choice of instrumental variables is justified. 
Second, the full results of the first-stage regression must be reported, 
including the partial F-statistic and partial R2. Third, analyses similar to the 
‘unconstrained’ second-stage should be reported. 
 
We apply two additional instrumental variables to correct for the potential 
endogeneity bias in our model, which is most likely associated with the 
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RoACE variable (Rit). The first is production cost per boe (UPCit). The 
second is finding and development cost per boe (FDCit). For a company’s 
portfolio of projects, average unit costs will reflect not only the company’s 
performance in the fields they operate themselves, but also the performance 
of other operators through participation in partner-operated fields. The 
widespread cooperation and partnerships in the international oil and gas 
industry is therefore likely to ensure the exogeneity of these variables. Both 
the instrumental variables are also lagged by one period, to reduce the risk of 
feedback effects from market valuations.  
 
The first step of our 2SLS estimation produces the following equation for 
RoACE (p-values in brackets): 
[2] 
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*) p-values in brackets.   
 
where Ai represent the set of company dummies. Equation [2] accounts fairly 
well for RoACE variation among the companies in our data set. The company 
dummies seem to crowd out the effect of oil and gas production, as the OGPit 
coefficient is small and insignificant. The RoACE impact of an increase in 
unit production costs (UPCit) is clearly negative, and so is the effect of an 
increase in finding and development costs (FDCit) . The estimated effect of an 
increase in the reserve replacement ratio (RRRit) is also positive. In statistical 
terms, this effect is less distinct than the others. The overall fit is satisfactory, 
and the test statistic for the joint significance of all parameters is robust. 
 
The second stage applies predicted values for RoACE from equation [2] 
instead of the observed values in our data set. The resulting 2SLS estimates 
for EV/DACF are compared with OLS estimates in models 2 and 3 in Table 
1. What we observe is that all coefficients are fairly stable across the two 
specifications.  
 
Models 3 and 4 suggest that EV/DACF is strongly influenced by oil price 
fluctuations and variations in production levels (revenue variables). Reserve 
replacement affects estimated company valuation, but the coefficient is not 
significant in statistical terms. Finally, the estimated valuation impact from 
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RoACE takes the expected sign, but the effect is small and statistically 
insignificant in both the models. 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks  
 
Over the last decade, we have experienced an unusual combination of high oil 
prices and low exploration efforts. One possible explanation is the use of 
short-term accounting returns (RoACE) as a key valuation metric among 
stock market analysts. We test the quality of this valuation indicator, and our 
analysis provides new and interesting insights on the links between financial 
markets and company behaviour. 
 
To assess valuation drivers, a simple econometric model is specified and 
estimated on market and accounting data for 14 major oil and gas companies 
from 1990 to 2003. The company-specific valuation multiple EV/DACF is 
regressed against a number of financial indicators, as well as the oil price. 
Our models take into account the potential endogeneity challenge in our data 
for market valuation and company performance. 
 
A robust result is that valuation multiples respond negatively to an increase in 
the oil price, implying that oil and gas companies are priced at mid-cycle oil 
prices. Our results also suggest that there is a robust and material influence on 
market valuations from oil and gas production. As the fluctuation over time is 
moderate for oil and gas production, this variable may serve as a proxy for 
company size. This suggests that company size and reputation still plays an 
important role in the valuation process. In our results, reserve replacement 
contributes positively to stock market valuation, but the effect is quite 
modest, and the significance is marginal. 
 
On the other hand, the general perception of RoACE as an important value-
driver is not supported by our estimated model, which is based on market 
valuations and accounting data for 14 major international oil and gas 
companies over a 14-year period. More precisely, our results indicate that the 
valuation impact of this simple profitability measure is negligible. We have 
offered some possible explanations to this result. First, the effect of short-
term return on capital can be crowded out by interdependent explanatory 
factors (multi-collinearity). Second, RoACE figures used in external analyses 
(and in our regressions) are not normalised to mid-cycle market conditions. 
Consistent data for normalised RoACE are unfortunately not available. Third, 
the RoACE figures suffer from the traditional shortcomings of historical cost-
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accounting in measuring true profitability (measurement errors). Researchers 
have repeatedly argued that this is particularly important for the oil and gas 
industry (e.g., Antill and Arnott, 2002). 
 
Our study elucidates some the weaknesses of RoACE for company valuation 
purposes. Our primary focus is on inter-company comparisons and relative 
stock market valuation. Within the individual companies, a consistently 
normalised RoACE may still be a useful key indicator in their internal efforts 
to improve operational and financial performance over time. 
 
This paper represents an early attempt to substantiate the links between 
market valuation and financial and operational indicators in the international 
oil and gas industry. The results are interesting, but preliminary. Our belief is 
that profitability and returns on invested capital is linked to company 
valuations. However, our RoACE variable does not establish this link. Future 
research should explore alternative measures of underlying financial 
performance, to overcome the weaknesses of RoACE. 
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Abstract1 
 
We explore a hypothesis that a change in investment behaviour among 
international oil companies (IOC) towards the end of the 1990s had long-lived 
effects on OPEC strategies, and on oil price formation. Coordinated 
investment constraints were imposed on the IOCs through financial market 
pressures for improved short-term profitability in the wake of the Asian 
economic crisis. A partial equilibrium model for the global oil market is 
applied to compare the effects of these tacitly collusive capital constraints on 
oil supply with an alternative characterised by industrial stability. Our results 
suggest that even temporary economic and financial shocks may have a long-
term impact on oil price formation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: C32, G31, L72 
 
Key words: Capital formation, dynamic panel data models,  
structural break  
 
 
                                                 
1 This study has benefited from comments by Ådne Cappelen, Solveig Glomstrød, Tor 
Karteveold, Lutz Killian, Terje Skjerpen, seminar participants at Statistics Norway and the 
University of Stavanger, and participants at the annual meeting of the Norwegian Economist 
Association (Forskermøtet) in Oslo 7-8 January 2008. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Ever since the oil price shocks of the early 1970s, the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has been followed with massive 
interest from the public, reflecting the vital significance of the oil price to 
industry, households and financial markets. The special structure of the oil 
market has also attracted scholarly interest, with numerous studies of OPEC’s 
role and strategy in various models of producer behaviour under imperfect 
competition (e.g., Smith, 2005; Fattouh, 2007). Less attention has been given 
to the role of producer behaviour in non-OPEC countries. Nevertheless, 
investment behaviour in the international oil and gas industry is an important 
part of supply-side dynamics in the oil market, and therefore also an 
important factor behind the formation of oil prices.  
 
Our key hypothesis is that a strategic redirection of the international oil 
industry towards the end of the 1990s has had long-lived effects on OPEC 
strategies – and on oil price formation. Starting in 1998, increased focus on 
shareholder returns, capital discipline and return on capital employed 
(RoACE)2 caused a slowdown in investment rates and production growth 
among international oil companies (Antill and Arnott, 2002; Osmundsen et 
al., 2006). Strong growth in oil demand and consolidation in the competitive 
fringe allowed OPEC to raise their price ambitions significantly at the turn of 
the century (Haskel and Scaramozzino, 1997; Kohl, 2002). The objective of 
this study is to quantify the oil price impact of these developments. Using a 
detailed simulation model for the global oil market, we examine the effects of 
the change in investment pattern on oil supply and oil prices, as compared 
with a situation characterised by industrial stability and unchanged price 
ambitions within OPEC.  
 
Oil demand is quite inelastic to oil price changes, and tightly linked to GDP 
growth.3 As noted by Lynch (2002), the dissection of crude oil supply is less 
straightforward, with geology, geopolitics, and imperfect competition as 
                                                 
2 RoACE is defined as net income adjusted for minority interests and net financial items (after 
tax) as a percentage ratio of average capital employed, where capital employed is the sum of 
shareholders’ funds and net interest-bearing debt. 
3 The macroeconomic role of the oil price has intrigued macroeconomic researchers for decades 
(Barsky and Killian, 2004). Empirical studies suggest that oil price changes above some 
threshold level will have contractionary effects on global economic activity (e.g., Jiménez-
Rodriguez and Sánchez, 2004; Jones, Leiby and Paik, 2004; IMF, 2005). Distributional effects 
are also involved, as the rewards of an increase in the oil price are reaped by oil-exporting 
nations, whereas the costs tend to be carried by less wealthy oil-dependent countries (e.g, 
Gately and Huntington, 2002; World Bank, 2005). 
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important complicating factors. At the same time, the degree of concentration 
among the most important oil producers is significant, leaving a potential 
scope for pricing power (Fattouh, 2007). Total oil supply is comprised by 
production from two groups of players. One is the group of OPEC countries, 
with national oil companies situated in the most resource-rich regions of the 
world (Noguera and Pecchenino, 2007). The other is often referred to as non-
OPEC, strongly influenced by the group of international oil companies 
(IOCs). Most of these companies have their origin in the western hemisphere, 
they have private shareholders, and their shares are traded on stock exchanges 
in London and New York.  
 
Osmundsen et al. (2007) argue that changes in the interaction between listed 
oil companies and their shareholders have suppressed investment behaviour 
and production growth among these companies from 1998 and onwards. We 
present a more comprehensive assessment of the oil market impact of changes 
in IOC investment behaviour. Our modelling approach allows an empirical 
assessment of supply side dynamics following the change in investment 
policies in the oil industry after the Asian economic crisis. The model 
simulations clearly suggest that enhanced capital discipline caused a 
temporary slowdown in investment and production growth among 
international oil companies. Consequently, global exploration activities, 
investment expenditures and oil production growth were suppressed, allowing 
OPEC to raise their price ambitions. Specifically, we find that the curb on 
IOC investments around the turn of the century caused an increase in the oil 
price of nearly 10 per cent in the long run. Both OPEC and non-OPEC 
producers gain from this development, whereas the cost is carried by oil-
importers and consumers. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a review of previous 
research of OPEC behaviour and oil industry dynamics, as well as a 
discussion of the rationale for our hypotheses about supply side behaviour. In 
Section 3, we introduce the FRISBEE model, and discuss two different 
scenarios for the oil market – to isolate the effects on exploration activities, 
investments, oil production growth and price formation. Concluding remarks 
and directions for future research are presented in Section 4. 
 
 
2. Financial market pressures and OPEC behaviour  
 
The last serious oil demand shock was experienced in 1998-1999, when the 
Asian economic crisis reduced anticipated demand growth rates by some 2 
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percentage points (EIA, 2006). One result was a change in investment 
behaviour among the IOCs. At the same time, the Asian economic crisis had 
the effect of pulling the OPEC countries together. OPEC regained market 
power and oil price ambitions were raised. We explore the behavioural 
changes of OPEC and the IOCs in greater detail below.  
 
2.1 Tacit collusion in IOC investment  
In the late 1990s, both the oil market and the financial market turned against 
the oil and gas industry. First, the “New Economy” euphoria made investors 
shift their investments from oil and gas to IT stocks. Oil and gas companies 
were generally perceived as old-fashioned and inefficient, with limited 
exposure to the exuberance of the IT sector. Second, the Asian economic 
crisis caused a sharp slowdown in global oil demand. In 1998 the oil price 
touched record lows of 10 USD/bbl., increasing the uncertainty and anxiety 
also with respect to oil price expectations. The result was not only a severe 
pressure on current oil company cash flows, but also an increasing scepticism 
with respect to future earnings. In consequence, oil and gas companies failed 
to deliver competitive returns to their shareholders.  
 
One response to these developments was a wave of mergers to build scale, 
reap synergies, and improve efficiency. This process erased a range of former 
prominent independent names,4 and attracted interest both from researchers 
(e.g., Weston et al., 1999; Fauli-Oller, 2000) and regulators (Scheffman and 
Coleman, 2002; Froeb et al., 2005). Another response from the international 
oil industry was a strategic redirection from development of reserves and 
production in the longer term to operational efficiency and capital discipline 
in the short to medium term. Companies were benchmarked and rated 
according to a specific set of financial and operational performance indicators 
(Antill and Arnott, 2002; Osmundsen et al., 2007). The most important of 
these indicators was RoACE.  
 
An example of common benchmarking and valuation practices is illustrated in 
the left-hand panel of Figure 1, where a financial market valuation multiple5 
is plotted against RoACE for major oil and gas companies. A regression is 
often added to illude “normal valuation”, and deviations from this 
relationship offer signals to buy or sell the stock. This practice of 
                                                 
4 Examples include Elf, Fina, Mobil, Amoco, Arco, YPF, Texaco, Phillips, Lasmo, Unocal – 
and recently also Hydro. 
5 EV, or Enterprise Value, is the sum of the company’s debt and equity, at market values. 
DACF, or Debt-Adjusted Cash Flow, reflects cash flow from operations plus after-tax debt-
service payments. 
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benchmarking and valuation made reported RoACE increase more than the 
oil price increase would suggest (see also Dobbs et al., 2006).  
 
Figure 1. IOC valuation and financial indicators 
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Source: Deutsche Bank (2004; oil industry data). 
 
Deutsche Bank (2004) reports that total investment expenditures among the 
major international oil and gas companies were cut by 16 per cent in real 
terms from 1998 to 2000, with a 38 per cent reduction in exploration 
expenditures over the same period. Mohn and Misund (2007) present 
econometric evidence of a structural break in IOC investment behaviour in 
1998, implying that the investment response to the late rise in the oil price is 
significantly less than the estimated response for the period before 1998. An 
important reason is the implicit increase in the required rate of return on new 
investments among international oil companies, to secure improved capital 
discipline and RoACE performance.6 Due to conservative valuation 
procedures,7 RoACE will improve when investment rates decline, providing 
an additional argument for IOCs to bridle their capital expenditures.8 
 
                                                 
6 In spite of differences in terms of definition, there is a close economic relationship between 
the ex ante required rate of return (RRoR) measure and the ex post return on average capital 
employed (RoACE) indicator. See Antill and Arnott (2002) for a more comprehensive 
discussion of accounting standards, financial market behaviour and corporate investment 
strategies. 
7 This improvement in RoACE generated simply by reducing activity levels is mainly due to 
the system of depreciation (production unit method) and the most common way of treating 
exploration expenses (full cost method). 
8 For an IOC perspective on investment in the first years of the new century, see Smith (2003).  
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Thus, the emphasis on RoACE in valuation of oil companies curbed 
investments, implicitly representing a tacit collusion to support an increase in 
the oil price. In retrospect, maintaining the original investment rate (cheating) 
would have been beneficial for any one oil company, as earnings would have 
surged on both higher oil price and higher production. However, the general 
perception among oil company managers was that a lower ranking in the 
financial community would reduce the stock price, increase the takeover 
threat, and reduce the potential for profitable acquisitions.  
 
Over the last couple of years, the tide has turned. Both investors and 
companies seem to have realised that reserve growth is required to sustain 
long-term production and activity growth. Accordingly, the pressure for 
short-term financial returns is relaxed. Spurred by advancing depletion of 
legacy fields of the past and limited access to new exploration acreage, 
management focus has shifted back to exploration and business development 
to access new oil and gas reserves. Our model scenarios are designed to 
capture both the rise and the fall of the RoACE era in the international oil and 
gas industry.  
 
2.2 OPEC behaviour  
Empirical studies of OPEC’s role in the oil market have generally failed to 
establish firm evidence of stable cartel behaviour (e.g., Griffin, 1985; Dahl 
and Yücel, 1991; Griffin and Nielson, 1994; Alhajji and Huettner 2000a,b). 
However, recent studies acknowledge that some sort of collusion is taking 
place. The current discussion is more about which model of imperfect 
competition the oil price formation adheres to, and to stability issues of 
OPEC’s market power. Böckem (2004) combines theories of new empirical 
industrial organisation (NEIO) literature with modern econometric 
techniques, and argues that a price-leader model provides the best description 
of OPEC behaviour. Hansen and Lindholt (2004) obtain similar results in an 
econometric study of monthly oil price data over the period 1973-2001. Smith 
(2005) provides a critical overview of empirical studies of OPEC behaviour, 
and concludes his own assessment with weak support for a “bureaucratic 
syndicate” model.  
 
Traditionally, OPEC has collected data for a “basket” of different crude oil 
qualities, and the global oil market has been monitored through a reference 
price based on this basket (cf. Figure 2). In March 2000, OPEC established a 
price band mechanism to respond more automatically to changes in market 
conditions (Kohl, 2002). According to this mechanism, production would be 
adjusted at price levels below 22 USD/bbl and above 28 USD/bbl. The 
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mechanism was later adjusted to allow production adjustments at OPEC’s 
discretion.9 The price band mechanism was suspended in January 2005. 
Combining these observations with the oil price development, there are clear 
indications that OPEC’s pricing power was significant at the turn of the 
century (Fattouh, 2001). 
 
Figure 2. OPEC decision variables 
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As argued by Haskel and Scaramozzino (1997), physical and financial 
capacity is likely to affect conjectural variations in an oligopoly. With a cartel 
strategy contingent on the ability of fringe producers to react, a variety of 
developments shed light on OPEC’s self reliance. First, the outlook for non-
OPEC supply was curbed by financial market pressures and strict capital 
discipline. Second, the oil price outlook was uncertain, and did not provide 
sufficient incentive for massive private oil and gas investment. Third, the 
domestic provinces of the IOCs were maturing rapidly,10 with deteriorating 
exploration results and decaying reserves. Fourth, the Asian economic crisis 
demonstrated the importance of internal discipline when demand is 
insufficient to meet every cartel member’s production ambitions. Finally, the 
global economy was recovering swiftly, with especially high growth in GDP 
and energy demand in non-OECD countries. Hyndman (2007) and Fattouh 
(2007) provide convincing evidence that agreements in a cartel like OPEC are 
easier to achieve when times are good then when times are bad. All in all, 
                                                 
9 By 2004 the price band mechanism had been activated only once; In October 2000, total 
OPEC production was increased by 500,000 barrels per day.  
10 USA, Canada, United Kingdom, and Norway. 
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OPEC regained strength during 1999, and entered the new century with 
increased market power – and a willingness to exploit it (Kohl, 2002).  
 
We now turn to a detailed and model-based analysis of these developments, to 
reveal more precise implications in terms of investments, production growth 
and oil price formation.  
 
 
3. Model scenarios 
 
3.1 Overview of FRISBEE 
The FRISBEE model is a recursive, dynamic partial equilibrium model of the 
global oil market.11 Particular attention is paid to the oil industry’s supply of 
oil, and the model accounts explicitly for discoveries, reserves, field 
development and production in four field categories across 13 global regions 
(including two OPEC regions). The model is calibrated based on market data 
for the base year 2000, as well as other relevant data and estimated parameters 
from the literature (e.g. demand elasticities, production costs, oil resources 
etc.). The global oil market is assumed to clear in each period (year). Regional 
supply, demand and trade flows are among the outputs of the model. The 
model does not intend to exactly replicate the historical development of the oil 
market, or forecast the future, as the oil market obviously is influenced by 
much more than economics. However, the model can still provide valuable 
insight into the effects of certain changes in the market, such as changes in the 
international oil industry. 
 
In each region oil is demanded for transport and stationary purposes in three 
sectors of the economy: Manufacturing industries, Power generation, and 
Others (including household demand). Oil demand depends on user prices of 
oil products, and to some degree on other energy prices. In the end-user 
sectors the direct price elasticities are on average around -0.3 in the long run, 
and around -0.1 in the short run (cf., Liu 2004). Income growth is particularly 
important in the longer term, with (per capita) income elasticities on average 
around 0.6. Population growth and exogenous energy efficiency are also 
affecting energy demand. In the power sector oil competes with other fuels on 
a cost basis.  
 
                                                 
11 A more detailed, informal description of the model is given in Appendix A. For a more 
extensive presentation of the FRISBEE model system, see Aune et al. (2005). More recently, 
the model has been extended to include international gas and coal markets (see Rosendahl and 
Sagen 2007). 
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The development of non-OPEC production is influenced by initial production 
capacity and investments – in exploration, field development and efforts to 
increase oil recovery (IOR). Non-OPEC producers are assumed to behave 
competitively, as no single oil company has a market share above 3 per cent.12 
Thus, production volumes from developed fields are determined by the 
equalisation of marginal producer costs to producer prices in each region. 
Investments are driven by expected returns, and net present values are 
calculated for the four field categories in the 11 non-OPEC regions (i.e., 44 
field groups), based on adaptive price expectations and a pre-specified 
required rate of return.  
 
Oil companies form their investment strategies subject to an appropriate set of 
planning assumptions, reflecting expectations of relevant market 
developments. Their expected oil price trajectory will normally depict a 
gradual transition between the spot price and a constant long-term expectation 
for the real oil price.13 Based on this trajectory, short-term projects will 
largely be influenced by near-term expectations, which will typically not be 
very different from the current oil price. As the investment horizon is 
extended for development and exploration activities, the role for long-term 
oil-price expectations also becomes gradually more important. For tractability 
reasons, we specify these ideas and mechanisms in terms of expected mean-
prices for each investment activity, measuring the average price expected over 
the relevant time horizon for the investment activity in question:14 
 
1 1(1 ) ,it i t i itEP P EP- -= a + - a  
        [1] 
 
where EPit is the expected (real) mean-price of oil applied for evaluation of 
investment activity i, Pt-1 is the corresponding observed (real) price last year, 
and ai are parameters that determine the speed of expectations adjustment for 
                                                 
12 It could be argued that a country like Russia, having a total market share of 12 per cent in 
2006, can coordinate oil production from its domestic oil companies so as to influence the 
market. However, so far there have been few signs of such behaviour in Russia or other non-
OPEC countries except in extraordinary situations. 
13 Previous empirical studies of oil price expectations provide firm support for the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis (e. g., Pesaran, 1990; Farzin, 2001). This implies an important role for 
historical memory in the formation of oil price expectations, and may be seen as a 
generalisation of the popular hypothesis of mean reversion. For a recent comparative 
investigation of alternative models for oil price expectations, see Prat and Uctum (2006), who 
reject the standard hypothesis of rational oil price expectations in favour of a combination of 
adaptive, extrapolative, and regressive expectations. 
14 In the model, the oil price differs somewhat across regions (due to transport costs), but this is 
disregarded in the equations here. 
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each of the three investment categories. The values of ai in equation [1] are 
assumed to be respectively 0.60, 0.35 and 0.10 for IOR activities (I), field 
development (D) and exploration activity (E).15 This reflects that IOR 
investments typically produce returns with a time lag of 0-2 years; field 
developments have a perspective of 2-5 years before start-up, whereas 
exploration projects are for the long term. Oil companies therefore adjust their 
IOR activities more rapidly than their exploration activities in response to oil 
price changes, as short-term price expectations change more rapidly than 
long-term expectations.16 It takes time before the oil industry believe that a 
price adjustment is permanent, as illustrated by the slow pace of long-term 
investment response to the current price increase.  Neglecting subscript t for 
simplicity of exposition, oil company investments in field development and 
IOR activities outside OPEC are derived from the following maximisation 
problem (Aune et al., 2005): 
 
( ), , , , , , , ,ijR ij i j ij j j jMax R EP r CO CC GT NT FP
r
       [2] 
 
where P is expected discounted profits, Rij denotes investment in new 
reserves (new field developments or IOR) in field group j, r is the required 
rate of return, COj and CCij operating and capital costs, respectively, GTj and 
NTj  gross and net tax rates on oil production, respectively, and jF
r
 is a vector 
of field characteristics that differ across field groups (notably production 
profile and time lags). Capital costs are increasing in investment activity, 
decreasing in undeveloped reserves (new fields), and increasing in the 
recovery rate (IOR). A simpler approach is applied for exploration 
investments, where we assume that the process for discovered reserves (REj) is 
captured by the following function:  
 
( , , , ) ,Ej Ej E j jR R EP r U F=
r
         [3] 
 
                                                 
15 This means that 90 per cent of the weights in the price expectation formation are based on the 
3 last years’ prices for IOR activities, 6 last years for field development, and about 20 last years 
for exploration activity. Other values of ai would alter the investment activities somewhat. 
However, in terms of investment composition, our results are quite robust to changes in these 
parameters. 
16 When the oil price started rising around the turn of the century, volatility was high, and the 
longer term outlook was very uncertain. The company response was a redirection of investment 
toward activities with a short-term horizon, like IOR and (satellite) field developments, at the 
expense of longer term exploration investments, whose price expectations were not adjusted 
upward to the same extent (Osmundsen et al., 2007). 
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where EPE is the expected oil price applied for evaluation of exploration 
activities, Uj denotes (expected) remaining undiscovered reserves, and 
subscript t is still subdued.  
 
To summarise, oil companies outside OPEC choose optimal levels of 
exploration activities, field development, and IOR activities, based on 
expected prices, required rate of return, etc. A higher expected price and/or a 
lower required rate of return will increase the investments in new fields and 
IOR activities, and increase the level of discoveries. Because the time lag 
between capital outlays and revenues is highest for exploration and lowest for 
IOR, we should expect the required rate of return to be most important for 
exploration, and least important for IOR activities. 
 
OPEC’s behaviour is not easily depicted, and has certainly changed over time 
(see, e.g., Fattouh, 2007). However, as discussed above, several studies 
conclude that a price-leader model may provide a reasonable description. 
Since OPEC suspended its price band in 2005 because of the considerable 
upward pressure on the oil price, no official price targets have been 
announced. However, OPEC certainly considers the oil price development 
when production quotas are determined. Thus, the FRISBEE model assumes 
that OPEC searches for the price path that maximises its net present value of 
oil production until 2030 at a given discount rate,17 and chooses a production 
profile consistent with this price path. However, we restrict the analysis to 
price paths on the following form: 
 
0
1
t tOPEC OPEC
t tP P
-
+ = + g y ,         [4] 
 
where PtOPEC is the average producer price for OPEC, and ?  and ? are 
parameters that determine the price path from an exogenous base year level (t0 
= 2000). The concave price trajectory illustrated in Figure 4 below is the 
result of a calibration with ? = 0.9, which is also applied in our further 
simulations.18 The model now searches for the value of ?  that maximises the 
                                                 
17 In the simulations presented in this paper, we use a discount rate of 7 per cent. Simulations 
with much lower (down to zero) or higher discount rates give almost the same conclusion when 
it comes to the relative price effects of changes in non-OPEC’s investment strategy (if 
anything, the price effect is slightly stronger). 
18 Our choice of ? is of course a significant restriction of all the possible price paths OPEC can 
choose between. We have chosen a ? below unity (i.e., concave price path), as this seems to be 
in accordance with OPEC’s mission statement: “OPEC’s mission is to … ensure the 
stabilization of oil markets in order to secure an efficient, economic & regular supply of 
petroleum to consumers, a steady income to producers & a fair return on capital to those 
investing in the petroleum industry." (http://www.opec.org/home). In any case, for the purpose 
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net present value of OPEC’s profit flow. As a comparison, Berg et al. (2002) 
and Yang (2007) simulate OPEC’s behaviour through a dynamic optimisation 
model ala Hotelling (1931), but their modelling of the oil market is much 
simpler in other respects. On the other hand, Gately (2007) searches for an 
optimal strategy for OPEC that is robust to changes in uncertain future market 
conditions.  
 
Note that we assume different expectation formation for OPEC and non-
OPEC. Whereas non-OPEC producers have adaptive expectations about the 
future oil price, OPEC has (implicitly) rational expectations about future 
demand and how non-OPEC will react to different oil prices. Reasons for this 
could be that OPEC’s behaviour has changed over time, and is therefore less 
predictable than non-OPEC’s behaviour, which to a larger degree has been 
based on expected profit maximization (there are of course important 
exceptions to this generalisation).  
 
Figure 3. Oil price formation in the FRISBEE model 
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Figure 4 provides a stylised overview of oil price formation in the FRISBEE 
model. Total demand and non-OPEC supply are based on neo-classical 
behavioural equations for oil and gas producers, other industrial companies 
and households in 13 regions across the world. The price set by OPEC (POPEC) 
clears the market, and implicitly determines both total oil production and the 
                                                                                                                    
of exploring the impacts of a change in non-OPEC’s investment strategy this restriction is of 
minor importance since ? only determines the curvature of the price path. Simulations with 
other values of ? (including ?=1, i.e., linear and strictly convex price paths) indicate that the 
price differential in the long run (i.e., 2020-2030) is quite similar in relative terms.  
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market shares for OPEC and non-OPEC. For a given price chosen by OPEC, 
oil demand and non-OPEC production are determined independently, and 
OPEC supply is closing the gap. A credible defence of the price target will 
require surplus capacity. In our model, we therefore assume that OPEC will 
always invest sufficiently in new fields and IOR activities to maintain a 
capacity surplus of 10 per cent. 
 
In summary, oil companies invest in exploration for new reserves, field 
developments and in efforts to increase oil recovery from producing fields. 
Non-OPEC production is profit-driven, whereas OPEC meets the residual 
“call on OPEC” at a pre-specified oil price path that is determined through an 
NPV maximisation process, subject to total demand expectations and 
conjectures for non-OPEC supply behaviour. A higher oil price path 
(compared to a reference path) will gradually increase production from oil 
producers outside OPEC. Extraction from existing capacities is fairly fixed, 
but the profitability of IOR investments is increased, leading to higher 
production capacity in the short to medium term. In the medium to long term 
oil companies develop more fields, and in the longer term new fields are 
discovered and appraised for development. A higher oil price path will also 
gradually reduce oil demand. The model scenarios below illustrate how the 
interaction between financial markets and oil and gas companies may affect 
the supply side of the oil market. 
 
Figure 4. RoACE and oil price scenarios 
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3.2. Assumptions and calibration of two scenarios  
Following the discussion in Section 2, we want to explore the market effects 
of change in non-OPEC’s investment strategy observed in the oil market at 
the end of the last century. According to Deutsche Bank (2004), RoACE 
increased substantially among the IOCs in the 1990s, from 9 per cent in 1990-
1997 to 16 per cent in 1998-2005. This indicates that the required rate of 
return on new investments was considerably raised in this period.  
 
We will consider two different scenarios using the FRISBEE model. The first 
scenario, called the 'Reference scenario', assumes that the non-OPEC 
producers follow the attitude of the IOCs from the first half of the 1990s. That 
is, their required rate of return is assumed to be 10 per cent. The second 
scenario, called the 'Tacit collusion' scenario, assumes that the non-OPEC 
producers require a higher rate of return, i.e., 15 per cent, at the beginning of 
the new century. However, as discussed above, we have seen a gradual 
change among the IOCs over the last couple of years, with a gradual 
redirection of attention (and investment) from short-term profitability to long-
term reserve and production growth. Accordingly, we allow the required rate 
of return to fall gradually from 15 to 10 percent towards 2010, as illustrated in 
Figure 4 (below we also consider the effects of a prolonged period with 15 per 
cent rate of return). In all other respects, the scenario assumptions are 
identical.19  
 
A higher rate of return in the 'Tacit collusion' scenario will induce less 
investment among non-OPEC producers compared to the 'Reference scenario', 
consistent with the observed behaviour of the IOCs after 2000. On the other 
hand, when the rate of return is gradually reduced in the former scenario, 
investment activities should pick up again. In fact, with more unexploited 
projects and possibly higher oil price, investment activities may surpass the 
activity level in the 'Reference scenario' after some years. In the next 
subsection we will investigate how this may have affected the oil market since 
2000, and what impacts it may have on the future market. 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 We assume that OPEC has perfect expectations about the required rate of return in non-
OPEC. Alternatively, we could assume that OPEC has adaptive expectations about the rate of 
return. In this case OPEC would choose a higher initial growth in the oil price in the ‘Tacit 
collusion’ scenario, assuming that non-OPEC producers would stick to a high required rate of 
return also in the future. Simulations indicate that this would lead to a significantly higher oil 
price level also in the long run. 
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3.3 Model results 
In the ‘Reference scenario’, the oil price increases from 29 USD/bbl 2000 to 
50 USD/bbl in 2030. Hence, it is clearly profitable for OPEC to settle on an 
increasing oil price path from the level in 2000. In the 'Tacit collusion' 
scenario, reduced investment activities among non-OPEC producers gradually 
reduce the supply outside OPEC compared to the ‘Reference scenario’, at 
least temporarily. This makes it profitable for OPEC to choose a higher oil 
price than in the latter scenario, cf. Figure 4. The short-term investment effect 
of the change in IOC strategy is substantial. As the difference in attitude for 
non-OPEC producers is fairly short-lived, we shouldn’t expect a big change in 
the long-term oil price. However, the long-term oil price difference between 
the scenarios is not negligible (4.4 USD/bbl, or 9 per cent). 
 
Figure 5. OPEC and non-OPEC oil supply (mtoe per year) 
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Source: FRISBEE Model.    
 
Between 2005 and 2010, non-OPEC investment levels in the 'Tacit collusion' 
scenario surpass the levels in the 'Reference scenario' for all three investment 
activities. After 2005 the required rate of return is almost the same, whereas 
the oil price is higher in the former scenario. Moreover, the recovery rate in 
existing fields is lower, which means that there are more profitable IOR 
projects left. In addition, there are more undeveloped fields (despite fewer 
discoveries), which means that the oil companies have more profitable fields 
to develop. The (expected) amount of undiscovered oil reserves is also higher. 
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From Figure 5 we also see that non-OPEC supply is somewhat reduced in the 
'Tacit collusion' scenario compared to the 'Reference scenario' in the first 15-
20 years. Less investment gradually affects production levels. In the first 
couple of years this is driven by fewer IOR projects. After 5-10 years the 
effects of less development projects are perceptible, too. Gradually fewer 
discoveries also affect supply. However, as investment activity in non-OPEC 
starts to accelerate when the required rate of return is reduced, production 
levels outside OPEC gradually catch up with the 'Reference scenario'. From 
around 2020 non-OPEC supply is highest in the 'Tacit collusion' scenario.20 
 
As explained in Subsection 3.1, a higher required rate of return among oil 
companies outside OPEC will affect new discoveries most and IOR projects 
least. This is because the time lag between investment expenditures and 
expected revenues are lowest for IOR activities and highest for exploration 
activities. Figure 6 shows how the different investment activities develop in 
the two scenarios. We see that IOR investments are least affected, as 
expected. They are reduced by up to 18 per cent in the 'Tacit collusion' 
scenario. New field developments are almost halved in the first couple of 
years, and so too are new discoveries.  
 
Which scenario is most profitable for oil companies outside OPEC? Figure 7 
shows how the net cash flow evolves, i.e., net revenues from oil production 
minus investment expenditures. We see that the 'Tacit collusion’ scenario is 
clearly the most profitable one, whatever discount rate we apply. In the short 
run, non-OPEC producers gain from reducing their capital outlays. In the 
medium term, they gain from a slightly higher oil price, and lose from a 
slightly lower supply. Investment expenditures are about the same. In the 
longer term, both the oil price and non-OPEC production are higher, and these  
effects dominate the effect of higher capital expenditures. That is, non-
OPEC's temporary restraint in investment activities is beneficial for both non-
OPEC and OPEC producers, whereas the consumers stand to lose from higher 
prices. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 If the oil price path was unchanged in the ‘Tacit collusion’ scenario, the investment levels 
would still surpass the levels in the ‘Reference scenario’ before 2010. However, the investment 
levels in the two scenarios would be more similar towards 2030, and non-OPEC supply would 
be highest in the ‘Reference scenario’ over the entire time horizon. 
Oil company investment and market interaction 
 214 
Figure 6. Reserve-generation (RG) by investment type and non-OPEC 
cash flow21 
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Source: FRISBEE Model.      
 
                                                 
21 Unconventional oil (i.e., tar sands in Canada) is included in all graphs except for new 
discoveries. Within our time horizon, conventional oil discoveries are much more important for 
new field developments than unconventional discoveries, as reserves of tar sand are already 
huge and not really constraining field development in Canada. If we subtract unconventional oil 
also in the graph for new field developments, we will see a gradual but distinct decline after 
2010 in both scenarios. In 2030 unconventional oil constitutes almost half of new field 
developments outside OPEC, according to our scenarios. 
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Figure 7. Oil price effects if the shock is permanent 
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Source: FRISBEE Model.      
 
Finally, what if the oil companies outside OPEC had required a higher rate of 
return (i.e., 15 per cent) for a longer period of time? Figure 7 shows the 
relative increase in the long-run oil price level when the decline in the rate of 
return is delayed by different number of years (e.g., 0 years is equivalent to 
the original ‘Tacit collusion’ scenario, whereas 25 years means that non-
OPEC has 15 per cent rate of return over the entire time horizon). As the 
figure shows, the long-run effect on the oil price would be much stronger if 
the change in investment strategy in the oil industry was more than a short-
lived phenomenon. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The process of capital formation in the oil and gas industry is an important 
part of the supply side dynamics in the oil market. Understanding how oil and 
gas companies think in terms of investment is therefore essential in order to 
develop and maintain the required insights for meaningful analyses of oil 
price formation. Over the last 10 years, international oil and gas companies 
have gone through a period of escalating market turbulence, restructuring and 
redirection of investment strategy. As the oil price dropped to a historical low 
in the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis, management focus shifted to 
short-term accounting returns, at the expense long-term field development and 
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reserve replacement. We explore the impact of this strategy redirection on oil 
price formation. 
 
The temporary one-dimensional focus on RoACE forced the international oil 
companies to cut back on investments, thus generating higher oil prices. This 
change in strategy has clearly proved profitable for the international oil 
industry. Through the capital market analysts' RoACE-benchmarking of 
companies, an implicit coordination on lower investment levels was achieved. 
In retrospect, it can easily be demonstrated that deviation from the common 
strategy of low investment would have been profitable for any individual oil 
company. By maintaining its standard investment policy (e. g., a constant 
reinvestment ratio), it could have reaped the joint benefit of high oil prices 
and high production. However, tight co-operative capital discipline was 
maintained, as managers feared that a lower RoACE than the industry average 
would harm share prices in the short run, thus making it harder to raise capital 
and increasing the takeover probability. 
 
This study demonstrates how increased focus on shareholder returns, capital 
discipline and return on capital employed (RoACE) have caused a temporary 
slowdown in investment and production growth among international oil 
companies. We find that the strategic redirection of the international oil 
industry towards the end of the 1990s had long-lasting effects on OPEC 
behaviour – and on oil price formation. Our scenarios suggest that the change 
in investment strategies of the late 1990s caused a lift of approximately 10 per 
cent in the long-term oil price. Both OPEC and non-OPEC producers gain 
from this development, whereas the cost is carried by oil-importers and 
consumers. 
 
Industrial leaders and their companies do not operate in a vacuum. Rather, 
they respond continuously to changing political and market environments. 
Their models and ways of thinking may be stable for periods. However, their 
mindset will also be challenged by external forces from time to time. And 
sometimes these pressures even bring about deeper changes. This study 
demonstrates that such changes may have persistent effects on the oil market.  
 
From the perspective of the investors, an adequate question is if strategies 
now have shifted too far away from accounting returns. The international oil 
industry has a history of over-investment at high oil prices (e.g., Jensen 1986). 
However, there are signs that the current situation is different from the 
traditional high price cycle scenario: The lack of adequate investment projects 
actually put an effective curb on investments, and reserve replacement levels 
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are low. On the other hand, some of the current investment projects in the oil 
industry have break-even prices considerable above historic oil prices. 
Company managers thus face some tough decisions. Traditional counter-
cyclical asset trading (selling reserves at top of the oil price cycle) may not 
seem so tempting when the company is unable to replace its reserves. On the 
other hand, buying reserves in the current market sentiment may seem risky. 
Assets are traded at prices that entail a considerable downside risk. Part of this 
picture is the fact that the IOCs are competing for new reserves against NOCs 
that are not subject to the same capital market scrutiny. 
 
An interesting direction for future research would be to study the stability of 
the investment process in the oil and gas industry in greater detail, preferably 
with micro-econometric studies of company data. Modern econometric 
techniques may reveal more exact information on how the process of capital 
formation in the oil and gas industry was altered in the late 1990s.
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Appendix A. Description of the FRISBEE model 
 
In this appendix we give a more detailed, informal description of the 
FRISBEE model, with emphasis on the oil market.22 FRISBEE is a 
recursively dynamic partial equilibrium model of the global oil market. The 
world is divided into 13 regions (see Appendix B). In each region oil 
companies produce oil, which they sell on the global market. Three different 
end-users in each region consume oil products, which they buy at regional 
prices linked to the global market. We assume that the oil market clears in 
each period, i.e., total supply from all regions equals total demand in all 
regions, and all trade between regions goes through a common pool. The time 
periods in the model are one year, and the base year is 2000. Exchange rates 
are held constant over time.  
 
Production of oil  
In each of the 13 regions the model distinguishes between 4 field categories 
based on field size and geology (see Appendix B). Within each of the 
resulting 52 operational areas, there are developed and undeveloped reserves. 
New discoveries add to the stock of undeveloped reserves at the end of each 
year.  
 
Both production and investment decisions are explicitly modeled. For each 
region and field category we apply a pre-specified production profile. This 
profile is taken for granted in the investment decisions, but can to some 
degree be altered during the lifetime of the field (see below). The profile is 
divided into four phases: The first phase is the investment phase, i.e., the time 
lag between the investment decision and start of production. The second phase 
is the pre-peak phase, i.e., when production builds up towards the peak level. 
The two first phases are quite short, varying between 2 and 6 years in total 
across regions. The third phase is the peak phase, when capacity is at a 
constant and pre-specified level. This phase lasts between 5 and 10 years. The 
fourth and final phase is the decline phase, when capacity declines at a 
constant rate per year until production is too low to be profitable. Thus, all 
developed reserves are divided into region, field category and vintage (phase). 
The initial allocation is based on input from an extensive database of global 
petroleum reserves in the year 2000.  
 
At the end of each year, oil companies decide how much to invest in 
developing new fields and in improved oil recovery (IOR) from existing fields 
                                                 
22 A formal description is found in Aune et al. (2005), whereas Rosendahl and Sagen (2007) 
describes the gas market modelling in more detail. 
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(see below). When new fields are developed, the stock of undeveloped 
reserves is reduced. We assume that new discoveries are made each year in 
every region and field category. The volumes of new discoveries are assumed 
to be a concave function of the expected oil price, and a linear function of the 
expected remaining undiscovered reserves. This discovery function is 
calibrated for each region so that if the oil price stays at $40 per barrel, total 
accumulated discoveries over the time horizon (i.e., until 2030) equal USGS's 
(2000) mean estimate of potential new discoveries over a 30 years period. 
 
The model includes supply of conventional oil (crude oil and NGL), and 
unconventional oil from Canada (tar sand) and Venezuela (extra heavy oil). 
 
Production in non-OPEC 
The oil production capacity in a region is by and large fixed at each point of 
time, and determined by investments in earlier years. However, production is 
not totally fixed, but can be above or below the pre-specified production 
profile if profitable. A short-term marginal cost function decides whether a 
deviation from the pre-specified profile is optimal. For non-OPEC regions we 
assume that oil supply is determined by equalizing the producer price of oil 
with the sum of marginal operating cost and gross sales taxes in each field 
category and vintage. The producer price of oil in a region is mainly 
determined by the global crude oil price and transport costs, but may also 
differ due to crude oil quality. We assume that the initial differences in 
producer prices across regions are unchanged over time. 
 
In the pre-peak and peak phase we assume that marginal operating costs are 
fairly constant (and low) except when production is very close to capacity. 
Thus, there is only a slight possibility to adjust production in these two 
phases. In the decline phase, however, marginal operating costs increase more 
rapidly as production rises. This reflects that some of the declining fields are 
approaching the end of their lifetime, and extraction is falling for a given 
operational input. That is, costs per unit production get higher, and the oil 
price level will to a larger degree affect the optimal production level. Thus, 
production is more flexible in the decline phase. Marginal operating costs are 
based on detailed information about unit costs in different types of fields in 
the most important oil producing countries. 
 
Production in OPEC 
In the model OPEC chooses a fixed price path, and we search for the price 
path that maximizes OPEC’s net present value (given some restriction on the 
form of the price path). The fixed price path assumption implies that demand 
Oil company investment and market interaction 
 220 
and non-OPEC supply are determined independently of each other, and that 
OPEC supply is solely determined by the residual demand (or call on OPEC 
oil). OPEC must therefore continually possess enough capacity so as to 
support the chosen price path (see OPEC's investment decisions below). 
 
Investment decisions in non-OPEC 
The basic incentive for oil companies is to invest in provinces and field types 
with the highest expected return. To sort out the most profitable among 
projects, net present value (NPV) is calculated for investments in each of the 
44 non-OPEC provinces/field types over the entire project lifetime at a given 
discount rate. Linear capital allowances are made over 6 years (this seems to 
be a reasonable approximation over different fiscal regimes). As explained in 
the main text, non-OPEC producers have adaptive price expectations.  
 
Oil companies continuously target the most profitable reserves. Reserves that 
are more costly to extract gradually enter as candidates for investment, and 
the cost of production will rise as the reserves are depleted. On the other hand, 
new discoveries and technological change reduce the costs of developing new 
fields. 
 
Besides investing in new fields, oil producers have the option to invest in 
improved oil recovery (IOR) from fields in the decline phase. IOR 
investments generate additional reserves and open up for increased output in 
the short- to medium-term by lifting the tale of the production profile of a 
given field. The costs of IOR investments increase as the recovery rate 
becomes higher.  
 
Risk is a factor that affects oil companies’ investment strategies. Risk can be 
political, fiscal or related to exploration and production as such. FRISBEE 
incorporates an exogenous risk premium to account for variations in risk 
assessment in different provinces and field types. The risk premium is 
expressed in terms of additional costs per barrel that is required to make the 
investment project as attractive as a risk neutral project. 
 
FRISBEE further incorporates other factors in the investment cost function, 
postulating that  
- a large current production modifies the rising trend in field development 
costs (technical, institutional learning, "materiality") 
- a large regional activity level modifies the rising trend in development 
costs (infrastructure, competitive subcontractors) 
- few undeveloped reserves increase the rising trend in development costs  
Oil company investment and market interaction 
 221 
These factors make it more attractive to stay on in an area rather than enter 
new locations with a lower degree of reserve development, as long as the 
mature area still has much undeveloped fields left.  
 
Investment decisions in OPEC 
OPEC is a residual producer filling the supply gap necessary to keep the oil 
price at the preferred level. In FRISBEE, the operational rule for OPEC is to 
invest enough in new fields and IOR to maintain a current capacity surplus of 
about 10 per cent, in order to demonstrate the ability to increase production 
and control the price level. The distribution of investments between OPEC 
Core and Rest-OPEC, and between new fields and IOR, is exogenous. 
 
Demand for oil 
We distinguish between three end-users of oil products, i.e., Manufacturing 
industry, Power generation and Others (including households). Manufacturing 
industries and Others consume both transport oil and stationary oil (including 
processing), whereas Power producers consume fuel oil. All oil products are 
bought at a regional product price, which is determined by the global crude oil 
price, transport costs and refinery costs. The end-user prices of the different 
oil products must also cover distributional costs and taxes, and will generally 
differ across end users. End-user prices and regional product prices are 
generally taken from IEA, but other sources and some guesstimates have been 
used to fill the gaps. Transport-related costs, refinery costs and taxes are held 
constant in real terms over the time horizon. Stock changes are exogenous and 
are phased out over time. 
 
Demand for oil in Manufacturing industries and Others are log-linear 
functions of population, income per capita, prices of other energy products 
and an autonomous energy efficiency improvement (AEEI), as well as 
demand in the previous year. This means that we distinguish between short- 
and long-run effects of price and income changes via an adjustment 
parameter. Between 30 and 55 per cent of the long-run effect is obtained after 
one year (varies between oil products and end-users), whereas the long-run 
price elasticity varies between -0.1 and -0.6 (weighted average is -0.19 for 
Manufacturing industries and -0.37 for Others). The price elasticities and 
adjustment parameters are mainly taken from Liu (2004). Prices of gas and 
coal are endogenous in the model, based on supply and demand in those 
markets. Demand for fuel oil in Power generation depends on unit costs for 
various power technologies.  
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Growth rates of GDP and population are exogenous in the model. Income 
elasticities are calibrated based on projections of energy demand, and vary 
between 0.1 and 1.1 in the long run (weighted average is around 0.6 for both 
Manufacturing industries and Others). Transport oil is generally about twice 
as income elastic as stationary oil. AEEI is set equal to 0.25 per cent per year 
in OECD and 0.5 per cent outside OECD.  
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Appendix B. List of regions and field categories in the FRISBEE model 
 
Field categories 
Regions 
  1   2   3   4 
Africa Onshore All 
Offshore deep 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offhore 
shallow All 
Canada Onshore All 
Unconvention
al 
All 
Offshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Caspian 
region 
Onshore 
< 400 
Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 400 Mboe 
China 
Onshore 
< 100 
Mboe 
Onshore 
>100; < 1000 
Mboe 
Onshore 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore 
All 
Eastern 
Europe 
Onshore 
< 100 
Mboe 
Onshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 100 Mboe 
Latin 
America 
Onshore 
All 
Offshore deep 
< 1000 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offhore 
shallow 
All 
OECD 
Pacific 
Onshore 
All 
Offshore deep 
All 
Offshore 
shallow 
< 100 Mboe 
Offshore 
shallow 
> 100 Mboe 
OPEC core* 
Onshore 
< 400 
Mboe 
Onshore 
>400; < 1000 
Mboe 
Onshore 
> 1000 Mboe 
Offshore 
All 
Rest-Asia 
Onshore 
< 400 
Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
< 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Rest-OPEC 
Onshore 
< 400 
Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore deep 
All 
Offhore 
shallow All 
Russia/Ukra
ine/Belarus 
Onshore 
< 400 
Mboe 
Onshore 
> 400 Mboe 
Arctic 
< 400 Mboe 
Arctic 
> 400 Mboe 
USA Onshore All 
Alaska 
All 
Offshore deep 
All 
Offhore 
shallow All 
Western 
Europe 
Offshore 
deep 
< 400 
Mboe 
Offshore deep 
> 400 Mboe 
Offshore 
shallow  
< 100 Mboe 
+ Onshore 
Offshore 
shallow  
> 100 Mboe 
 
* OPEC core consists of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, UAE and Venezuela, whereas Rest-
OPEC consists of the remaining OPEC member countries. 
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The neoclassical model of investment behaviour 
 
Tobin (1969) gave rise to one of the currently most popular models of modern 
empirical investment research. The attractiveness of this specification of 
investment behaviour has at least two sources. First, the model is simple and 
has an intuitive appeal. Second, theory implies that Q represents a sufficient 
statistic for investment, a property that has been tested in a range of empirical 
applications. Consider the profit function of a representative firm, given by: 1 
 
  )],,([)(),,( tttt
I
ttttttt eKIGIpKFpeIK +-=P       [1] 
 
F(Kt) is a well-behaved neoclassical production function, Kt represent the 
stock of fixed capital, and It is gross investment. Variable inputs are 
suppressed for simplicity of exposition. The firm puts its product at the 
market at the price pt. G(It, Kt,et) is an adjustment cost function, ptI is the price 
of investment goods, and et is a stochastic shock to the adjustment process.2 
 
The neo-classical model of investment is subject to a range of standard 
assumptions of economic theory. To summarise, the model assumes that the 
firm’s only quasi-fixed input is a single homogenous capital good and no 
adjustment costs associated with labour and other current inputs. The model 
also assumes the absence of financial policy issues and that the firm’s only 
objective is to maximise returns to risk-neutral shareholders. Moreover, our 
firm operates in competitive input and output markets with symmetric 
information, and is allowed to issue unlimited amounts of equity at 
exogenously given required rates of return.3 Finally, an implicit assumption of 
the model is separability between real and financial decisions (Modigliani and 
                                                 
1 See Bond and Van Reenen (2007) for a recent overview of microeconometric models of 
employment and investment. 
2 Observe that in a long-run approach to capital demand, we may treat capital as a variable 
input. This is equivalent to an assumption that capital services (k) can be leased in competitive 
markets at a rental price included in the vector of input prices w. Consequently, this user cost of 
capital (Jorgenson, 1963) will enter the profit function ),(( wpP=P ), and the company’s 
demand for capital services can readily be derived by Shephard’s lemma as ),( wpk
kw
=P¶ . 
Numerous studies have explored the estimation of this user cost, its sensitivity to regulation and 
tax, as well as its role for capital formation. Excellent surveys are provided by Chirinko (1993) 
and Caballero (1999). See Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer (1999) and Ellis and Price (2004) for 
recent econometric applications. 
3 The implication is that internal sources of finance (retained profits) and external sources 
finance (new share issues) are perfect substitutes. 
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Miller, 1958).4  Under these circumstances, the firm’s dynamic optimisation 
problem can be stated as: 
 
  ( )ú
û
ù
ê
ë
é
Õ= å
¥
=
+++
0
,,max
i
ititit
i
tt eIKEV b         [2] 
 
where Vt is firm value, r+= 11b  is a constant discount factor,
5 and Et[.] 
denotes the expected value conditional on information available in period t. 
Firm value as defined by Equation [2] is maximized subject the usual 
constraint on capital accumulation:  
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where d is an exogenous and fixed rate of depreciation for capital. First-order 
conditions are given by: 
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The Lagrangian multiplier ( )
11
1
-¶
¶
-= t
t
K
V
t dl  represents the shadow value of 
getting into one additional unit of capital in period t. According to Equation 
[4], profit optimisation requires the cost of acquiring additional units of 
capital in period t to be equated to the shadow value (l). Equation [4] sets this 
shadow value equal to the marginal cost of acquiring additional units capital 
in period t. The first-order condition [5] describes the relation between 
shadow values in period t and future shadow values.  
 
                                                 
4 The validity of this assumption is the subject of another influential strand of the empirical 
investment literature over the last 10 years. See Schiantarelli (1996) for an overview of the 
early contributions on the investment cash-flow relation. More recent econometric studies 
include Bond et al. (2003), Baum et al. (2006) and Jin and Jorion (2006).  
5 Irreversibility options and uncertainty over price and demand could imply an increase in the 
required rate of return. Thus, both the irreversibility theory of investment (e.g., Abel and 
Eberly, 1999) and general CAPM principles (e.g., Mossin, 1966) can be embedded in our Q 
theory of investment. 
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Linear homogeneity of the profit function implies:  
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The first-order conditions [4]-[5] are now combined with Equation [3] to 
yield: 
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Solving this equation forward we obtain for the value of the firm: 
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We now define marginal qt as the ratio of the shadow value of capital to 
purchase cost I
t
t
pt
q lº . Hayashi (1982) demonstrates that under linear 
homogeneity of the profit function marginal q equals average q.6 A useful 
implication of the Hayashi conditions is that the unobservable shadow value 
of capital can be related to an observable average q ratio, namely the ratio of 
total asset value to its replacement cost: 
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Equation [9] presents marginal qt as the ratio of Vt to the replacement cost 
value of the capital stock from the previous period. The numerator (Vt) 
represents the sum of discounted cash-flows from the existing capital stock, 
and captures changes in current and expected product prices, production 
plans, unit costs and discount rates. The denominator represents the cost of 
replacement for the capital stock. This ratio is known as Tobin’s q (Tobin 
1969), and suggests that companies with superior investment returns (high q) 
attract more capital and spend more on capital investment than 
underperforming firms. We follow the mainstream approach to adjustment 
                                                 
6 This is equivalent to constant returns to scale, a classical assumption for competitive market 
equilibria. As pointed out by Bond et al. (2005), failure of the Hayashi (1982) conditions will 
threaten the validity of the average Q model. See also Erickson and Whited (2000) for a 
thorogh discussion of problems concerning potential measurement errors. 
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costs, (e.g., Bond et al. 2005), and assume a quadratic adjustment cost 
function: 
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where b is a coefficient to represent the importance of adjustments costs. 
Equation [10] states that the unit cost of capital adjustment is a convex 
function of the investment rate, that adjustment costs kick in as soon as some 
investment threshold (a) is passed, and that the investment process is 
disturbed by stochastic shocks (et). With this specification, the first-order 
condition in Equation [4] can be modified into a simple relation between 
investments and the q ratio in company i: 
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where Qit = qit-1, and a and b are parameters of the adjustment cost function. 
Equation [A11] forms the basis for empirical specification in Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation, as well as wide range of other applied econometric studies of 
investment behaviour. See Bond and van Reenen 2007 for a recent overview. 
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Investment and uncertainty 
 
Asymmetry and uncertainty in investment behaviour is typically linked to 
contemporary extensions of the standard neoclassical model of investment. 
These modern variants of investment theory are highly relevant for oil and gas 
investment in general, and for exploration spending in particular. This 
appendix offers a brief review of the literature on irreversible investments, 
with key results illustrated in a simple two-period model. 
 
The role of uncertainty in fixed capital investment has drawn interest from 
theorists and empirical researchers for decades. A traditional view stems from 
the properties of the neoclassical production technology. Early theoretical 
contributions (e.g., Oi, 1961; Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983) stress that the 
convexity of the profit function gives rise to a “desirability for price 
instability” (Oi, 1961) effect on investment in times of increasing uncertainty. 
With convex profits, which represent the standard assumption of neo-classical 
theory of producer behaviour, any price variation may be exploited for 
optimisation. Accordingly, any increase in uncertainty will also raise the 
marginal valuation of investment, yielding a positive link between capital-
accumulation and uncertainty.  
 
Academic interest in theories of investment behaviour was spurred by 
theoretical work in the early 1980s, when Cukierman (1980), Bernanke 
(1983), McDonald and Siegel (1986) and others studied the implications of 
irreversibility and waiting options for investment decision-making. Common 
for these contributions was the idea that investment could not be reversed. 
This irreversibility provided the firms with a real option to defer investment. 
Any increase in the uncertainty around future profitability will increase the 
value of this waiting option. Accordingly, this strand of literature suggests 
that investment will respond negatively to increased uncertainty.  
 
The idea of irreversible investment is truly relevant to oil and gas investments. 
Huge capital commitments, long investment lags and field-specific sequences 
of investment decisions involve a series of waiting options. This irrevocable 
character of investment expenditure is perhaps especially salient for 
exploration activities; Once a well is spudded, there is no way back. 
Moreover, theory does not provide clear-cut answers for the role of 
uncertainty in investment behaviour. Consequently, empirical studies are 
required to clarify the issue. 
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A two-period  model of irreversible investment 
 
Drawing on Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Svensson (2000), we now illustrate 
some key points from the literature on irreversible investment in a more 
formal framework. We demonstrate how irreversibility of investment gives 
rise to a negative effect between investment and uncertainty due to the eal 
option value of deferral. Within this two-period model framework we will 
also identify, explain and discuss the asymmetric behaviour of investment 
implied by Bernanke’s (1983) bad news principle. 
 
Consider a 
 company that has to decide on a capital investment i > 0. The investment is 
irreversible. For simplicity, we assume absence of operating costs, and 
instantaneous productivity of the investment, with a known instant profit 
p0 = p. Future profit (pt) can take two values: high profit (pth = fp) which 
occurs with probability q, or low profit (ptl = xp) which occurs with 
probability 1-q, where f > 1 > x. We also assume that investment return in 
the bad state is lower than the user cost of capital (ri), and that all uncertainty 
disappears after one period. The net present value of investing today may now 
be stated as: 
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With irreversibility, V0 > 0 is not a sufficient investment signal. The company 
may still not invest. The reason is that with uncertainty and irreversibility, the 
bad outcome (ptl = xp) may fall short of the cost of capital. No company wants 
to commit to unprofitable projects. With this potential outcome, the company 
may rather postpone the project to learn more about the determinants of future 
profits. The net present value of waiting one period and investing if future 
profits are high is: 
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The company will invest today if and only if V0 > V1, i.e. if the net present 
value of investing today dominates the net present value of investing 
tomorrow, including the value of the waiting option. The implication is also 
that it takes more than a positive net present value to trigger an irreversible 
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investment decision. In other words, the real option value of waiting creates a 
wedge between the trigger value and the traditional net present value. To 
illustrate this more precisely, we note that the net present value of investing 
today may be stated as: 
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Moreover, the waiting option has a value only for the case where investment 
should not have been undertaken in period 1. In other words, waiting has no 
value if immediate investment would have been profitable anyway. Therefore, 
the net present value of waiting one period and investing if future profits are 
high is given by: 
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The company will invest today if and only if V0 > V1, i.e. if: 
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Equating V0 to V1 now yields: 
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Solving for p to gives us the critical level of profit (p*) that will trigger 
investment: 
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Equation [7] has a user cost interpretation, and illustrates that it pays to invest 
in the current period only if the first period return exceeds the user cost 
(ir/(1+r)) by a margin large enough to compensate for a possible irreversible 
unsuccessful investment. This decision rule illustrates not only the role of the 
waiting option in investment decision-making, but also the negative relation 
between investment and uncertainty. In our model framework, a mean-
preserving increase in uncertainty will have to imply an increase in x. For 
investment to take place, this would require a higher current profit treshold, 
and investment would therefore tend down. 
 
Bernanke (1983) was one of the first studies to stress the asymmetry 
implications of irreversibility in the popular “bad news principle of 
irreversible investments – that of possible future outcomes, only the 
unfavourable ones have a bearing on the current propensity to undertake a 
project” (Bernanke 1983, p. 91). The bad news principle reflects the fact 
that the decision to invest is made in such a way as to expose the 
company to good outcomes and reduce exposure to bad outcomes. The 
bad news principle can also be illustrated in the above formal framework. 
Observe that news concerning the possible realisation of high profit 
(E0[p | p = p l] = fp) is irrelevant for the investment decision rule represented 
by Equation [7]. The economic interpretation is that the option to wait has no 
value in situations where direct investment would have been the optimal 
decision (V1 < V0). An appealing application to oil and gas exploration is that 
news about oil price increases are irrelevant for the value of the option to 
wait. On the other hand, news about oil price reductions will increase the 
value of this option, and put a restriction on current exploration activities. 
This is one of the hypotheses will that might be tested empirically in an 
econometric model of exploration activity (e.g., Mohn and Osmundsen, 
2007). 
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Endogeneity issues in dynamic panel data models1 
 
There are a variety of reasons for the development whereby application of 
panel data for empirical studies of producer behaviour has become 
widespread. As opposed to cross-sectional data for several firms, panel data 
includes information for multiple time periods, granting the opportunity for 
estimation of dynamic models. Compared to pure time series data, panel data 
models escape from potential aggregation bias (e. g., Nickell, 1981), and also 
allows for the investigation of heterogeneity at the firm level.  
 
With panel data at hand, dynamic model specifications have a range of 
economic applications. Examples include empirical models of economic 
growth, Euler equations for individual consumption, and adjustment cost 
models of input demands at the firm level. Dynamic model specifications may 
also be required in the presence of autoregressive errors in the standard static 
model, and may therefore be applied even when the coefficient on lagged 
endogenous does not occur from the outset. 
 
The below exposition provides a brief overview of the rationale behind the 
special estimators for dynamic panel data models, with a special emphasis on 
the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimators applied in Chapters 4 
and 5 of this thesis. A comprehensive and rigorous survey is provided by 
Arellano (2003). This summary draws on Bond (2002), who provides a nice 
introduction to dynamic panel data methods, as well as a guide to 
contemporary methods and practice. 
 
The point of departure for our formal discussion is the following simple 
AR(1) model:2 
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where yit is the variable we would like to explain, yit-1 is its value lagged one 
period, and a is an autoregressive coefficient, bound to [-1,1]. Unobserved 
(time-invariant) heterogeneity is captured by the individual-specific time-
                                                 
1 For excellent comments and suggestions to this appendix, I thank (without implying) 
Frank Asche at the University of Stavanger and Terje Skjerpen at Statistics Norway. 
2 For simplicity of exposition, the key ideas are illustrated for this simple model 
without exogenous covariates (xit). However, all results are robust to extensions in 
terms of additional explanatory variables.  
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invariant effect hi, and vit is a genuine disturbance term with standard white-
noise properties. Observe also that the typical panel data set for 
microeconometric studies involves a large number of individuals over a 
relatively small time period. Consequently, asymptotic properties are usually 
considered for a fixed T, with N approaching infinity.  
 
In line with the standard panel data literature (e.g., Arrellano 2003, ch. 6), we 
treat the fixed-effects part of the error (hi) of our model as a stochastic 
variable. This means that fixed effects will be correlated with the lagged 
dependent variable (yit-1). At the same time, we assume that the true 
disturbances (vit) are serially uncorrelated. The implication is a correlation 
between the lagged dependent variable (yit-1) and the gross error term (hi + vit ) 
which is quite robust to sample size. Standard OLS estimates are therefore 
inconsistent, and Bond (2002) demonstrates that an upward bias is implied by 
this misspecification, at least for large samples. 
 
The standard approach is to remove this inconsistency by the application of 
the so-called fixed-effects estimator, whereby the model variables are 
measured as deviations from their unit-specific means. By this transformation 
the fixed effects are eliminated from the estimation. OLS is then normally 
used to estimate these transformed equations. However, a non-negligible 
correlation can be shown to prevail between lagged dependent variable and 
the error term also in the transformed fixed-effects equation. Based on the 
model in Equation A3.1, the transformed lagged endogenous variable is given 
by: 
 
 )......( 11111 --- ++++- TitiiTti yyyy ,  
 
whereas the transformed error term is: 
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It follows that the component 1-
-
T
y it of the first term will now be correlated with 
vit of the second term. In a similar fashion, 1
1
-
- -
T
v ti of the second term is 
correlated with yit-1 in the first term. Other positive correlations will be 
dominated by these two negative correlations, implying that the correlation 
between the lagged endogenous variable and the error term in the transformed 
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model is negative (Nickell, 1981). Again, Bond (2002) demonstrates that the 
fixed-effect estimator produces estimates with a downward bias.3 
 
A variety of instrumental variable techniques have been developed to handle 
the endogeneity bias of dynamic panel data models. Anderson and Hsiao 
(1981) propose a 2SLS estimator for the differenced model transformation 
( ititit vyy D+D=D -1a ), with instruments that are correlated with the 
transformed lagged dependent variable and orthogonal to the differenced error 
term. Lagged levels of the lagged dependent variables are valid instruments to 
obtain consistent estimates of the dynamic model, according to this approach. 
Applying the general method of moments (GMM) to a first-difference 
framework for labour demand, Arellano and Bond (1991) show that longer 
lags of the dependent variables are also valid instrumental variables.  
 
A problem with the original Arellano Bond framework is that lagged levels of 
the dependent variable is a poor instrument for first differences of highly 
persistent time series, and especially for variables that are close to a random 
walk.4 To make up for this deficiency, Arellano and Bover (1995) 
demonstrate that additional orthogonality conditions may be provided by the 
inclusion of the original level equations in the system of equations to be 
estimated, with significant efficiency gains. This estimator is referred to as the 
system GMM estimator, and is further developed by Blundell and Bond 
(1998), and Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer (2000).  We continue our 
overview with a brief introduction to this class of GMM estimators.  
 
 
The Generalised Method of Moments 
 
The key idea behind the class of GMM estimators is that any statistical 
moment of the data sample has its counterpart in the population. This analogy 
is then applied to justify sample moments as estimators of underlying 
population parameters. A simple example may be applied to the random 
                                                 
3 Observe that the bias is of order 1/(T-1), implying that the fixed-effect estimator is consistent 
for large T panels. This property is utilised in Chapter 2 of this Thesis, where dynamic panel 
data models for a narrow panel of exploration data is estimated by OLS. 
4 Persistent time series are defined by the role of history for their development, with positive 
correlation between current and lagged values. As an example, consider the simple AR(1) 
process: 
ttt vyy += -1a . Subtracting yt-1 from both sides now yields: tttt vyyy +-=- -- 11 )1(a . 
Consequently, as the autoregressive coefficient a approaches 1, Dyt (= yt – yt-1) will approach a 
random walk (vt). In general, a random walk process (I(0)) for the difference implies that the 
level of the same variable is integrated of degree 1 (I(1)).  
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variable yit of our model, as represented by Equation A3.1. Letting m represent 
the mean of the distribution of yit, the expectation for this variable may be 
stated as: 
 
.][ m=tiyE                   [A3.2] 
 
To estimate the population average, we may now carry on by forming the 
sample analog to the population expectation: 
 
.0][ =- mtiyE                  [A3.3] 
 
The empirical moment condition now turns out as the sample analog to the 
population expectation: 
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and an estimator for m is provided by the value of mˆ that satisfies the sample 
moment condition of Equation A3.3. 
 
A seemingly different example can be illustrated within the framework of the 
(biased) OLS estimator for the autoregressive parameter of Equation A3.1.  A 
critical assumption for the OLS estimator to be unbiased is: 
 
,0)]([][ 111 =-= --- itiitiit yyyEvyE a                [A3.4] 
 
which also has its sample equivalent in:  
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What Equation A3.4 illustrates is that the OLS estimator also may be viewed 
as a GMM estimator. However, I have already argued that a problem with 
dynamic panel data models is that both OLS and the fixed-effects estimator are 
biased, because the lagged endogenous variable (yit-1) is correlated with the 
error term (vit). Formally speaking, this implies a violation of a critical 
assumption for the OLS estimator, as implied by Equation A3.4.  
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The general response to this problem is a variety of instrumental variable 
techniques. Instruments typically include lagged levels (yt-2, yt-3, … ) and/or 
changes (Dyt-2, Dyt-3, … ) of the dependent variable. The GMM method was 
introduced for this purpose by Hansen (1982), whereas augmentation in a 
first-difference framework was provided by Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen 
(1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991).5 The set of instruments suggested 
Arellano Bond (1991) includes additional lags of the dependent variable. 
Drawing directly on the exposition of Bond (2002), the core of modern GMM 
estimators for dynamic panel data models involves a matrix of instrumental 
variables (Zi) of the form:  
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The rows of the instrument matrix corresponds to the first-differenced 
equations for t = 2, 3, . . ., T for observation unit i. A requirement for the 
validity of the instrument matrix Zt is given by the orthogonality condition: 
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where Dvi = (Dvi2, Dvi3, . . . , DviT)´. This requirement also forms the moment 
conditions for the GMM estimator, which basically minimises the criterion: 
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where the weighting matrix WN is defined as: 
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5 An alternative strategy to handle dynamic panel bias is proposed by Kiviet (1995), who 
recommends the fixed-effects estimator, followed by a correction for bias, which he finds can 
be predicted with surprising precision. However, as noted by Roodman (2006), this approach 
works only for balanced panels and does also not address the potential endogeneity of other 
regressors. 
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ivˆD represent estimates of the first-differenced residual from a preliminary 
consistent estimator. This approach is called the two-step GMM for dynamic 
panel data models. Observe that this estimator involves estimation uncertainty 
in both stages of the estimation procedure, first in the estimation of first-
differenced residuals for the weighting matrix (cf. Equation [A3.9]), and then 
in conjunction with the estimation of the model parameters (cf. Equation 
[A3.8]) after having inserted the estimated of the weighting matrix. These 
sources of uncertainty are also erosive for the asymptotical properties of the 
two-step estimator. Simulation studies also suggest that the two-step estimator 
tends to produce standard errors with a downward bias, especially in small 
samples (e.g., Bond and Windmeijer, 2002). 
 
In this context, it is therefore useful to note that homoskedasticity in the 
disturbance terms (vit) allows an asymptotically equivalent GMM estimator to 
be obtained in one step, if the weight matrix in A3.9 is replaced with a simpler 
version: 
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where H is a (T-2) square matrix with 2’s on the diagonals, -1’s on the first 
sub-diagonals, and zeros elsewhere. In this simplified approach, WN* does not 
depend on any estimated parameters, and hence there is only one source of 
estimation uncertainty. Simulation studies have shown that the costs of this 
simplified method are modest, and that the efficiency gains of the two-step 
approach are limited, even in the presence of substantial heteroskedasticity 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Blundell, Bond, and Windmeijer, 2000). 
Simulations on identical samples also indicate that one-step estimates produce 
more precise estimates than the above-mentioned two-step procedure.6 
Consequently, the one-step approach is the most popular one in empirical 
applications of GMM estimators for dynamic panel data. 
 
Issues of over-identification arise when the number of instruments exceeds the 
number of parameters to be estimated (i.e., when T > 2). When this is the 
case, the assumptions made to obtain the moment conditions (A3.7) can be 
tested with a so-called GMM test of over-identifying restrictions (Sargan, 
                                                 
6 A more comprehensive discussion of these issues is offered by Windmeijer (2005), who also 
propose a compensating small-sample correction procedure. This correction procedure is 
applied to calculate robust standard errors in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
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1958; 2000). The basis for this test is the property that under the null that the 
over-identifying restrictions are valid, NJN (cf. A3.8) has an asymptotic c2 
distribution.  However, as noted by Roodman (2006), the traditional Sargan 
statistic is sensitive to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, and tends to 
over-reject in the presence of either. An increasingly common approach is 
therefore to report the more robust Hansen (1982) statistic as a test for the 
exogeneity properties of the instrument matrix.7 Note also that similar 
procedures are available for tests of no serial correlation in the disturbances. 
Alternative and supplementary approaches to hypothesis testing are discussed 
in more detail by Bond and Windmeijer (2002). 
 
These GMM estimators are straightforward to compute, as the applied 
moment conditions (A3.8) are linear in the parameter of interest (a ). Quite 
easily, they may also be expanded to include additional explanatory variables, 
for instance strictly exogenous variables. Consequently, the GMM estimator 
described above has become increasingly popular, and today it stands out as 
the standard work horse of contemporary studies of dynamic panel data. 
Again, interested readers are referred to Bond (2002) for a less compact 
introduction, and to Arellano (2003) for a comprehensive and rigorous 
overview. 
 
                                                 
7 In this context, the so-called Hansen statistic is the minimised value of the two-step GMM 
criterion function (Hansen, 1982). 
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